Hidden Treasures.
Mapping Europe’s sources
of competitive advantage
in doing business. CEPS Paperback 2019 by Klaff, Donald & Renda, Andrea
 
C
EP
S  
H
id
de
n 
Tr
ea
su
re
s
Europe is often presented as a declining global power, in which red 
tape, incumbency interests and governance flaws hamper economic 
performance, innovation and productivity. In fact, Europe has done 
very well despite the wide array of America’s competitive advantages – 
and its ‘hidden treasures’ partially explain this anomaly. In the future, 
while cracks in the fabric of US society and the American approach to 
entrepreneurship may widen, Europe and its entrepreneurs can build on 
their strengths.
This book, a joint effort between Donald Kalff and Andrea Renda, 
with contributions from Willem Pieter De Groen, Karel Lannoo, Felice 
Simonelli, Nadina Iacob and Jacques Pelkmans, aims at identifying 
and exploring Europe’s ‘hidden treasures’, often neglected competitive 
advantages that could, if adequately nurtured, bring the ‘Old Continent’ 
back to the forefront of the global order.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Europe is often presented as a declining global power, in which red 
tape, incumbency interests and governance flaws hamper economic 
performance, innovation and productivity. Part of this can be traced 
back to the inherent challenge and ambition of the European 
integration project; but also to external factors, including the rise of 
the United States as a global superpower during the 20th century, 
and the worldwide diffusion of ideas, especially in politics and 
economics, that had seldom originated in Europe, or that were 
tailored to its particular legal, economic and social traditions. Until 
recently, Europe has sought to carve out its model and role in global 
governance by mimicking many US policy approaches: shareholder 
capitalism, deregulation and unconstrained movement of capital. 
As the global community increasingly sees the rise of protectionist 
stances, and a growing inability to face emerging challenges such as 
sustainable development and the breath-taking rise of disruptive 
digital technologies, Europe should seek to burnish its best qualities 
to reclaim its position in the global order, to the benefit of all. The 
prospect of Brexit, while certainly not favourable for the Union, 
paradoxically opens up new opportunities to face emerging 
challenges with a greater degree of cohesion. 
This book, a joint effort between Donald Kalff and Andrea 
Renda and benefiting from the contribution of CEPS researchers 
and a number of very helpful discussants, aims at identifying and 
exploring Europe’s ‘hidden treasures’, competitive advantages 
often covered by dust that could, if adequately nurtured, bring the 
‘Old Continent’ back to the forefront of the global order. In our 
approach, a hidden treasure must meet specific characteristics: in 
particular, it should be a feature of the economy, legal system or 
legal tradition of the EU or a subset of its member states, which was 
(or is) receiving insufficient attention in public policy, and which 
has the potential to increase Europe’s competitiveness and overall 
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positioning in the global context. Uncovering and promoting 
hidden treasures is a timely and much-needed exercise, as the EU 
approaches its post-elections transition and the global governance 
context appears to be changing rapidly, shaping a new playing field 
in which Europe has no obvious allies, and is increasingly 
challenged by superpowers with different, if not diverging, 
priorities. 
Our findings show that Europe’s unique balance between 
freedom, justice and fairness provides a solid basis for identifying 
hidden treasures. For example, we consider that the conspicuous 
advantages offered by continental European contract law, starting 
with the good faith requirement in in contract formation, have not 
been sufficiently capitalised on, which may have contributed to the 
overall belief that the EU legal system is inherently less efficient 
than the US one. The main obstacles that can be identified are the 
inefficiency of the judiciary in many countries, the cost of access to 
justice for smaller firms and citizens, and the lack of a robust set of 
rules protecting the interests of smaller contractors in relational 
contracts. This is why we believe that the EU should consider taking 
action to promote the use of civil law, improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of legal institutions, and remove the remaining obstacles 
to trade in the single market. 
Moreover, as is widely known in the EU financial institutions, 
banks form the most important source of external financing for 
companies, whereas in the US the capital markets contribute more 
to the financing of corporations and the broader economy. As we 
explore in Chapter 2, most European banks adhere to the 
‘relationship model’, in sharp contrast to the ‘transaction model’ 
that dominates in the US. This lets them gain deep insights into the 
history and prospects of their clients as well as their markets and 
competitors, and to play an important role in helping clients 
upgrade their investment programmes by backing or rejecting 
investment proposals. The contribution of relationship banking to 
the economy as a whole is real and should be more strongly 
emphasised at the EU level, and highlighted as an opportunity and 
a source of competitiveness for Europe, rather than as a 
cumbersome legacy of the past.  
Furthermore, researchers have started to uncover the 
existence of a fundamental trade-off between mainstream corporate 
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governance and the ability of a firm to innovate and successfully 
address societal challenges. This has resulted in mounting criticism 
of the ‘Shareholder Model’ typical of US capitalism, mostly coming 
from inside the US and the UK. What emerges is that both 
shareholder and stakeholder capitalism feature problems, as 
exemplified by American and German corporate disasters. And 
indeed, in Europe, the most advanced companies have moved 
beyond these standard models, a fact that deserves to be brought 
into the limelight. These developments are helping to delineate a 
distinct ‘European Enterprise Model’, which puts the creation of 
economic value, rather than the generation of profit, at centre stage. 
Such an organisational form features dispersed leadership 
combined with a heavy emphasis on the quality of decision making. 
It can only be managed based on principles, not rules. Its culture is 
characterised by fairness, both internally and when dealing with 
suppliers, customers and partners. And all this is enshrined in 
articles of association that become the corporate constitution. 
Much in the same vein, the EU has a real chance to build a 
new approach to innovation and competition, more inclusive and 
oriented towards sustainable development and well-being. This 
will take political courage and coordinated action with member 
states, some of which score very highly in global innovation 
rankings. One opportunity to uncover this innovation potential is 
provided by the upcoming transition to “mission-oriented 
innovation policy” in the future Horizon Europe, the EU’s 
€100 billion research and innovation programme: within that 
context, Europe should help small and large companies, universities 
and government research organisations to forge tailor-made 
coalitions, powered by trust as a basis for cooperation.  
Within this context, European patents may be used as a true 
‘quality seal’: obtaining a European patent should become a way to 
escape from the ‘noise’ generated by bad quality patents around the 
world. This can improve patent justice and certainty, particularly 
for small and medium-sized companies, and restore the patent 
system in Europe as a catalyst for innovation efforts and investment. 
In the neighbouring area of competition law, there is a growing 
divergence between US and EU rules. During her mandate, 
Commissioner Vestager seems to have spotted a hidden treasure: an 
extremely rich set of national experiences that extends the reach of 
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competition-related rules way beyond the remit of Article 102 
TFEU. Rather than being an obstacle, this now appears as an 
opportunity, to be reaped especially in key sectors such as retail 
commerce, agri-food, and the platform economy, and to be 
expanded to other sectors such as biotech, new materials and 
nanotechnology.  
We also see potential treasures in the way the EU deals with 
taxation and corruption. In Europe, minimum standards have been 
achieved on the quality of tax codes and tax rulings, and the 
handling of tax filings is more efficient in comparison with the US. 
Europe’s tax treasure, however, remains hidden due to the great 
heterogeneity of tax regimes and, most importantly, the overall lack 
of cooperation between member states, which leaves numerous 
loopholes. The move towards a common consolidated corporate tax 
base, coupled with the deployment of RegTech for regulatory 
monitoring and compliance purposes, could help Europe exploit the 
quality of its tax system to the benefit of all. More generally, Europe 
is better placed than most when it comes to effective policymaking 
as well as doing business: however, while the legal instruments and 
institutions to prevent and fight corruption are available in all 
member states, enforcement in many of them is insufficient. The 
direct cost of corruption in the EU of up to a trillion euros per year 
needs to be brought down without delay. 
Europe also has a chance to lead the global community thanks 
to its primacy in trade policy, and its emerging leadership in the 
regulation of emerging digital technologies. EU trade policy is 
already a sparkling gem, but additional policy coherence would 
make the EU a potential leader in ‘responsible globalisation’. And 
on digital technologies such as artificial intelligence, blockchain, the 
internet of things and 5G, Europe can claim to possess three 
advantages: a solid, comprehensive legal framework; the size of its 
single market; and a potential for leadership in the global quest for 
fundamental rights and sustainable development, at a time when 
the US is backtracking and China does not yet appear ready to lead. 
Establishing a comprehensive policy framework to enable the 
contribution of digital technologies to the Sustainable Development 
Goals would be optimal in placing the EU as global leader both in 
the SDG arena, as well as in the technological one. 
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These are our main findings. But we believe that the list could 
be much longer, and the treasure trove much richer. Most 
importantly, we believe that Europe’s unique balance between 
freedom (‘of’, not ‘from’), justice and fairness can make it the perfect 
place for the next generation of capitalism. Fairness, reasonableness, 
good faith, pre- and post-contractual obligations are time-tested 
principles and part of the heritage of continental Europe. These 
principles are enshrined in many laws and regulations. They give 
guidance to individuals, small, medium-sized and large companies 
in their different roles as customer, supplier and partner. They also 
provide the basis for most of the hidden treasures: in contract 
formation, in dealings between tax officials and taxpayers, in 
financing small enterprises, in the ‘European Enterprise Model’, in 
joint efforts to innovate, in granting patents, in competition law and 
enforcement and in the EU trade agreements. The fight against 
corruption can be seen as crucial to protecting these principles, just 
as the export of European standards is essential so as to spread them 
around the world. 
This book also shows that these principles are vital in meeting 
the economic challenges of our time: insufficient investment, lack of 
socially relevant innovation, and slowing productivity growth. The 
book shows that the ‘Shareholder Model’ of capitalism fails 
conspicuously on all three fronts. The EU-27 offers an ideal 
environment for alternative enterprise models that can make a 
positive difference. Pursuit of the creation of economic value, rather 
than short-term profit, unshackles investments. And the counter-
argument that well-designed financial markets would incorporate 
long-term economic value in their fundamentals is not convincing: 
financial markets are far from perfect, and incorporate imperfect 
signals, biases and herd behaviour to an extent that their ability to 
provide correct information signals is questionable at best.  
Our book also leads to two additional, essential findings 
related to technology and sustainability. On the one hand, Europe 
can harness the potential of digital technology ‘for good’, by setting 
ethical and policy standards through the sheer size of its single 
market, as well as through procurement, certification and trade 
policy. Europe’s ‘secret sauce’ on digital technology can fill an 
existing gap in global governance, and help the Old Continent find 
room for its approach to economic policy at the global level. This is 
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crucially related to Europe’s ability to treat technology as a means, 
not an end: in this respect, the upcoming ethical guidelines on 
artificial intelligence and the observed effectiveness of legislation 
such as the General Data Protection Regulation and on platform-to-
business trading practices will be essential to gauging Europe’s 
ability to play a decisive role in this expanding arena.  
This also leads to a more general consideration regarding the 
broader, long-term picture. Looking at current trends such as the 
resurgence of nationalism in politics, deterioration in the rule of law 
(also in some European countries), new protectionist stances and 
tariff wars in trade, short-termism in social policy and recurring 
denials of climate change, the SDG agreement reached in September 
2015 by 193 countries seems to belong to a distant era. In the absence 
of any strong political will, the pursuit of the SDGs looks more 
dependent on technological breakthroughs and global private 
initiatives than on the alignment of governmental agendas in the 
leading blocs. Recent reports have confirmed that, with the 
exception of Scandinavian countries, all high-income countries are 
far from a trajectory that would lead them to achieve the 17 goals, 
and they struggle in particular with the four objectives related to 
sustainable consumption and production patterns, climate action, 
aquatic life and life on land.  
To date, the EU has not shown sufficient ability to step up its 
efforts. In a recent stocktaking exercise of the past five years, 
Eurostat found slow progress in certain areas of sustainable 
development and a worrying rise in inequality. It is now time to 
shift gear: the financial crisis is over, the Silicon Valley model is 
plateauing, and the world is witnessing the rise of less democratic, 
less open forces in both developed and developing countries, as 
well as in the private sector. The Old Continent can push back 
against these worrying trends.  
We believe Europe’s hidden treasures offer an essential, 
compelling starting point to rethink Europe by retrieving its lost 
identity and strengthening its self-confidence. 
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HIDDEN TREASURES:  
MAPPING EUROPE’S SOURCES OF  
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN DOING 
BUSINESS 
Policymakers and businessmen often present Europe very 
negatively when it comes to entrepreneurship and innovation: a 
land of red tape, a deadly mix of precaution and bureaucracy where 
doing business is difficult, if not impossible. This is reflected in 
various slogans and declarations, aimed at highlighting Europe’s 
embedded risk-aversion and strong suspicion of innovation;1 the 
deep entrenchment of incumbent interests (Guinea and Erixon, 
2019); and the under-development of non-banking sources of 
finance such as venture capital. Commentators often point at the 
United States as the land of innovation and ‘ease of doing business’, 
in which companies can grow faster and become more profitable on 
the basis of a wider spectrum of possibilities for early and mature 
stage funding. Silicon Valley has taken on mythical proportions as 
echoed in countless speeches and presentations, while the 
innovation-friendliness of regulatory agencies, Congress and even 
the Supreme Court are highlighted as sources of superior 
competitiveness on the other side of the Atlantic (Epstein, Landes 
and Posner, 2017). The almost uncontested supremacy of US tech 
giants such as Apple, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Amazon has 
generated significant envy in Europe, leading politicians to ask 
themselves why Europe was not able to spawn such dynamic new 
firms.2  
One of the corollaries of this theorem is that Europe should 
simplify its laws and align them with the more agile and dynamic 
US legal framework. Indeed, the past decades have witnessed 
attempts to achieve stronger regulatory convergence between the 
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US and Europe, based on the underlying belief that the two blocs 
were similar enough, and complementary enough, to warrant an 
even closer relationship (Hamilton and Pelkmans, 2015). The 
negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(between 2013 and 2016) have, however, revealed significant 
differences both in horizontal, cross-cutting policies, as well as in 
sectoral legislation and in the overall enforcement of legal rules: a 
divergence that, especially on the US side, was interpreted as a sign 
of the superiority of the US legal and regulatory system vis-à-vis the 
older, less competitive EU one. This prejudice is equally present in 
Europe and the United States, and has spread throughout the global 
business community, where the US legal system is very influential, 
if not predominant. The intimate relation between the origins of 
contract law in UK common law and the lex mercatoria (merchant 
law) and the strong influence of the Anglo-Saxon tradition in the 
development of international law and policy (through the 
‘Washington Consensus’) have left traces on the perception of 
common law as a superior framework for doing business. Since the 
mid-1960s, some US scholars also started to highlight the alleged 
superior tendency of common law towards economic efficiency 
(Posner, 1972). Based on this view, in a nutshell, Europe should take 
the US as a model, and its regulatory framework as an agenda.  
At the same time, the ongoing disruption in international 
politics and global governance is signalling a time of unrest and 
unease in the United States as well. President Trump’s “Make 
America Great” agenda came with the stated desire to deconstruct 
the administrative state, and pull the US out of important global and 
regional accords such as NAFTA, the TPP and COP21. Fears that 
China may, and ultimately will overtake the US as the world’s 
largest economy are tangible and palpable in the US, and this is 
producing more protectionism and a resurgence of old-style 
industrial policy through market bans (recently, with Chinese tech 
giant Huawei) and trade tariffs.  
In such a fast-changing environment, the United States seem 
to be discovering the limits of their own highly-praised economic 
and regulatory model. In a widely read NBER paper, Gutierrez 
Gallardo and Philippon (2017) observe that while until the 1990s US 
markets were more competitive than European markets, today 
European markets display lower concentration, lower excess 
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profits, and lower regulatory barriers to entry. In an earlier 
contribution, Vogel (2012) explained how Europe came to become a 
leader in risk regulation and governance, and Wiener et al. (2011; 
but see also IRGC, 2017) ended up largely dismantling the myth that 
Europe is allergic to risk and innovation. Recent regulatory 
innovations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
and the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence 
show signs of a renewed EU ambition to become a ‘norm leader’ at 
the global level. From an entrepreneurial perspective, it is indeed 
remarkable that many European businesses managed to remain 
competitive on world markets, despite the wide range of 
competitive advantages enjoyed by American companies: a large 
homogeneous home market, a largely integrated legal and fiscal 
system, a common language and low energy costs.3 
Against this background, the jury is out as to whether Europe 
is experiencing a time of renaissance, or a phase of inevitable, even 
irreversible decadence. The patchy and complex process of 
economic and social integration and the difficulty in responding to 
mounting global competition have led Europe to gradually lose 
sight of a number of precious legacy and prospective advantages 
over its global competitors: such advantages mostly refer to the 
robustness of Europe’s set of values and its institutional setup. Some 
of them appear in vibrant relief, whereas many are only visible in a 
few member states; and others are simply covered by dust, waiting 
for someone to rediscover them. This is what this book seeks to 
achieve, by shedding light on ten “treasures” that Europe can 
rediscover and rely upon to restore a more sustainable growth. Such 
treasures encompass a wide spectrum of topics such as the overall 
quality of the legal system (Chapter 1), the patterns and traditions 
of corporate finance and governance (Chapters 2-3); the dynamics 
of innovation and more specifically the untapped potential of EU 
patents (Chapters 4-5); the quality and direction of competition 
rules (Chapter 6); the framework for taxation and the relative lack 
of widespread corruption (Chapters 7-8); Europe’s possible future 
enhanced role as a trade superpower (Chapter 9) and, last but not 
least, its ability to become a norm leader in emerging high-tech 
markets (Chapter 10).  
In developing our thoughts on Europe’s hidden treasures, we 
were supported by colleagues and friends who ended up sharing, if 
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not all the details, at least the spirit and direction of our research. In 
particular, we wish to acknowledge the collaboration of several 
CEPS researchers, including Karel Lannoo (Chapters 3 and 7); 
Willem Pieter de Groen (Chapter 2); Jacques Pelkmans (Chapter 9); 
Felice Simonelli and Nadina Iacob (Chapter 8). We also thank a 
number of friends and colleagues from EU institutions, who offered 
comments on selected hidden treasures at various moments since 
we decided, in July 2018, to embark into this adventure. They 
include Arnaldo Abruzzini, Nicholas Ashford, Annemieke van der 
Beek, Helena Braun, Filomena Chirico, Frank Heemskerk, Paul 
Nemitz, Stephan Raes, Joachim Schwerin, Luc Soete, Pawel 
Swieboda, Lucio Vinhas de Souza, John Zysman and all the 
participants at the session on Hidden Treasures we organised 
during the CEPS Ideas Lab in February 2019.  
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1. THE LEGAL SYSTEM:  
UNCOVERING EU ADVANTAGES  
The quality of the legal system is a globally recognised driver of 
growth. The efficiency and effectiveness of the civil justice system, 
the quality of legal institutions and the independence of the 
judiciary are included among the most important preconditions for 
growth. For example, in 1990, Mancur Olson observed that “a 
society cannot have much borrowing and lending or obtain many 
of the other gains from mutually advantageous trade unless 
individuals and firms have the right to make contracts with one 
another that will be impartially enforced”. And in the same year, 
Douglass North argued that “the inability of societies to develop 
effective, low cost enforcement is the most important source of both 
historical and contemporary under-development in the Third 
World”. Similarly, indicators such as the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators have sharpened our understanding of how 
the quality of institutions and the certainty generated by a strong 
rule of law can have a positive impact on economic development. 
Recent studies such as Han et al. (2014) showed that good 
governance, including regulatory and institutional quality and the 
control of corruption, is associated with both a higher level of per 
capita GDP as well as higher rates of GDP growth over time (Han, 
Khan and Zhuang, 2014).  
Against this background, Europe still presents a 
heterogeneous landscape when it comes to the quality of the legal 
framework, as testified by the World Bank’s Doing Business reports, 
as well as the EU Justice Scoreboard.4 Among the most evident 
challenges Europe faces, the most widely acknowledged are the 
difficulty in achieving coordination and suitable rules in the EU’s 
complex multi-level governance; the mix of legal cultures featured 
by member states; the lack of a fully fledged single market when it 
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comes to basic aspects of transactions such as redress and even 
parcel delivery; the lack of reliable and speedy judicial remedies in 
some member states; the presence of corruption in a subset of EU 
countries; and, obviously, the language barriers faced by citizens 
and businesses. Under these layers of dust, however, our first 
treasure is hidden: the inherent quality of the EU legal system can 
become, with adequate support, a driver of future growth and 
investment.  
1.1 Common law versus civil law: an endless querelle 
Is the legal system in the EU designed in a way that tends, over time, 
towards the selection of more efficient, business-friendly rules? In 
academia, a dispute has emerged since the 1960s on whether 
common law jurisdictions, such as the US and the UK, are more 
conducive towards efficiency than civil law jurisdictions. This 
debate can shed some light on the possible future efficiency 
orientation of the EU legal system, especially if Brexit leads the EU 
to strengthen its civil law dimension. At risk of oversimplification,5 
in this chapter we assume that the EU legal system post-Brexit could 
move towards a civil law system.6 
Table 1. Example of common and civil law countries 
Common 
Law 
French Civil 
Law 
German Civil 
Law 
Scandinavian 
Civil Law 
England and 
Wales France Germany Sweden 
USA Italy Austria Norway 
Canada Spain Switzerland Denmark 
Australia Portugal Japan Iceland 
New Zealand Belgium South Korea Finland 
India Netherlands Taiwan  
Nigeria Romania Slovenia  
Malaysia Brazil   
Singapore Argentina   
Ireland Mexico   
Burma Chile   
Jamaica Angola   
Barbados Egypt   
Zimbabwe Lebanon   
Pakistan Turkey   
Source: Garoupa et al. (2014). 
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There is a lot of literature on the comparison between civil law 
and common law from the standpoint of efficiency, fuelled by the 
writings of Richard Posner and others in the 1960s in the United 
States, mostly as part of the rise of the so-called law and economics 
movement (Posner, 1972; Parisi, 2004; Renda, 2011; Calabresi, 2017). 
Posner’s argument mostly rested on the idea that judges, lacking 
other criteria to solve disputes, would rely on Paretian efficiency 
tests (such as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency); whereas the more rigidly 
codified rules in civil law would not allow for such an exercise 
(Rubin, 1977; Deffains, 2011). Posner pushed his argument so far 
that he advocated the transformation of the United States into a 
“cost-benefit state”, in which every interaction between the public 
sector and private market forces would be triggered by (potential) 
Pareto efficiency considerations. Posner’s views, as well as those of 
other influential Chicago School economists such as Milton 
Friedman, were very influential, and permeated the global debate 
on the nature and shape of international private law, which still 
incorporates key dimensions of common law systems (Picker, 2008).  
These views were also later echoed by other authors in the 
corporate governance and finance domains, as will be explained in 
more detail below, in Chapter 2. This sectoral debate was initiated 
by work authored by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), which found that the legal system to which a country 
belongs, the content of laws, and the quality of law enforcement 
affected not only the degree of protection afforded to creditors’ 
rights, but also the performance of capital markets. In the views of 
La Porta et al., common law countries provide stronger investor 
protection than civil law ones. Levine (2003) later extended the 
analysis to the banking system, finding that countries with more 
stringent enforcement of contracts and closer creditor protection 
also had a more developed banking system and higher economic 
growth rates. These authors converged with Posner’s hypothesis, 
comforting the idea that civil law is less efficient than common law 
because it neglects economic effects on the behaviour of economic 
actors.  
Recent contributions, however, have gone in a different 
direction, with authors arguing that civil law can in principle 
provide more legal certainty and a smoother corporate and 
economic development over time compared to common law. Back 
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in 1988, Gordon Tullock (1988; 1997) suggested that, because of its 
nature, and its distinction between narrow holdings and dicta, 
common law can only develop very tight, narrow rules, whereas 
rules that are produced for civil codes, conversely, are broad and 
general in application. Tullock argued that it is much harder to 
manipulate lawmakers at the general level than it is to manipulate 
them at the narrow level through special interest pressures: since 
code provisions are very general, they can resist special interest 
pressures better than the narrow rules of the common law system.7 
In 2000, Aristides Hatzis observed that “an indication of the 
superiority of civil law, especially in the field of contracts, is that 
over the last two centuries, common law has consistently copied the 
institutions of civil law”; and added that “the particularistic and 
pragmatic approach of the Roman and civil law has proven to be 
more efficient than that of the rigid, theoretical approach of 
common law”. Moreover, Garoupa et al. (2016) observe that the 
‘legal origins’ theory, alongside its ‘policy version’ (the Doing 
Business reports of the World Bank) incorrectly selects a particular 
bundle of legal doctrines in order to measure the efficiency of a 
particular legal system, thereby erring in favour of the common law 
efficiency hypothesis. In their opinion, a different set of legal 
doctrines produces a different conclusion, and as a result the 
“identification of the efficiency of the common law is much more 
intricate and multifaceted than anticipated by the literature” 
(Garoupa et al., 2016).  
The current debate shows that deciding which legal system is 
more efficient is at once a time-consuming and a tentative exercise, 
and that the supposed superiority of common law has never been 
fully demonstrated in practice, but still greatly inspired the work of 
international organisations and the development of international 
private law. Looking at specific fields of law, however, may lead to 
totally opposite conclusions, which may be very important for the 
future of the EU legal system, currently trapped in an often self-
declared inferiority position. Among the key elements that affect the 
overall efficiency of the EU legal system, it is worth recalling the role 
of default rules, and in particular good faith obligations, in contract 
law; and the different patterns and cultures of litigation in the US 
and the EU. We explore them below. 
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1.2 The hidden treasure of the efficiency of EU contract 
law  
A sound and reliable legal framework is of increasing importance 
in international business and innovation. This is due to the fact that 
more and more innovative enterprises operate on a project basis in 
the context of open innovation projects, which require a variety of 
expertise and resources for the development of new products and 
services, from their inception to roll out. Open innovation, in 
particular, leads to the need to build tailor-made coalitions of 
institutions and enterprises (Chesbrough, 2003). In this context, both 
bilateral and relational contractual schemes (Williamson, 1979) are 
essential to the working of innovation projects, and the availability 
of a well-shaped legal framework can significantly reduce 
transaction costs, facilitating partners by offering efficient default 
options and helping partners avoid detailed, complex negotiations, 
in which typically the strongest parties have more resources and 
superior bargaining power (see below, Chapter 6).  
In the EU-27, and particularly in the civil law tradition, a 
generic good faith obligation applies to contract negotiation (inter 
alia, leading to pre-contractual liability), agreement and execution.8 
This implies that, regardless of the specific mentioning of good faith 
in the contractual document, parties are expected to behave in good 
faith throughout the whole contractual process and can be held 
liable if they fail to comply with the bona fide standard. If properly 
implemented, this can sharply reduce the risk of investing in the 
building of such coalitions, as the freedom to step out, once 
promising negotiations are under way, is limited.9 Fairness and 
reasonableness are closely associated with the good faith obligation: 
the latter makes behaviour more predictable, which in turn helps to 
build trust among the parties.  
Ejan Mackaay (2013) and other law and economics scholars 
have studied the differences between the two systems in depth, and 
Philippe (2018) explores “best effort clauses” on the two sides of the 
Atlantic. Key differentiating factors include the existence of general 
obligations to behave in good faith in the pre-contractual, 
contractual and post-contractual phases of contracts. Notable cases 
in which the European system has shown the potential benefits of 
bona fide requirements include Phillips Petroleum Cu Ltd. UK v Enron 
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Europe Ltd. (EWCA, 1996). In particular, the issue of pre-contractual 
liability has been subject to a completely diverging treatment in civil 
law and common law systems.10 Although courts in common law 
juridical systems recognise the existence of a duty of good faith 
while contracts are in force, they hesitate to consider it during the 
period of contractual negotiations. The resistance and the 
reservations towards the good faith doctrine are based on the fear 
that its acceptance might threaten the fundamental principles of 
private autonomy and freedom to contract.11 A good example is 
Walford v Miles, in which the House of Lords ruled that pre-
contractual duties, derived from good faith, are contrary to the 
prosecution of self-interest and to contractual freedom, which 
encompass the possibility of ending negotiations at any time 
(Cumberbatch, 1992). Contrary to what happens in common law, 
the Roman-Germanic legal tradition orders long ago accepted the 
notion of culpa in contrahendo, developed by von Jhering in the 19th 
century (von Jhering, 1861; Kessler and Fine, 1964).  
The lack of trust-oriented obligations has led to significant 
differences in contracting in the US and the EU. It is well known that 
commercial contracts are far more extensive and exhaustive than 
contracts in civil law legal orders (Cordero-Moss, 2007; 2014). As 
observed by Freire (2016), in common law countries “transaction 
costs are higher as a larger amount of time is expended in 
negotiations and direct costs, such as lawyers and legal advisers’ 
fees, are also more significant”; whereas in civil law countries, 
“contracts have fewer stipulations because contracting parties seem 
to trust that the existing legal and jurisdictional mechanisms are 
able to fill in the gaps or revise the contract when unforeseen 
circumstances occur. Ultimately, they trust that judicial decisions 
will have the ability to understand the immediate aims expressed 
by the parties but, above all, the substantive goals underlying the 
contract. Thus, a general principle of good faith, established by law, 
enables parties to delegate in the judicial system the interpretation 
and revision of contracts according to their best interests. 
Confidence is strengthened by the existence of a general rule of 
honesty and loyalty that functions as a conduct criterion and as the 
legal basis for courts to interpret the will that led to the agreement 
and to fulfil the gaps in contracts” (Freire, 2016). Hence, unlike what 
occurs in the US and the UK, contracts in the EU-27 do not have to 
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specify all the undesirable behaviour and steps of all the partners. 
In many cases framework agreements suffice, as all partners are 
bound by the principles of reasonableness and fairness.12  
These features of corporate life increase the likelihood that 
attempts to build coalitions will succeed, considerable costs will be 
saved, value will be created sooner rather than later and, most 
importantly, the coalition will be far more agile in adapting to 
changing circumstances. The obligation to meet post-contractual 
obligations provides a stimulus to build a solid reputation as a 
partner. A soft asset that over time will increase in value. If and 
when a conflict arises, the courts will go back to the original 
intentions of the partners and in fact fill in the apparent holes in the 
contract.  
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Figure 1. Time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases (2016) 
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1.3 The dust of obstacles to the efficiency of legal 
systems in the EU  
Our first treasure is hidden under layers of dust, which may have 
contributed to the overall belief that the EU legal system is 
inherently less efficient than the US one. The main obstacles that can 
be identified are the limited capacity and significant inefficiency of 
the judiciary in many countries, the cost of access to justice for 
smaller firms and citizens, and the lack of a robust set of rules 
protecting the interests of smaller contractors in relational 
contracts.13  
For what concerns the inefficiency of the judiciary, it suffices 
to look at the current statistics on the time needed to resolve cases 
in the member states, from the EU 2018 Justice Scoreboard. In two 
member states, more than 1,000 days are needed on average just to 
obtain an appeals decision (2nd instance).  
In specific areas of EU law, the Justice Scoreboard confirms 
the heterogeneity of findings. For competition cases, more than one 
third of member states report first instance cases lasting more than 
three years. In only a quarter of member states does the consumer 
protection authority take a decision in a case covered by EU 
consumer law in less than three months on average. And in the field 
of money laundering, while in about half of member states the first 
instance court proceedings take up to a year on average, these 
proceedings take around two years on average in several member 
states that are facing challenges. 
The Justice Scoreboard also indicates important concerns 
related to the perceived lack of independence of the judiciary in 
many EU member states. This, too, can be a deadly blow to the 
superiority of EU contract law, as the latter’s efficiency chiefly 
depends on the timely and independent action of the judge in 
interpreting the parties’ will in a given contract. 
Even more significant differences between the EU and the US, 
and among EU countries are found in the domain of litigation and 
enforcement. Gordon Tullock (1988) famously critiqued the system 
of dispute resolution in the United States, arguing that the 
adversarial system of adjudication exacerbates rent dissipation in 
litigation.14
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Figure 2. Perceived independence of courts and judges (2016-2018) 
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Overall evidence reveals that litigation is more frequent, and 
settlements are more common in the US compared to the EU. This 
is due to several factors: for example, on fee-shifting rules, 
Carbonara, Parisi and Von Wangenheim (2015) identify a hidden 
virtue of the English rule over the American rule, showing that an 
increase in fee-shifting may reduce total litigation costs and lead to 
desirable outcomes in socially valuable litigation. All in all, 
however, the US seems to feature a comprehensive set of plaintiff-
friendly procedural rules, which help injured parties in filing a 
lawsuit (and then most often in settling it). Suffice it to recall that, in 
the field of antitrust rules, more than 95% of EU antitrust cases are 
public enforcement cases, possibly ending in administrative 
sanctions; whereas in the US, more than 90% of cases are private 
enforcement cases, ending with damage awards if successful; and 
99% of these cases are settled before trial (Renda et al., 2008). The 
key challenge for the European Commission in its past attempts to 
stimulate private antitrust enforcement in Europe was to avoid 
creating the US “litigation culture” while at the same time 
strengthening the EU’s “compensation culture”.15  
All in all, it is important to realise that the use of the legal 
system, and the disciplining effect it exerts on the parties in 
contractual relationships, are a function of the effectiveness of the 
system itself. The advantages offered by EU contract law cannot be 
fully exploited if the parties cannot fully rely on the legal system: 
the flexibility granted by the obligation to behave in good faith and 
by the contextual interpretation of contracts gets lost if the parties 
cannot go to court easily and rely on an independent and competent 
judge. This is of utmost importance, especially if one considers that 
the diffusion of open innovation schemes and the platform economy 
determine the rise of various forms of contracting as prominent 
forms of organisation in the modern economy (Bénézech, 2012). 
More specifically, with increasingly modular products and complex 
value chains, large companies have the option of outsourcing entire 
phases of their value chains to smaller companies by establishing 
relational contracting schemes, whereas large platforms essentially 
rely on the market (and thus, individual contracting) as an 
alternative to more complex hierarchical structures (Coase, 1937, 
1960; Renda, 2019). A hybrid governance scheme between in- and 
outsourcing is represented by ‘relational contracting’, which 
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configures long-term contractual relationships, often based on trust 
and a relatively sophisticated governance (Williamson, 1979; 1985).  
Against this background, the requirement of good faith in 
contracting can be a boost for smoother and more efficient 
commercial relationships between large and smaller firms: at the 
same time, if not coupled with adequate arrangements in terms of 
specific SME-friendly policies, appropriate provisions for access to 
justice and conflict resolution, such requirements could become a 
curse for SMEs and for society at large, as larger companies would 
have the temptation to rely too much on open innovation schemes 
and relational contracting, knowing that they will be able to abuse 
their superior bargaining position over time (Brunswicker, 2012). In 
other words, if our first ‘hidden treasure’ is not adequately coupled 
with side measures, it may end up promoting inefficient governance 
decisions and an over-reliance on B2B contracting as opposed to 
pure market transactions or the in-sourcing of production. This, in 
turn, leads to what will become a dominant theme in this book: the 
lack of a dedicated set of EU policies that support SMEs in 
approaching commercial relationships and dispute resolution when 
dealing with larger businesses: a situation that is hardly covered by 
existing policies such as EU competition rules on abuse of 
dominance (Articles 102 TFEU), or the Small Business Act.  
1.4 Policy implications 
Our analysis of the advantages offered by civil law especially for 
B2B cooperation in complex value chains and open innovation 
projects has far-reaching consequences for the EU agenda in the 
years to come. We recommend four main actions: the promotion of 
civil law over common law, especially in contract formation; the 
strengthening of the civil court system to speed up procedures and 
to improve the quality of the business environment at the national 
level; the removal of barriers for SMEs to access the civil court 
system; and the introduction of specialised civil courts on issues 
related to Information and Communication Technology, Biotech 
and Energy. Below, we provide more details on each of these 
recommendations.  
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1.4.1 Promote civil law over common law in contract formation 
The Commission and the member states should consider actively 
promoting the use of civil law over the use of common law in 
contract formation, especially when contracts involve Anglo-Saxon 
and EU-27 companies. Initiatives to raise awareness of the merits of 
civil law among entrepreneurs are highly advisable, and long 
overdue (Hadjemmanuil, 2018; Escobar Ribas, 2017). The use of civil 
law can be promoted and endorsed in various ways, mostly by 
leveraging the financial and commercial power of the single market. 
For example, EU institutions such as the European Commission and 
the European Investment Bank provide financial support to small 
and large firms in many shapes and forms to projects and 
programmes. The use of civil law could be both incorporated in the 
terms of reference, and also used as a ‘conditionality’, i.e. a 
mandatory condition for the eligibility to receive funding.  
Escobar Ribas (2018) observes that Brexit will have significant 
implications for particular aspects of business contracts, in 
particular for what concerns interpretation, applicable law and on 
Brexit as grounds for termination. But recent research also 
demystifies the view that the popularity of English law is due to its 
quality or substantive merits (Vogenauer, 2013). Empirical evidence 
shows that the choice of law is usually “determined by familiarity 
and the dominant position of English law firms”; and that in cross-
border transactions, parties do not engage in ‘contract law 
shopping’, but rather leave this activity to large law firms. The latter 
often use English law as part of a ‘package’, alongside insurance and 
arbitration in London. Whether Brexit can break this habit and bring 
back civil law as a default option, together with arbitration on the 
continent, for both large and small firms, remains to be seen. 
1.4.2 Invest in improving the court system 
The EU and its member states should invest in the court system, to 
make the use of civil law attractive to all comers. At the very 
minimum, the cost-cutting that has taken place over the past decade 
needs to be rolled back: investment in the quality of institutions and 
in particular courts, should regularly feature in the types of reforms 
that member states are asked to implement and monitor under the 
European Semester: available statistics show that the quality of the 
legal system is positively correlated with sustainable growth. The 
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trend towards specialised courts for specific, highly technical 
subjects (corporate governance, patents, information technology, 
competition) should be subject to more in-depth analysis, and 
endorsed where beneficial (Ginsburg and Wright, 2013). Including 
reforms of the court system in the Semester would also be consistent 
with a commitment, within the Agenda 2030, to mainstream SDGs 
into every aspect of EU policy: as a matter of fact, goal 16 aims inter 
alia at strengthening institutions for sustainable development, and 
courts are important institutions in this respect.  
Another promising avenue for the single market is the recent 
trend towards the introduction of English as an optional language 
in civil courts, which can facilitate non-nationals in settling 
controversies by using civil or even common law as appropriate 
(Kern, 2012). This transition is going to become even more urgent 
after Brexit, since many commercial and financial contracts rely on 
UK common law and would therefore become bereft of a forum for 
settling controversies in continental Europe. Apart from 
international arbitration cases, the availability of courts to settle 
international disputes in English in countries like France, Germany 
and the Netherlands is increasingly a reality, which will lead to 
further hybridisation between civil (procedural) law and common 
law, and even growing interpretation of the law by courts in 
common law cases.16 The inherent risk is that this trend towards 
English-speaking courts leads to increased use of common law: we 
argue that the EU should avoid facilitating this tendency and should 
proactively seek to promote civil law. 
For example, the Netherlands set up a new international 
Commercial Court, which opened its doors in Amsterdam on 
1 January 2019. The major ‘selling point’ of the Court is that the 
entire proceedings can be conducted in English, including any 
written statements, communication with the Court and hearings. 
Furthermore, the procedural rules of the Netherlands Commercial 
Court also provide the flexibility for proceedings to be conducted in 
the civil law tradition or in a manner similar to proceedings in 
international arbitration or common law jurisdictions. By providing 
this flexibility, the Netherlands Commercial Court aims to make 
proceedings recognisable for international parties. The Netherlands 
Commercial Court will hear international civil or commercial 
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disputes, provided that the parties have expressly agreed to confer 
jurisdiction on the Netherlands Commercial Court. 
1.4.3 Remove barriers to access to justice for SMEs 
Improving the legal system is also, and especially, important for 
weaker parties lacking the financial resources to sustain litigation 
for a long period. In particular, SMEs’ access to the courts should be 
greatly improved, especially in a cross-border setting (see Figure 3). 
This would encourage enterprises to be scrupulous in meeting their 
contractual obligations and could very well reduce the number of 
court cases. In addition, there is a large unmet need for innovative, 
cheap and fast methods to resolve conflicts. Experiments are 
underway in different member states, many of which are geared to 
forms of triage to ensure that only cases with merit reach the legal 
system.  
In 2017, with specific reference to the need for SMEs to ensure 
adequate protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), a 
manifesto published by an umbrella organisation (IP Europe) 
advocated fairer access to justice for European SMEs, by specifically 
mentioning stronger IPR protection in all jurisdictions, the 
promotion of a fair, fit-for-purpose legal system so that SMEs can 
protect their inventions and cost-effectively challenge those, notably 
large companies, who infringe their patents and profit from their 
inventions without taking out a licence; ensuring that the 
guarantees and bonds required from SMEs seeking injunctions 
against large companies are not prohibitive, and that all courts in 
Europe have the discretion to set bonds that do not deprive SMEs 
of their access to justice; the adoption of pro-SME measures, 
including easier access to Courts and reduced fees in all 
jurisdictions to ensure that any litigation and costs supported by 
SMEs in protecting their R&D investments are not beyond their 
financial reach. The Manifesto also included an urgent call on the 
Commission to implement the non-legislative supporting measures 
mentioned in the Communication “Putting intellectual property at 
the service of SMEs to foster innovation and growth”.17 
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Figure 3. Major obstacles to exporting for SMEs in the five largest EU 
member states 
 
Source: Abel-Koch ed., 2018. 
 
HIDDEN TREASURES | 17 
 
1.4.4 Create specialised civil courts for ICT, Biotech and Energy  
The creation of specialised courts, in charge of solving disputes 
related to specific sectors that are thought to be particularly 
technical (e.g. intellectual property, competition) or atypical, 
worthy of specific resource allocation (family law), is a consolidated 
practice in a number of member states. The EU institutions could 
decide to set up specific courts for sectors that are considered to be 
particularly strategic for the EU agenda, as well as likely to feature 
heavy litigation to the detriment of small, innovative companies. 
But also large companies could profit from the availabilities of a 
network of courts throughout the territory of the EU, with 
specialised knowledge in highly technical sectors. The key benefit 
of competent courts being available would need to be weighed 
against the perils of repeated interaction between the courts and the 
litigants. This is why good governance, strong independence of the 
judiciary and a high level of transparency are needed in this 
domain.  
1.4.5 Create EU-level dispute resolution mechanisms for SMEs 
In addition to creating specialised courts at the national level, the 
EU could take the initiative to create mechanisms for dispute 
resolution at the EU level, designed in a way that would favour the 
collection of confidential complaints, and also avoid smaller firms 
refraining from accessing the justice system for fear of retaliation by 
their larger counterparts. In fact, as will be observed below in 
Chapter 6, competition rules barely protect smaller businesses in 
Europe, if not in the rather uncommon cases in which antitrust law 
can be invoked. Creating ad hoc rules to protect SMEs in cases of 
abuse of superior bargaining power, strategic behaviour and abuse 
of economic dependency, and coupling these rules with centralised 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure easier access to justice for SMEs 
would boost the business environment for European SMEs, and in 
turn promote the competitiveness of the whole continent. This 
would also be very much in line with the creation of a more 
‘decentralised’ single market, with a more fragmented and local 
market structure, as will be evoked below in Chapter 10. And it 
could be made available in particular if small businesses had access 
to a dedicated European enterprise statute, tailored to their needs, 
which will be described in the next chapter.  
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2. THE FINANCING OF INVESTMENTS 
AND WORKING CAPITAL OF 
COMPANIES: EUROPE’S UNIQUE RECIPE  
A competitive economy must provide adequate sources of financing 
to innovative enterprises, whatever their size. At the same time, the 
economics literature never converged on an unambiguous 
conceptualisation of the relationship between financial markets 
development and economic growth. A recent literature review by 
Paun et al. (2019) largely confirms this view. For example, in an 
analysis focused on Latin America, Blanco (2009) finds that “while 
economic growth causes financial development, financial 
development does not cause economic growth”; Naceur et al. (2017) 
observe that “financial development does not appear to be a magic 
bullet for economic growth”, and that they could not find an 
“unambiguously positive relationship between financial 
development, investment, and productivity”; studies on Africa … 
show that “financial liberalization failed to increase economic 
growth” for the overwhelming majority of surveyed countries; 
whereas Gries, Kraft and Meierrieks (2009) analyse 16 sub-Saharan 
African countries, concluding that “finance, growth and openness 
do not share significant long-run relationships”.  
The financial crisis that hit the global economy in 2007 shed 
more light on the nature of the relationship between finance and 
growth, leading economists to identify cases of excessive 
financialisation of the economy (Mazzucato, 2018). Prochniak and 
Wasiak (2017) focus on EU and OECD economies in the period 
1993–2013, concluding that “an excessively large size of the financial 
system … may negatively impact GDP dynamics”. And Haiss, 
Juvan and Mahlberg (2016) study 26 European countries in the 
period 1990-2009, concluding that under current conditions, “the 
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financial sector is not capable of dampening unsustainable levels of 
indebtedness, risk-taking and leverage or to avoid euphoria in the 
markets”.  
At the same time, economics literature is almost unanimous 
in finding a positive impact of well-developed, sophisticated capital 
markets on economic growth. This spurred a heated debate at the 
EU level, where the private equity market is under-developed 
compared to the United States (EIB, 2018). In fact, over the 2007–15 
period, the average venture capital-backed US company received 
five times more than its EU counterpart, i.e. €6.3 million compared 
with €1.3 million (AFME, 2017); the gap between the US and Europe 
is especially wide at the scale-up stage (EIB, 2018), whereas at the 
start-up stage, there is relatively little difference in the amount of 
funding.  
Figure 4. Share of bank and non-bank financing in total non-financial 
corporation debt financing in the euro area and the United States 
(outstanding amounts; percentages) 
 
Source: ECB, Federal Reserve System. Latest observation: Q2 2018. 
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As a result, there are significant differences in the way 
businesses are financed in the US and the EU: while the size of the 
financial system is broadly comparable, the EU banking sector is 
about twice the size of the US banking sector. This is partially due 
to a difference in accounting standards and (with Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac) a different way of financing mortgage loans; but even 
when these two factors are accounted for, the banking sector 
remains substantially more important as a financing source in the 
EU than in the US. This difference will become even larger post-
Brexit. 
Although the relatively larger role of banks might provide EU 
corporates with fewer options for funding of investments and 
business activities, this might fit better the demands of the (on 
average) smaller companies operating in the EU. Moreover, the EU 
banking system is more stakeholder-focused, especially when it 
takes the form of cooperative and savings banks, which permits a 
longer-term perspective and requires lower rates of return than 
listed commercial banks.  
With the launch of the Capital Markets Union project in 2015, 
the European Commission aimed to develop the EU’s capital 
markets, which is characterised as “under-developed and 
fragmented” in its action plan.18 Looking at financing for 
companies, the European Commission sees opportunities for 
venture capital markets and securitisation in particular. This, 
however, raises the question whether capital markets are indeed the 
solution for all businesses, or only for a limited number of large 
corporations. Banks, historically the main funding source for the 
large majority of EU corporations, are currently confronted with a 
transformation. A combination of new legislative and supervisory 
requirements in the aftermath of the 2007-9 global financial crisis 
and digitalisation is challenging their existing business models and 
market practices. Although the transformation is contributing to 
more efficient and safer financial markets, they might potentially 
also have some negative unintended consequences for the financing 
of corporations and in particular SMEs. The transformation, for 
instance, challenges relationship banking and stakeholder banking 
models, which are traditionally important in the financing of EU 
SMEs. This suggests that actions should be taken to preserve these 
historic strongholds in EU corporate finance. 
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2.1 Tailoring the financial system to the EU’s 
traditional and market features 
Financing demand and supply differs substantially across business 
sizes, primarily due to different levels of information asymmetry. In 
general, there is substantially more accessible information available 
about publicly listed and large companies than about SMEs and 
private companies. SMEs, with the exception of some high-growth 
potential companies, are also subject to less scrutiny from analysts 
than large companies (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). 
Figure 5. Enterprises by size of business (2016) 
   
Note: Number of businesses for all EU member states excl. Lithuania and 
Luxembourg. For Sweden, UK and US, the data are for 2015. 
Source: OECD Data Portal (2018). https://data.oecd.org/entrepreneur/ 
enterprises-by-business-size.htm#indicator-chart 
 
Small and micro-enterprises are relatively more important for 
the EU than the US economy. Looking at the sizes of the companies, 
there are substantial differences between the EU and the US. In both, 
micro companies (0 to 9 employees) form the majority of companies, 
but in the US the relative weight of small (10 to 49 employees), 
medium-sized (50 to 249 employees) and large companies (more 
than 250 employees) is almost twice that in the EU (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 6. Employment by size of business (2016) 
 
Note: Employees by business size for all EU member states excl. Lithuania and 
Luxembourg. For Sweden, UK and US, the data are for 2015. 
Source: OECD Data portal (2018). https://data.oecd.org/entrepreneur/ 
employees-by-business-size.htm#indicator-chart 
In terms of activity, SMEs are also substantially more 
important for the EU economy (see Figure 6). Large companies form 
less than 2% of the businesses in the EU and the US, but are 
responsible for the majority of the employment in the US (64%). In 
turn, the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU are 
jointly responsible for more than half of employment (56%).  
Large and publicly listed companies are required to disclose 
much more information about their financial performance and 
activities. Moreover, this information for larger and publicly listed 
companies is also subject to more intense scrutiny from accountants 
and auditors, than that for SMEs. In addition, lenders to both 
smaller and larger companies collect additional private information 
about the creditworthiness of companies during the lending 
relationship (e.g. receivables and payments). This information is, 
however, only available to a limited number of lenders that are not 
keen on sharing it, given the competitive advantage it offers. In fact, 
the smaller the company size, the lower the average number of its 
bank relationships, and thus the smaller the number of banks that 
possess the information required to assess its creditworthiness (see 
Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Number of bank relationships by size of business (October 
2017-March 2018) 
 
Source: ECB (2018). 
Traditionally, information collection to determine the 
creditworthiness of SMEs is very labour intensive. With limited 
hard information available, soft information is more important for 
SMEs. This information is collected over time due to relationships 
between lenders and borrowers (Berger and Udell, 2000). The soft 
information is not stored in databases, but in the minds of the loan 
officers of banks. In addition to the labour-intensive information 
collection, the smaller amounts involved also contribute to the 
higher costs of lending to SMEs. 
It is not coincidental that banks are currently the main 
financers of SMEs. Banks have a comparative advantage over other 
lenders in providing financing to SMEs. First, most banks operate 
larger bank branch networks that, besides loans to SMEs, also 
provide financial and non-financial services (e.g. cash handling, 
insurance, real estate brokerage) to households and other 
customers. This allows banks to distribute the relatively high cost of 
operating a bank branch among its various services. Second, 
European banks offer highly efficient payment systems and arrange 
savings and investment accounts. Banks are also well positioned to 
cover both private and business demand for services, which is 
crucially important for micro and small companies. Their 
comprehensive insight into the skills and attitudes of the 
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entrepreneur, their private finances and business is extremely 
valuable to avoid both false positives (e.g. granting loans that 
should have been rejected) and false negatives (e.g. denying loans 
to creditworthy entrepreneurs and ventures).  
Figure 8. Use of internal and external financing by euro area enterprises 
across by size of business (October 2017-March 2018) 
 
Source: ECB (2018). 
 
Banks also constitute the most important source of finance for 
large companies, which on average require higher amounts and 
more varied types of financing than SMEs, including also capital 
markets financing (equity and debt securities). In turn, on average 
SMEs use fewer sources of financing than large companies, mainly 
internal funds and bank financing. Besides loans, credit lines, trade 
credit, factoring and leasing can also be provided by banks. 
However, in some cases these are provided by alternative financers. 
Some of these forms of financing such as factoring and leasing are 
fully collateral-based and therefore require less information on the 
company and are also more often provided by alternative financers. 
Capital markets are a relatively insignificant source of financing for 
SMEs, with only a very small share of primarily high-growth 
potential SMEs obtaining equity and to a lesser extent debt 
financing through exchanges and other (unregulated) capital 
markets. 
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The EU banking sector has evolved to address the financing 
needs of SMEs. In particular, many stakeholder-owned banks such 
as savings and cooperative banks still have relatively large branch 
networks through which they primarily serve SMEs and 
households (see Figure 9). These stakeholder value banks are mostly 
owned by their customers, foundations or governments. The 
stakeholder-owned banks are distinguished from commercial banks 
with profit maximisation as their main target by having other 
objectives such as serving their owners (i.e. local households and 
companies) or contributing to local socio-economic development. 
Stakeholder-owned banks are dominant in Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, The 
Netherlands, Slovenia, Poland and Portugal (see Figure 10). In the 
US, credit unions could be considered as stakeholder value banks, 
but they are relatively small in size.  
Stakeholder value banks in the EU have numerous different 
business models and governance structures. According to empirical 
evidence, their performance and efficiency are fairly similar to those 
of commercial banks. However, there are potential economic, 
systemic and welfare benefits that can be derived from having a 
diverse banking sector in general and more cooperative banks in 
particular. Indeed, a more diverse banking sector increases 
competitiveness, financial stability and economic growth (Ayadi et 
al., 2010). 
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Figure 9. Bank branches and stakeholder value banks (2017) 
 
Source: ECB (2018). 
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Figure 10. Distribution of banks across ownership structures and countries (% of assets in EU member states) 
 
Source: Ayadi et al. (2016).
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2.2 Europe’s diverse banking system is a hidden 
treasure 
Legislation introduced after the 2007-9 global financial crisis and the 
digital transformation challenges the existing business models of 
many banks and in particular stakeholder-owned banks as the 
regulation and supervision of banks in the EU and especially in the 
euro area has been strengthened and extended. First, capital 
requirements have been reinforced and complemented with 
leverage ratio and liquidity ratios. This required all banks to raise 
their capital levels, which is more challenging for most stakeholder-
owned banks as they cannot issue equity. Second, with the 
introduction of the resolution mechanism, the orderly unwinding of 
distressed systemic banks or a way of ensuring their continuity 
needs to be arranged. This scheme, however, only considers 
commercial (private bail-in) and public solutions (recapitalisation 
via resolution fund). This means that in cases where a stakeholder-
owned bank is resolved, it is likely to become a commercial bank. 
Third, the supervision in the euro area has been consolidated at the 
ECB. ECB supervision is more data-heavy, which is problematic for 
stakeholder-owned banks and others whose lending is traditionally 
based more on soft information. Fourth, the newly adopted, more 
stringent regulation is also accompanied by higher compliance 
costs. This is challenging, in particular for the stakeholder-owned 
banks that often manage many banking licences, obliging some of 
them to consolidate their organisation or networks over the past few 
years. 
Digitalisation makes it easier for banks and other financial 
institutions to collect more frequent hard information at a distance 
and potentially reduces the need for the collection and storage of 
soft information, which requires a denser branch network and 
closer proximity to companies. However, it can only overcome the 
difficulties to a limited extent, as soft information is by definition 
hard to express quantitatively (Stein, 2002; Uzzi, 2000). In addition, 
the digital transformation potentially challenges the business model 
of stakeholder-owned and other banks that operate many branches, 
and might also reduce lending to small, new and high-growth 
potential companies. For these companies, for which less hard 
information is available and soft information is more important in 
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assessing their creditworthiness, credit is likely to become more 
costly and/or scarce (Begenau et al., 2018). In addition, fintech and 
big-data-driven alternative lenders are more likely to lend to 
borrowers with high creditworthiness (Buchak et al., 2017). In this 
latter respect, perhaps the biggest threat to relationship banking is 
the possibility for big tech companies to gain access to information 
held by banks: the recent provisions on open banking introduced by 
the second EU Payment Services Directive (PSD2) risk creating a 
situation in which extremely precious customer information is 
taken from banks and delivered into the hands of technology giants.  
2.3 Does Europe really need more venture capital? 
The previous chapters have helped us identify a key issue related to 
the financing needs of European companies. While economists 
agree that more sophisticated capital markets often accompany 
growth, the extent to which this is a case of correlation, or one of 
causation, is still far from settled. Moreover, the quest for more 
venture capital seems a bad fit for the needs of European SMEs: 
more generally, such a stance should not overshadow the need for 
quality capital, rather than growth at all costs. In fact, venture-
backed start-ups often face huge pressure to perform: either succeed 
rapidly, or fail fast (and if possible, gracefully). And the literature 
exploring the links between the financialisation of the economy, 
venture capital, the rise of inequality and the gradually growing 
instability of the economy is becoming richer every week.  
A decade has passed since newly elected European 
Commission President Barroso invoked venture capital as one of the 
four reforms that would bring Europe back to sustained growth 
after the financial crisis wave (together with energy liberalisation, 
the reduction of red tape and the services directive). Those ideas and 
hopes, today, appear preposterous at best. Scholars like Mariana 
Mazzucato (2018), Kate Raworth (2016), Lynn Stout (2012) and 
George Stiglitz (2017; 2018) have since vehemently criticised 
‘shareholder capitalism’ as too narrow and ultimately unfit for the 
age of sustainable development. And economists and market 
analysts start to realise that ‘patient capital’ and a more balanced 
model of capitalism can offer more stable growth opportunities to 
SME-dominated economies like those in the EU.19 Venture capital is 
of course welcome, but it comes in many different guises and is in 
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many cases far too expensive in terms of the cost of dividends 
and/or of serving the loans taken out by the owners as well as in 
terms of lost entrepreneurship. Funds work very much under a 
short-term perspective, aimed at securing a successful exit, and 
exploiting the fiscal advantage of debt over equity. Mixing the 
personal interests of the fund managers and the fund is not 
necessarily a driver of successful scale-up and the best way to 
leverage European entrepreneurship. On the other hand, 
commercial banks are also struggling to provide small loans, as 
costs have risen and staff has been reduced. All this produces the 
very well documented ‘valley of death’, where promising 
prototypes become stranded and perish. 
And yet, boosting venture capital still seems to be the master 
plan in the EU, in particular through the complex and ambitious 
array of initiatives that fall under the umbrella name of the Capital 
Markets Union. However, the EU business structure in which SMEs 
have a more prominent position still requires, at least for the time 
being, a bank-dominated system, and possibly the co-existence of a 
variety of business models, together with legislation that does not 
undermine the stability and overall incentives of stakeholder-
owned banks. Soft information is likely to play a more important 
role for the financing of especially small, new and high-growth 
potential companies. This means that policies in this domain should 
allow banks to collect and use soft information to assess the 
creditworthiness of SMEs.  
An important strand within the literature seeks to understand 
the models, mechanisms, and the general nature of bank financing 
for SMEs. The consensus in most of the literature is that small and 
domestic banks provide more financing to SMEs (Berger & Udell, 
1998, 2006; Hassan et al., 2017; Hernandez-Canovas & Martinez-
Solano, 2010), since “small and domestic banks have more capacity 
to engage in relationship lending, the use of soft information and 
continuous personalized contacts to lend to SMEs” (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Peria, 2011; Hassan et al., 2017; Hakenes et al., 
2014). The argument is that relationship lending reduces the 
information asymmetry between SMEs and banks (Esho and 
Verhoef, 2018). Beck et al. (2017) find, on the basis of interviews with 
bank CEOs in 397 banks across 21 countries, that relationship 
lending is particular useful during times of economic downturn; 
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this is due, inter alia, to the fact that, since relationship lenders 
acquire valuable information during the lending relationship, they 
can also more easily adapt their lending conditions to changing 
circumstances (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Bolton, Freixas, 
Gambacorta, and Mistrulli, 2016).  
European enterprises can and should take advantage of the 
diversity of the EU banking system with commercial banks, 
cooperative banks and savings banks. Most European banks adhere 
to the ‘relationship model’ in sharp contrast to the ‘transaction 
model’. They have deep insights into the history and prospects of 
their clients as well as their markets and competitors. They know 
the main players, their strengths and weaknesses. Relationship 
banking remains the superior route to banks’ risk management: 
Svenska Handelsbanken is a shining example in this respect. 
Relationship banks play an important role in helping their clients to 
upgrade their investment programme by backing and by rejecting 
investment proposals. The contribution of relationship banks to the 
economy as a whole is real and should be more strongly 
emphasised at the EU level.20 
2.4 Policy implications  
Our discussion of corporate finance in Europe is intimately related 
to the analysis of the particularity of the EU legal system, as well as 
the dynamics and features of continental EU corporate governance 
and innovation. Brexit, when it occurs, will leave Europe bereft of a 
vibrant capital market, as well as of the most financialised large 
economy compared to other large member states. This may offer an 
opportunity to revisit the overall approach to SME financing, 
focusing on the acquisition of quality information regarding the 
prospects of existing ventures, as well as countless possibilities for 
mentoring and nurturing talent without falling prey to short-
termism and the urge to deliver on investment. This approach may 
lead to important consequences for EU policymakers in the next 
legislature. Below, we explore a few steps that may bring value to 
the future EU: the preservation and promotion of relationship 
lending (including in emerging fintech intermediaries), the creation 
or expansion of house funds by institutional investors, and the 
provision of various forms of mentoring and support to promising 
SMEs, possibly through a blending of instruments, rather than a 
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siloed approach to financing (see more detail on this latter point in 
Chapter 4).  
2.4.1 Preserve and promote the diversity of banking models in 
Europe 
The EU legislative and policy framework should allow for a diverse 
banking sector, including, in particular, stakeholder-owned banks 
that focus on SMEs. This implies that the policy framework does not 
amplify scale advantages, and that diverse ownership of banks is 
preserved. The resolution and supervisory framework should allow 
for cooperative and savings banks to continue operating as such 
after resolution. Moreover, supervisors should take the ownership 
structure into account: stakeholder-owned banks have limited 
possibilities to attract external capital, which means that they 
sometimes require longer transition periods to meet higher capital 
requirements or recover. This also means that provisions on capital 
requirements may have to differentiate between listed and non-
listed banks, as the combination of the pursuit of shareholder return 
on investment (ROI) and the use of IFRS makes the former more 
vulnerable.21 
2.4.2 Explore in-depth how banks decide on loans to SMEs 
In the banking domain, the European Commission should support 
a study into the way banks handle loan applications and the 
decision criteria that are applied. At present, these decisions appear 
to be mostly based on readily available information, such as 
corporate accounts and tax returns, which have very little predictive 
value. This is in line with the predominant arms’ length approach 
to banking. On the contrary, evaluation on the basis of productivity, 
investment record and the intellectual property on ‘a virtual balance 
sheet’ and other factors could help avoid two types of mistakes: 
approving loans that should have been rejected (‘false positives’) 
and rejecting loans that should have been approved (‘false 
negatives’). DG GROW undertook a study in 2013, which explored 
credit assessment tools used by banks and provided useful 
recommendations (CSES and Panteia, 2014). At the time, however, 
it was quite difficult to assess the way banks handle loan 
applications and the decision criteria that they apply, due to the vast 
spectrum of rating models used by banks (either standardised or 
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internal). Existing practices and new forms of interaction and 
feedback should be further explored in the coming years.  
2.4.3 Leverage fintech solutions based on the relationship model 
The digital transformation of banking is leading to a proliferation of 
business models, some of which may offer opportunities to 
consolidate our “hidden treasure”. As a matter of fact, besides 
Internet giants, part of the fintech universe is actually based on 
relationship models: this includes crowdfunding, peer-to-peer 
lending, and ICOs/tokens that in general emerge bottom-up at a 
small scale. This part of fintech is, in a way, the digital twin of the 
old savings and cooperative banks, building on trust and close 
connectivity, only without those traditional banks as such (although 
hybrid models exist) but based on digital entities and 
cryptocurrencies. If Europe succeeds in helping such initiatives to 
scale up and spread best practices, the new generation of financial 
services and intermediation will incorporate the benefits of the 
relationship model with the agility of fintech. This may require 
specific approaches to competition policy (see Chapter 6), aimed at 
preserving the possibility for smaller players to compete on an equal 
footing with large tech giants.  
2.4.4 Incentivise institutional investors to set up equity funds for 
SMEs  
Institutional investors, generally with long-term obligations, should 
be incentivised to invest in in-house funds for SMEs, run by quality 
staff. Banks could start equity funds as long as these are 
organisationally separate from the main bank and separately 
financed. Ideally, these funds should be accompanied by a portfolio 
of services, including equity, loans, lease products and export 
financing. This would enable SMEs to avoid private equity and its 
associated cost and, more importantly, to design their own 
procedures and criteria for granting loans.  
The EIB is the prime example of an independent, highly 
entrepreneurial and safe bank and EU institutions are right to 
gradually expand its role. Member states are exploring the 
foundation of development banks, and some of them already rely 
on extremely strong institutions (e.g. France, Germany, Italy). The 
European Commission is also setting up a dedicated body in charge 
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of promoting the scale-up of promising firms, the so-called 
European Innovation Council, and is mobilising funding for 
innovative projects through both InvestEU and Horizon Europe. 
Altogether, if coupled with adequate policy reforms aimed at 
creating a level playing field and a rich, diverse banking 
environment, these initiatives could lay the foundations of a new, 
different model, rooted in Europe’s legal and economic approach to 
innovation, competition and corporate governance (see the next 
three chapters).  
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3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  
IN SEARCH OF THE EUROPEAN 
ENTERPRISE 
The way in which the internal supervision, management, and 
decision-making of large companies is structured has a strong 
influence on their incentives and behaviour. Traditionally, the 
literature on comparative corporate governance has focused on 
transatlantic differences between the ‘Shareholder Model’ adopted 
in the US, which leads companies to primarily pursue the interests 
of shareholders, directors and management; and the ‘Stakeholder 
Capitalism’ model adopted by many European corporations, which 
tends to address a broader group of stakeholders. This debate is 
echoed in other parts of academic scholarship, such as the business 
ethics literature, which has debated extensively on whether 
managers should prioritise primarily or exclusively the interests of 
shareholders (à la Milton Friedman), or whether they should 
consider or balance the interests of a wider group of stakeholders 
(Agle & Mitchell, 2008; Campbell, 2007; Freeman, 1994; Phillips, 
1997).  
Similarly to what occurred in the case of common and civil 
law systems, here too the academic literature has traditionally 
looked at common law as a more growth-friendly system: the 
emergence of the ‘law and finance’ debate (La Porta et al., 1997) led 
to an initial conclusion, that the common law system generally 
provides “a more favourable basis for financial development and 
economic growth, and on the other hand, the French branch of the 
civil law tradition is the least favourable in this respect” (Graff, 
2008). These economists mostly looked at the relationship between 
law (in the form of investor protection) and financial development, 
using as a variable the legal family or legal origin (i.e. French civil 
36 | CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IN SEARCH OF THE EUROPEAN ENTERPRISE 
law, German civil law, Scandinavian civil law and common law). 
The underlying hypothesis is that England, France and Germany 
developed different legal styles of controlling business due to their 
unique histories. Today, within continental Europe distinctions are 
made between the French tradition, where the dominant 
stockholder is usually a family or a company, the German tradition, 
characterised by a “universal bank” that holds a considerable share, 
and the Nordic countries, where families play an important role 
(Cools, 2005). 
In fact, there are differences in the way corporations are 
organised in different parts of the world, and the literature has 
broadly confirmed the influence of the legal tradition in affecting 
corporate structure and governance. As recalled by Sofie Cools 
(2008), the “Berle and Means corporation”, with many dispersed 
shareholders and control in the hands of management, is not a 
worldwide phenomenon. In other parts of the world, different 
corporate ownership structures exist (Musacchio and Turner, 2013). 
The index developed by La Porta et al. (1997) is still being relied 
upon extensively as a quantitative measure of investor protection. 
On that basis, scholars have found that investor protection 
correlates with broad and deep capital markets, higher dividend 
pay-outs, higher corporate valuation, better access to external 
finance, more efficient capital allocation, and the extent of exchange 
rate depreciation and stock market collapse during a crisis. They 
have uncovered correlations with a country’s cultural profile, the 
value of control benefits, and many other factors, or used the index 
as a control variable. This stream of literature dominated the scene 
in academia for more than two decades and led its pioneers to rank 
among the most often quoted authors in the history of social 
sciences.  
However, the views of La Porta and his colleagues have been 
criticised even before the financial crisis of the late 2000s by a 
number of scholars, in particular as regards the so-called “anti-
director” index used in the Law and Finance paper (Vagts, 2002). 
Some scholars have highlighted biases in the selection of legal 
variables, as well as a lack of rigour in the coding of laws and other 
statistical fallacies (e.g. Milhaupt and Pistor, 2008; Spamann, 2010); 
other scholars have argued that La Porta and his colleagues gave too 
much importance to the law, neglecting the influence of history and 
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politics on corporate governance and finance (Coffee, 2000; 
Cheffins, 2001; Roe and Siegel, 2009); in a recent paper, Gerhard 
Schnyder, Mathias Siems and Ruth Augilera (2018) argue that the 
Law and Finance paper did not take law seriously enough. Aguilera 
and Williams (2010) espouse a similar view by calling it “inaccurate, 
incomplete, and important”. The diffusion of this stream of 
literature has indeed determined the emergence of a real inferiority 
complex in Europe, where scholars have started to overtly advocate 
for adherence to the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance. 
In fact, as observed, among others, by Heremans and Bosquet 
(2011), the findings of the ‘law and finance’ literature have been 
influential in policy making, including corporate governance codes 
and even EU legislation to converge toward the Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance model. Governments have taken action to 
change corporate law, and push their corporations towards more 
dispersed ownership, or increased influence of institutional 
investors in management.  
On a parallel, completely separate front, the academic 
literature on business ethics reacted disapprovingly to this view of 
corporate governance, starting long before La Porta and his 
colleagues. In particular, a querelle emerged already in the past 
decades between the focus on shareholder interests of the 
“Shareholder Theory” of Milton Friedman (1962), who took a 
laissez-faire approach to the social responsibility of business 
(described as limited to using resources and engaging in activities 
designed to increase profits); and Freeman’s (1984) seminal 
formulation of “Stakeholder Theory”, which, while not denying that 
profitability should be a goal of corporations, sees the primary 
purpose of the corporation as being a vehicle to manage stakeholder 
interests. The latter theory, which echoes a social function of private 
initiative and property that is typical of many European legal 
systems, has become one of the most prominent theories both 
within business ethics (Phillips, 2003) and the wider field of 
management, as well as a dominant paradigm for corporate social 
responsibility (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Most importantly, as 
recalled by Rönnegard and Smith (2018), the ‘shareholder primacy 
norm’ based on the initial contributions of Milton Friedman has 
been considered as a key obstacle to corporate social responsibility, 
since it “hinder managers from considering the interests of other 
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corporate stakeholders besides shareholders” (Campbell, 2007; 
Evan and Freeman, 1983; Phillips, Freeman & Wicks, 2003).  
Should Europe reconsider its approach to corporate 
governance to enable a stronger link between corporate strategy 
and Agenda 2030? Are European legal traditions (e.g. the French, 
the German, the Scandinavian) a hidden treasure, which puts 
Europe in a privileged position to seek sustainability and prosperity 
in the mid- to long-term? After twenty years of research and lively 
debate fuelled, inter alia, by the Law and Finance approach, it is time 
to bury the hatchet, and develop a more balanced view of corporate 
governance structures, and most importantly a functional one, 
which looks at Europe’s mid-term goals. Below, we explore the 
differences between the Shareholder and Stakeholder theories of the 
corporation in greater depth, and propose a ‘third way’, the 
European Enterprise Model, which fits the needs and particularities 
of Europe’s unique legal, economic and social environment and 
puts the focus on economic value creation by means of growth and 
improved productivity.  
3.1 What if we got it all wrong? 
Piercing the veil of corporate governance structures, it appears that 
the polarisation of the debate along the dichotomy between the 
Anglo-Saxon and other legal traditions has sacrificed more 
important and granular issues, such as: the limited time supervisory 
board members allot to their complicated tasks; the combination of 
advice and supervision and the unhealthily close relationship 
between the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and the Chief 
Executive, cutting out other members of the Board and the 
Management team at critical moments. Likewise, the attention 
devoted to the issues of diversity on the board and executive 
remuneration overshadows more fundamental problems: for 
example, the restriction of corporate governance to the 
arrangements between the shareholder, the board and the 
management of the company, ignoring the works councils and other 
forms of employee participation. More generally, corporate 
governance depends on the positioning of the company in its socio-
economic context and on the source of its legitimacy. In this respect, 
rather than focusing only on the ‘shareholder primacy norm’, 
alternative forms such as cooperatives pursue the interests of their 
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members; foundations, a much-underestimated vehicle for 
economic activity, pursue their interests as laid down in their 
articles of association; and in millions of family businesses it is 
considered self-evident that the interests of the company and its 
contributions to society at large should take centre stage.  
An example of the focus adopted by mainstream corporate 
governance theory is the trade-off between the ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’ models of share ownership. The insider model arises in 
companies with share registers dominated by a controlling 
shareholder or a small group of shareholders (Edmans, 2014); 
whereas in the outsider model, individual shareholders are 
‘outsiders’ who may lack the incentive to actively engage in 
governance issues. The insider model is common in privately-held 
companies, but also among listed companies in continental Europe 
and in most other non-English speaking countries around the 
world; the outsider model of company ownership is common in 
many large UK- and US-listed corporations, and often arises 
because institutional investors and their asset managers – which 
dominate the share registers of Anglo-American listed companies – 
prefer to diversify their investments across large portfolios of 
equities and other asset classes.  
The starting point for mainstream corporate governance is 
that both the insider and outsider models create potential 
governance concerns for minority shareholders which need to be 
mitigated by an appropriate framework of governance. In the 
insider model, controlling shareholders can potentially exploit their 
high level of control and influence over the company in ways that 
might damage the interests of minority shareholders, e.g. through a 
range of techniques and activities which collectively are known as 
‘tunnelling’. In the outsider model, minorities may fear that the CEO 
and the board may be tempted to exploit their significant 
(executive) powers in a similarly self-serving manner.  
These problems have been addressed by an array of 
governance practices such as:  
 Appointing a largely independent board of directors, led by 
an independent chairman and mainly composed of 
independent non-executive directors, which oversees 
management and ensures that they remain loyal to the 
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interests of the company as a whole (including minority 
shareholders);  
 Giving strong legal rights to minority shareholders, 
including for example the right to call shareholder meetings, 
initiate civil actions against directors, pre-emption rights 
which prevent dilution when new shares are issued, or 
shareholder votes on some key corporate actions and 
appointments;  
 Adopting high levels of corporate disclosure and 
transparency, which facilitate the process of external 
company monitoring by outside shareholders and other 
stakeholders;  
 Adopting executive remuneration policies that align 
management incentives with the interests of shareholders, 
e.g. through stock awards or share options;  
 An active market for corporate control, which makes a 
company vulnerable to takeover or activist shareholder 
interventions if insufficient attention is paid by 
management to share price performance;  
 A significant role for external actors and advisors – such as 
auditors, proxy advisors, activist investors, investment 
bankers and stock market analysts – in keeping corporate 
decision-making in line with shareholders’ interests.  
According to conventional wisdom, the effective 
implementation of such a governance framework should enhance 
investor trust in the company and reduce the cost of capital. Such 
measures are also seen as an important means of attracting domestic 
and foreign investment. Many of these governance features have 
been encouraged or made obligatory over the last three decades by 
a mixture of developments in corporate and securities law, listing 
rules and corporate governance codes (implemented on the basis of 
“comply or explain”). 
Together with the OECD (Principles of Corporate 
Governance) and advisory firms, the European Commission has 
also been influential in promoting the spread of these practices in 
corporations. Recently, however, researchers have started to 
uncover the existence of a fundamental trade-off between 
mainstream corporate governance and the ability of a firm to 
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innovate. For example, Bianchini et al. (2015) measure the 
correlation between composite governance and innovation 
performance for over two thousand companies and find a 
surprising result: companies with ‘better’ corporate governance had 
on average a worse innovation performance. This effect was 
particularly evident for younger, less established companies. In 
addition, the authors found a strong negative association between 
innovation performance and the vulnerability of the company to 
takeover. One possible explanation for this is the dilemma between 
‘value protection’ and ‘value creation’ in corporations (Bertoni et al., 
2013). In a recent publication, Barker and Chiu (2018) boldly 
uncover the problem by observing that the insights from the 
resource-based theory of the firm “may conflict with the prevailing 
standards of corporate governance imposed on many securities 
markets for listed companies, which have developed based on 
theoretical models supporting a shareholder-centred and agency-
based theory of the firm”. The authors further argue that “there is a 
need to provide some room for accommodating the resource-based 
needs for companies in relation to promoting innovation” and 
suggest that the most practicable option would be the development 
of recognised exceptions that deviate from prevailing corporate 
governance standards.  
Even in countries with a two-tier board structure and a 
significant ‘co-determining’ role for employees – as in Germany, the 
Netherlands and various Nordic and central European economies – 
the emphasis is still on ‘protecting’ less well-placed stakeholders 
from the potential abuses of those with their hands on the levers of 
corporate power. In essence, the fundamental assumption at the 
heart of modern corporate governance is a lack of trust between the 
major company stakeholders. In our opinion, and with the support 
of most recent literature on corporate governance, we argue that 
governance is too narrowly defined in this debate. As 
authoritatively observed by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2004), “a 
theory of innovative enterprise plays little if any role in the current 
European policy discussion on corporate governance”. In other 
words, corporate governance scholars continue to focus largely on 
how the interests of outside shareholders and stakeholders are 
considered and safeguarded in listed companies, but not on the 
models of corporate governance that make companies (i) more 
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innovative; and (ii) more oriented towards the social good. To the 
contrary, more comprehensive enterprise models are required to 
provide a framework for the analysis of the impediments to the 
healthy development of the company and the removal thereof.  
Our conclusion is that lack of innovation, declining 
productivity growth and overall growth are not primarily macro-
economic problems, to be tackled by tried and tested macro-
economic instruments; they are prevalently micro-economic 
problems. So far, politicians and policymakers have had far too 
much respect for private sector management and have felt 
politically constrained in addressing corporate governance 
shortcomings: removing these self-imposed constraints will lead to 
interesting policy implications. 
3.2 Searching for the hidden treasure: a comparative 
analysis of business models 
3.2.1 The Shareholder Model 
At face value, the Shareholder (or Anglo-Saxon Enterprise) Model 
appears to be a highly appealing way to conduct business, but its 
key characteristics are also its flaws as outlined below. The 
underlying rationale is clear: shareholders are the modern 
incarnation of the entrepreneur, putting their money at risk: hence, 
it is considered morally just and economically wise to put the 
pursuit of shareholders’ interest at the forefront of corporate 
governance rules and practices. This in turn means that the return 
on equity (ROE) becomes the overriding corporate objective. The 
underlying (wrong) assumption is that endlessly rising profits per 
share are the key to a higher stock price and shareholder return. This 
assumption creates a number of impediments to innovation and 
growth. 
First, all things being equal, the push to optimise profits per 
share acts as a drag on investment. Bookkeeping conventions 
dictate that R&D and start-up costs of investments come at the 
expense of reported profits. Moreover, the push to maximise profit-
per-share makes it more attractive to acquire than to invest, since 
acquisitions are accounted for on the balance sheet, not the profit 
and loss account, and can be amortised over many years. As most 
HIDDEN TREASURES | 43 
 
acquisitions fail, much value is destroyed (Schilling, 2018). Finally, 
the key role of profit-per-share is behind the extent of stock buyback 
programmes, an expensive hobby with exploding stock markets, 
with consequences for the solvency of the company while not 
adding any value.  
Second, the safest way to increase profit in the shortest 
possible time is cost-cutting, often synonymous with manpower 
reduction. This practice can however break up valuable internal and 
external, commercial and operational networks and destroy 
intellectual property in the broadest sense of the word, e.g. 
including tacit knowledge. Defence of margins on existing products 
contributes more to profit than introducing new products, which 
might take time and resources. Another way in which cost-cutting 
is sought is mergers: but again, most mergers fail.  
Third, emphasis on personal leadership is rooted in the belief 
that only individuals can guarantee consistency in corporate 
policies and should then be held accountable. But this comes with a 
high price to pay, since the enterprise becomes fully exposed to all 
the biases and stereotypes of the leader, and to their overconfidence 
in predicting the future and judging people. Each new CEO feels 
entitled to impose radical change on the enterprise and non-
performing CEOs are very difficult to dislodge, leading to a toxic 
combination. In many enterprises, particularly US-headquartered 
ones, the Chairman and CEO roles are fulfilled by a single person, 
which may lead to a lack of checks and balances. In fact, the 
literature often compares this so-called US model with the UK 
model, which entails the separation of the two roles. This spurred a 
lively debate in academia, which ultimately seems to have led many 
US companies to consider the separation: the percentage of S&P 500 
companies whose chief executives also serve as chairman fell to 
45.6% in 2018, compared with 48.7% the year before: this is the 
lowest percentage in at least a decade, according to the Wall Street 
Journal.22 According to the same article, the percentage of Stoxx 
Europe 600 companies with the CEO and Chairman roles combined 
was as low as 9.2% in 2018, down from 11% in 2013. 
Fourth, the need to meet the profit-per-share target 
communicated to the markets leads to the implementation of tight 
controls based on financial and operational indicators. Sticks and 
carrots are introduced for each division and business unit down to 
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the individual employee. This provides strong incentives to 
negotiate reachable targets (so-called key performance indicators, 
or KPIs) with the next higher echelon at the expense of other units 
and creates fierce competition for resources to meet the targets. In 
the name of rationality, internal competition for investment 
budgets, talent and other resources is encouraged. All this results in 
low-trust organisations, which is far from helpful as the availability 
of inspired individuals and fruitful, proactive cooperation across 
organisational boundaries are key requirements for innovation and 
growth.  
Fifth, and more generally, the Shareholder Model can create a 
sometimes-suboptimal short-termism within corporations. As 
observed, among others, by Robert Anderson IV (2016), the law of 
corporate governance is “heading for a showdown” after, in recent 
years, a growing chorus of commentators has argued that “short-
term investors, especially short-term activist institutional investors, 
wield too much influence over corporate governance”. The core 
theme of these articles is that there is a “stark difference” between 
the interests of short-term and long-term investors: “[s]hort-term 
shareholders prefer managers to maximise short-run share price, 
while long-term shareholders prefer to forego immediate gains in 
favour of maximising long-run shareholder value” (Hazen, 1991). 
This is even truer in the case of institutional investors. As Kahan and 
Rock (2007) put it, short-termism “presents the potentially most 
important, most controversial, most ambiguous, and most complex 
problem associated with hedge fund activism”, giving rise to the 
related accusation that hedge funds induce managerial short-
termism. The issue is reportedly worsened by the existence of legal 
provisions and corporate policies, especially in the US, which tilt the 
balance in favour of short-term shareholders. They include: 
dividends and share repurchases, motivated by institutions’ desire 
to increase “short-term earnings” by cutting research and 
development; and the combination of leverage returning cash to 
shareholders. Karmel (2004) observes that during the 1980s, “the 
pressure for high overall return by institutional investors in U.S. 
corporations resulted in an unhealthy leveraging of U.S. 
corporations to meet that demand. Funds were borrowed to pay 
dividends to shareholders, in the form of ordinary cash 
distributions, share repurchases, or takeover premiums” 
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(Anabtawi, 2006). Grossman (2010) further argues that myopic 
markets end up penalising managers for long-term investment, 
pressuring them to govern for short-term objectives. 
Moreover, in a world dominated by the Shareholder Model, 
SMEs can suffer from the high staff turnover often occurring at large 
companies. The latter are constantly uprooting their organisation 
and cutting manpower, and SMEs struggle to find representatives 
with a mandate to close a deal. In organisations in which the 
avoidance of risk is a condition for survival this search could be 
frustrating. SMEs are never sure whether the negotiating positions 
adopted by their counterparts are chosen in the best interest of their 
companies, which is to be respected, or aimed at helping them meet 
their personal targets. Worse, SMEs know that their counterparts 
are under considerable pressure to meet their targets: a below-
average bonus is in many listed enterprises a kiss of death, 
accompanied by a looming threat of dismissal. This in turn leads 
SMEs to pull out all stops to get their way. The relationship, given 
these constraints and fears, ends up suspended in an endless 
negotiation game. Attempts to build trust in the interest of both 
parties are in vain, and even past evidence of solid, trust-based 
cooperation loses importance. Unilateral changes in the contract 
should be expected. The epitome of pressure exercised by large 
listed companies vis-à-vis SMEs is the retrospective demands for 
discounts: no obligation to concur of course, but at the expense of 
future orders.  
In summary, the favoured policies of listed companies often 
destroy economic value in the name of the shareholder: put bluntly, 
the Shareholder Model serves financial markets and not the 
economy. The emphasis on control and transfer of risk constitute 
high hurdles for innovation and enhanced productivity. And the 
consequence of adopting this model can end up worsening the 
relationship between large and small companies.  
3.2.2 The Stakeholder Model 
Like the Shareholder Model, the Stakeholder Model has 
considerable, albeit superficial appeal. Who would be against 
appropriate protection of shareholders and employees? And who 
wouldn’t, given their legitimate interests, be in favour of fair 
treatment of suppliers and customers? Intuitively, companies that 
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feel a responsibility to the communities in which they operate 
deserve support. However, the basic problem is that companies 
operate in a force field of conflicting demands expressed by a 
variety of more or less powerful interest groups. They must cope 
with many interrelated issues and continuously shifting coalitions 
around these issues. In more detail, companies that have embraced 
the Stakeholder Model are vulnerable in that they have to engage 
interest groups with and without legitimate claims. Stakeholders 
seek to institutionalise their position to strengthen their bargaining 
power. Also trade unions, employers’ associations, municipalities 
and special interest groups have different channels to make 
themselves heard. Trade unions, for example, negotiate collective 
labour agreements, are represented in works councils and are in the 
position to put pressure on governments and supervisory bodies for 
legal steps and regulatory measures. They also make inroads into 
the company by nurturing contacts with senior managers; and 
finally, the human resource department often acts as their informal 
internal lobbyist. Stakeholder theory has also been criticised for 
being somewhat nebulous, to such an extent that it eventually 
leaves corporate managers with no clear objective and deprives 
them of the possibility to act strategically in their self-interest (Miles, 
2017; Sternberg, 2004; Jensen, 2002). Other scholars (Key, 1999) have 
stated that it does not properly link different actors of the firm, nor 
does it link internalities and externalities. Also, Brandt and 
Georgiou (2018) observe that considering the interests of multiple 
stakeholders does not equate with being socially (let alone 
environmentally) responsible. On the one hand, broad social 
concerns and stakeholder considerations are not necessarily the 
same, and, indeed, stakeholder theory is not an underlying concept 
of corporate social responsibility. On the other hand, when it comes 
to long-term social and environmental sustainability 
considerations, it must be recalled that the relevant stakeholders 
(future generations) are often unable to make their voices heard 
within the boundaries of the corporation, and as such are mostly 
absent from the incentive scheme of the manager. The stakeholder 
approach is then nothing more than a strategic approach to doing 
business.  
In a nutshell, stakeholder corporations often drown in endless 
quests for consensus-building and incur substantial transaction 
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costs. Yet, the stakeholders of the future are not represented, which 
helps to resolve conflicts by postponing the tackling the issues of the 
day and by shifting the absorption of costs to later. This brings in a 
form of ‘collective’ short-termism, as opposed to the individual 
short-termism triggered by the Anglo-Saxon model. In a major 
misalignment between corporate incentives and the long-term 
requirement for pro-innovation, pro-sustainability corporate 
conduct, stakeholders end up exercising power without 
responsibility and accountability for the broader impact of the 
corporation’s activities. They invariably claim to act in the best 
interest of the company, helped by the feeble resistance of many 
corporate directors. Overburdened managers who must juggle with 
many dossiers on a single day are no match for rested, focused 
negotiators who know their single dossier inside out. The standard 
push-back by directors focused on the need for profitability is 
inadequate, as it inevitably leads to an unwinnable debate about the 
right level of shareholder return on investment. The need to 
maintain access to stock markets over time is too abstract even if it 
were true. The obligation on the part of the company to generate 
enough economic value to pay for all expenses, to invest and to 
cover the real cost of capital constitute far more solid ground for 
discussions with stakeholders (see the next chapter for more 
details).  
The consequences for innovation, productivity and growth of 
the company are again profound. Stakeholders are inherently 
conservative as any technical and organisational disruption implies 
a challenge to the delicate balance of power and is likely counter to 
their members’ interests. Most of the time it is a question of 
exercising veto power as most stakeholders lack the expertise to 
suggest viable alternatives. Thinking in terms of interests does not 
stop at the corporate boundary. The Stakeholder Model permits the 
practice where divisions and large business units act as 
powerhouses. The Board is well advised to obtain the support of 
divisions and business unit management for far-reaching proposals. 
Board proposals that seriously undermine the position of power of 
a division are guaranteed to trigger conflict. Proposals are often 
amended to accommodate divisions in the mistaken belief that such 
a concession will smoothen implementation. The original intentions 
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of the proposal become compromised and its potential value is not 
achieved.  
The position of power of various divisions is to a large degree 
dependent on their contribution to overall corporate profitability. 
This in turn often depends on a limited number of large customers 
that have integrated the corporate products in their offering to their 
customers and are therefore interested in improvement of quality 
and/or a lower price and not in innovation. Competition between 
divisions is part and parcel of corporate life, so as innovation 
requires permeable organisation boundaries many initiatives are 
short-lived. For all these reasons, the Stakeholder Model deserves 
its reputation for slow, inconclusive decision-making and the 
avoidance of risk.  
3.2.3 An alternative: towards a European Enterprise Model  
The most advanced European companies have moved beyond the 
standard models described in the previous chapters. Companies 
like Novo Nordisk, Statoil and Svenska Handelsbanken easily 
outshine their Anglo-Saxon competitors GSK, BP and Barclays in 
this respect. There is of course no way that financial markets will 
give up their grip on listed European companies which, with very 
few exceptions, have embraced the Shareholder Model, but 
companies that consider a stock market listing should be 
forewarned: this includes established private companies, but also 
small, fast-growing companies. The tide seems to have turned, as 
the number of listed companies comes down, the enrolment of 
students in MBA programmes declines, and public awareness of 
well-documented examples of corporate cynicism increases. 
Banking scandals have become part of life, large pharmaceutical 
companies come increasingly under fire for their pricing policies 
and the halo of the technological giants is gone. In the ‘trust game’, 
there is a need for more responsible business conduct, and the legal 
system is called on to provide adequate incentives to this end.23  
Astute observers point to the fact that companies that are 
guided or bound by shareholder interest are not in the best position 
to contribute to long-term challenges such as those posed by global 
warming (Dahlberg and Wiklund, 2018). What we define here as the 
‘European Enterprise Model’ is a broad church, as it should be, as 
different technologies and markets require different approaches, 
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but some general principles emerge in sharp contrast to the other 
two models.  
First, the European model draws heavily on the way many 
family companies are positioned and managed. Modern companies 
derive their licence to operate from society at large: this stimulates 
the exploration of possible futures and the prospects for the 
corporate products and services. Change without immediate need 
is a tall task but comes with huge rewards. 
Second, many European companies make the creation of 
economic value the leading principle in guiding decision-making. 
The difference over time between all forms of income and all kinds 
of expenditure should exceed the cost of capital, dividends and 
interest payments. The aim is to generate free cash flow for future 
investment and strengthen the balance sheet of the company: only 
a strong balance sheet can address the concern that companies need 
to be able to capture future cash flows. A strong balance sheet is also 
required to take the risks inherent in entrepreneurship.  
Third, this distinct emphasis helps to identify four different 
sources of economic value, each supported by specialised managers 
and by a tailor-made form of decision-making: the reduction of 
value destruction; better use of available assets and workforce; 
emphasis on investment lato sensu, including plant, equipment, and 
ICT but also organisational development and training; and changes 
made in the portfolio of business models supported by the 
company. A major step forward is that each member of the 
organisation contributes to one aim, each in a unique way. This way 
the company can be approached in a holistic way. This requires far-
reaching delegation of responsibility and accountability to the 
different management teams in charge of a specific form of value 
creation.  
In order to pursue its mission, such an organisation has 
dispersed leadership, not unlike the unique mandates of national, 
provincial and local institutions in well-designed multi-level 
governance systems. It can only be managed based on principles, 
not prescriptive rules. Its culture is characterised by fairness, 
internally and in dealings with suppliers, customers and partners 
(see above, Chapters 1 and 2 and below, Chapter 10). Only then can 
trust grow, and the cooperation fully move in the direction of 
productivity growth and sustainable development. 
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How widespread is this enterprise model? Schroeter (2007) 
recalls the words of famous American economist Charles 
Kindleberger, who observed that “If European integration is to be 
really achieved, there must be European corporations”. In his 
investigation, Schroeter finds evidence of distinctive traits of a 
European enterprise, despite the ongoing contamination with the 
American model, characterised by more evident organisational 
patterns such as the multi-divisional structure (the so-called M-
Form). Even today, large mergers such as Bayer/Monsanto pose 
challenges in the reconciliation of shareholder capitalism with more 
European ways to organise and conceive of business conduct and 
structure. Cassis, Colli and Shroeter (2016) have shed light on the 
transformation and contamination of European capitalism due to 
the advent of more risk-oriented forms of capitalism from across the 
Atlantic. Again, the push towards a European Enterprise Model 
may be further nurtured by Brexit, since the British corporate 
governance model has traditionally remained closer to the 
American one than the continental European one (Armour, Deakin 
and Konzelmann 2003). Williams and Conley (2005) spoke of a 
“third way” to capitalism already more than a decade ago, 
emphasising how the European model had already made progress 
towards enhanced corporate social and environmental 
responsibility of firms. 
The prospective European Enterprise Model, however, is not 
fully represented in the current EU corporate governance model, 
despite the fact that a vibrant debate has emerged since the late 
1990s among academics and other stakeholders (in particular trade 
unions) on the need to rebalance shareholder capitalism with more 
stakeholder representation and a more diffuse model of 
governance. For example, the so-called Davignon Working Group 
in 1997 argued that workers must be closely and permanently 
involved in decision-making at all levels of the company, and paved 
the way for the creation of the European Company Statute, or 
Societas Europaea (SE). Yet corporate governance was only put firmly 
on the European regulatory agenda a couple of years later, with the 
Financial Services Action Plan of 1999. A decade later, in the midst 
of the financial crisis, the De Larosière report commissioned by the 
European Commission concluded that corporate governance 
constituted “one of the most important failures of the present 
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crisis”. But little if anything has been tried since then to effectively 
reform the corporate governance model in Europe, let alone tailor it 
to SMEs, which constitute the overwhelming majority (more than 
98%) of European businesses.  
Horn (2011) sees a clear pattern in which the importance of 
workers in European enterprises, emphasised since the Green Paper 
on Employee Participation and Company Structure of 1975, has 
gradually been replaced by an almost exclusive emphasis on market 
efficiency. For example, she quotes the words of the then 
Commissioner for the Internal Market Frits Bolkestein, who claimed 
that the objective of regulation was merely “to set up a framework 
which then enables the markets to play their disciplining role in an 
efficient way” (Bolkestein, 2003). She further argues that during the 
1980s and 1990s, “rather than advocating a ‘positive’ harmonisation 
approach, the Commission’s approach has become increasingly 
based on identifying and subsequently eliminating obstacles to the 
free movement of companies and capital. Whereas corporate control 
used to be very much located in the domain of company law, subject 
to ‘positive’ harmonisation, it has become increasingly regulated 
under aspects of capital and financial markets law”. The long, 
tortuous passage of the EU Takeover Directive was a prime example 
of this shift, with a final result that places decisions related to the 
company in the case of a takeover exclusively in the hands of 
shareholders. Later, the 2003 Company Law Action Plan and key 
decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU contributed to this shift 
towards the ‘marketisation’ of European corporate governance. 
3.2.4 Key differences between enterprise models 
The key differences between the three models are summarised in 
Table 2 below, which highlights the distinctive features of the 
European Enterprise Model, in particular as concerns the emphasis 
on principles, the dispersed leadership, the focus on quality and the 
culture of cooperation. 
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Table 2. Key differences between the Shareholder, Stakeholder and 
European Models 
 Shareholder Model 
Stakeholder 
Model 
European 
Model 
Source of 
legitimacy Shareholder Stakeholder Society 
Worldview Financial Political Economic 
Modus 
Operandi Analytical Continuity Holistic 
Overriding 
objective 
Shareholder 
ROI Eclectic 
Creation of 
economic 
value 
Steering 
Variable Profit per share Multiple Free cash flow 
Principal 
source of 
finance 
Stock market Banks Diverse 
Leadership Individual Committee Dispersed 
Culture Individual competition 
Competition 
between units Cooperation 
Management By rule By principle derived rules By principle 
Decision-
making 
Procedure 
driven 
Horses for 
courses Quality driven 
Control Command & incentives 
Formal 
commitments 
Professional 
standards 
Attitude to risk Transfer and control Steering clear 
Facing 
uncertainty 
Source: Kalff (2017). 
3.3 Policy implications 
The discussion above has profound consequences for the 
relationship between corporate governance and the achievement of 
the vision of a more competitive and sustainable society, in 
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particular in Europe. It also has significant consequences for 
economic policy as a whole. For example, since the 1980s, 
governments have privatised many state companies such as 
utilities, railways, social services, health care, and to some extent 
education. This is sometimes defined as the first wave of regulatory 
governance and was greatly inspired by faith in the market 
mechanism, and some of its direct corollary, such as the shrinking 
of government regulation (‘less is more’). Governments were 
encouraged by the belief that markets were best suited to provide 
services on a large scale: this even led to a significant rise in the 
reliance on private sector to self-regulate even in critical domains of 
policymaking, such as the supervision of banks’ sizeable exposures 
(Balleisen, 2009; Renda, 2011). After 2008, further decentralisation 
and the need to cut costs to bring government spending under 
control went hand in hand. Governments, unduly impressed by 
private sector efficiency, were unwittingly instrumental in rolling 
out the Shareholder Model in many sectors. Today, disappointing 
results and unrealised savings should inspire member states to 
explore the merits of alternative models.  
Member states carry a direct responsibility for the enterprise 
model used by state-owned enterprises, and therefore for the value 
destruction that has taken place under their watch. Many 
opportunities to turn the tide have been squandered over the past 
decade, the most eye-catching being the chance to put banks on a 
different footing in the interest of the real economy. In particular, 
the stock market listing of banks makes them highly vulnerable.24 
Many supervisory and management boards played a large and 
negative role in the failure of their institutions. Governments 
replaced fonctionnaires but left the positioning, structure and culture 
of large banks intact. With the integrity of the financial system at 
stake, politicians, regulators and central banks should feel obliged 
to take a second look. 
Another responsibility of the member states is the upgrading 
of corporate governance codes as in many countries these codes are 
enshrined in law. The well-established practice to leave the 
upgrading and the adjusting of the code to the private sector and 
rubberstamp the results amount to no less than an abdication of 
responsibility.  
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Finally, member states finance and cherish business schools 
that, with very few exceptions, accept the primacy of financial 
markets and are committed to the teachings of shareholder business 
doctrines. They should feel compelled to diversify business 
education: the academic literature appears ready to accept non-
mainstream views, and the primacy of the Shareholder Model 
appears disproportionate in current curricula.  
Below, we offer a few ideas for future policy initiatives that 
would help in remedying some of the problems outlined in this 
chapter, bringing to light the merits of the European Enterprise 
Model, our third hidden treasure. 
3.3.1 Protect and stimulate diversity in corporate governance  
The alleged superiority of the shareholder model of corporate 
governance can safely be considered to belong to the past. The rise 
of a variety of possible corporate governance arrangements, which 
can be subsumed under a broad notion of a European Enterprise 
Model, provides a new possibility for businesses and member states 
to experiment with forms of governance that are more oriented 
towards stability, fairness and sustainability. In this respect, the 
variants of the European Enterprise Model are very much aligned 
with the need to rediscover the good faith requirement in the civil 
law of contracts (Chapter 1), as well as the need to avoid the 
excessive financialisation of the economy (Chapter 2). Ideally, 
competition between models of corporate governance could be 
promoted and stimulated by a more neutral regulatory framework, 
which creates the preconditions for greater social responsibility 
among corporations.  
3.3.2 Promote the development of the European Enterprise Model 
as an alternative for the Shareholder and Stakeholder Models 
The Commission can make a major contribution by capitalising on 
Brexit to return to the drawing board to redesign the European 
Company to align it with European characteristics, needs and 
vision. At present the European Company is a hybrid creature, 
drawing on two very different legal traditions. It is remarkable that 
despite its shortcomings, 50 large companies have already signed 
up. A revamped European Company could provide a suitable 
framework for tailor-made governance choices to which each 
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company can add elements of the European Enterprise Model. To 
facilitate this, the Commission should sponsor research into the 
impact of different enterprise models on innovation and economic 
development.  
The European Commission should also revisit work 
undertaken in the past and develop a European Company model 
for SMEs. While awareness of the cost of the Shareholder Model is 
growing, politicians are tempted to dust off the Stakeholder Model 
as an alternative: these voices are heard even in the US. This, 
however, would be a very serious mistake: ignoring for the moment 
that the Stakeholder Model was swept away by the Shareholder 
Model in only a couple of years, the Stakeholder Model is unsuited 
for modern economies. A European Company 2.0 would be an 
attractive alternative for the Shareholder Model and would help to 
avoid the trap of the Stakeholder Model. It would also provide an 
historic opportunity to put co-determination on a modern footing. 
Where work councils at present are relegated to rubber stamping 
directors’ decisions, a new body could become a true strategic 
partner in a context where financiers, the boards and the employees 
are all bound by the obligation to put the interest of the enterprise 
first.  
3.3.3 Establish a revamped Societas Privata Europaea  
Since the adoption of the SE legislation in 2001, the idea of creating 
a European Company form targeted at SMEs has been on the 
political agenda. In 2002, a High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts organised by the European Commission proposed the 
creation of the European Private Company, or Societas Privata 
Europaea (SPE). The Commission adopted an SPE proposal in 2003, 
followed up by a proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute 
for a European private company: however, the proposal was 
heavily criticised, among others by the European Trade Union 
Council and its members, which fear that this legal form could be 
used by companies to avoid national rules on worker involvement. 
Also the issues of separation of home and host country, minimum 
capital requirements and taxation issues remain controversial 
between member states. The idea continued to develop over the 
years and after a positive feasibility study by the Commission’s 
Company Law Action Plan, the European Parliament requested the 
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Commission to draw up a legislative proposal for the SPE in 
February 2007. In June 2008, the Commission presented its Proposal 
for a ‘Council Regulation on the Statute for a European private 
company’,25 which was broadly (although not unconditionally) 
welcomed by the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European 
Parliament. However, the proposal spurred a heated political 
debate based on the significant national differences, in particular as 
regards employee participation, as well as on fears that the 
favourable legal framework for the SPE could be strategically 
exploited by large companies. (Roth & Kindler, 2013, p. 23; 
Teichmann & Fröhlich, 2014, p. 537; Conac, 2015, p. 221). This 
discussion led to the adoption of a significantly revised proposal by 
the European Parliament in 2009, and ultimately to the failure to 
reach a political compromise in the Council at the end of that year.  
The Commission then proposed additional supranational 
legal forms, such as a European single-member company (Societas 
Unius Personae, or SUP). However, based on the Commission’s 2012 
Company Law Action Plan, the SUP mainly serves the purpose of 
facilitating the establishment of subsidiaries in other member states. 
As observed by Gelter (2018), “the relative lack of formalities, which 
might be its strength by making the SUP an appealing legal form, is 
again a weakness of this proposal, given the opposition from 
Member States favoring a more regulatory corporate law”.  
As of today, a genuinely European governance model tailored 
to SMEs is still missing. Establishing it would be a very important 
step towards the creation of an ad hoc legal system in which smaller 
businesses can thrive throughout the EU, both as stand-alone 
organisations and in their relationship with large companies. 
3.3.4 Diversify management education to cater to the requirements 
of the shareholder model  
Business guru Peter Drucker famously commented a few years ago: 
“if you find an executive who wants to take on social 
responsibilities, fire him, fast”. Most of the business community, 
especially in the United States, has followed this mantra for 
decades. In Jon Benjamin’s The New Republic, an MBA student and 
Dean’s Fellow at the MIT Sloan School of Management argued that 
“MBA programs are not the open forums advertised in admissions 
brochures”, and that when dealing with any business issue, MBA 
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classes normally wave away society-level implications, assuming 
the principals’ overriding goal—profit maximisation. In a Financial 
Times article, Sarah Murray observed that “while there is growing 
consensus that focusing on short-term shareholder value is not only 
bad for society but also leads to poor business results, much MBA 
teaching remains shaped by the shareholder primacy model”. 
The primacy of the Shareholder Model in today’s business 
schools has been subject to extensive literature in economics and 
management. One specific case is that of the “agency theory” put 
forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976), which quickly reached the 
top of the ranking of the most quoted papers in major economics 
journals. As recently observed by Salter (2019), “the most significant 
management implication of this elegantly argued theory — that 
long-term value maximisation for shareholders needs to be the 
primary metric for assessing the performance of business enterprise 
— also found a great deal of support in the financial and business 
communities and among faculty members in many leading business 
schools, including my own” (i.e. Harvard Business School). Jensen 
also famously observed (in 2002) that “any organization must have 
a single-valued objective as a precursor to purposeful or rational 
behavior … It is logically impossible to maximise in more than one 
dimension at the same time … telling a manager to maximise 
current profits, market share future growth profits, and anything 
else one pleases will leave that manager with no way to make a 
reasoned decision. In effect, it leaves the manager with no 
objective”. Even more recently, Spencer (2019) observes that 
mainstream economic theories have “condoned more than created 
‘bad’ management”, and that the transformation of management 
will require wider reforms in, and importantly beyond, business 
schools. Rönnegard and Smith (2018) recall that “business schools 
teach as part of the ‘Theory of the Firm’ that profit maximisation is 
the purpose of the corporation in society and that it is the duty of 
managers to pursue this end on behalf of shareholders as their 
agents”. West (2011) adds that this is not only true of business 
schools but also law schools. Several authors suggested that a 
disproportionate focus on the Shareholder Model by business 
schools was a contributory factor in the 2008 financial crisis 
(Rönnegard and Smith, 2018). 
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Against this background, business schools are teaching, with 
few exceptions, the same theory of the firm that led the whole 
economic and financial system to the brink of collapse, and the 
whole economy along an unsustainable path. If a new variety of 
models of corporate governance is to be promoted in Europe, this 
too will have to change.26 
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4. INNOVATION:  
EUROPE’S MOST HIDDEN TREASURE? 
The dominant rhetoric among EU policymakers is that despite being 
a leader in basic research in several scientific domains, the EU lags 
behind the US and other countries, such as Japan and Korea, when 
it comes to innovation; and its lead over China is gradually 
shrinking. Very often, industry leaders and high-level politicians 
have denounced Europe’s innovation deficit, and pointed at the 
impossibility to restore sustainable growth absent a shift of gear in 
this key dimension of economic performance. Among the key 
factors that are often associated with these concerns, the most 
recurrent are the lack of entrepreneurial, risk-loving culture in 
Europe’s ageing society; the corresponding lack of widespread 
venture capital investment; an overall business environment that 
does not easily accommodate failure; a too precautionary approach 
in regulation, which ends up stifling innovation; a lack of openness 
towards immigrants, who end up having few chances to prove their 
worth at opening and running new businesses; and a massive 
amount of red tape, which forces SMEs into too burdensome 
compliance behaviour and investment. Based on all these 
arguments, both the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 and the Europe 2020 
strategy at the beginning of this decade were launched with a clear 
intention to boost Europe’s innovation performance, in particular 
by setting the target of spending at least 3% of EU GDP on research 
and innovation.  
While these arguments all have some merit, a closer look 
reveals a more nuanced picture. First, not all European countries are 
performing badly on innovation: on the contrary, many of them, 
including Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Germany 
score very highly in global innovation rankings. Table 3 below 
shows the Global Innovation Index 2018 ranking, which sees 
Switzerland on top, followed by the Netherlands and Sweden, and 
with the UK, Finland, Denmark, Germany and Ireland in the top 10.  
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Table 3. Global Innovation Index 2018 rankings 
 
Source: Global Innovation Index 2018 
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While the comparison with the US is always 
methodologically difficult (one must consider that several states of 
the US, starting with Massachusetts and California, would rank 
above the best EU member states if compared one to one, see 
Granieri and Renda, 2010), this finding suggests that there are no 
structural elements that would prevent the whole of Europe from 
outperforming other large blocs on innovation. Looking at the most 
innovative cities, Europe is even better positioned: Barcelona, 
Berlin, Munich, Milan, London, Paris, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, 
Stockholm and many others provide proof of European dynamism, 
by providing ideal platforms and ecosystems to test socially 
relevant innovation. In a recent report by Philips Lighting and 
SmartCitiesWorld, Barcelona was listed as a prime example of a city 
undergoing a “smart transition” having created 47,000 jobs by 
embedding IoT solutions across the city, as well as saving 
€42.5 million on water use and generating €36.5 million annually 
through smart parking. Similarly, London has become a testing 
ground for IoT technology, almost equalling Singapore in this race 
to the future. In the Cities in Motion index compiled by Barcelona-
based IESE Business School, and which presents performance scores 
for 165 cities across 80 countries based on an exhaustive list of 
economic and social indicators, London, Amsterdam and Paris rank 
in the highest positions alongside New York, and Helsinki, Berlin, 
Stuttgart, Antwerp and Prague rank among the highest in the Social 
Cohesion indicators.27 Europe clearly dominates the top spots in the 
ranking, with seven west European cities in the top ten positions. 
Europe’s dominance becomes even more evident if one looks at the 
top 50: more than half of the cities are European. Table 4 below 
shows how Europe performs compared to other regions in many 
city-related indicators. 
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Table 4. Cities of the world, various indicators 
Ranking 
by city 
CIMI 2018 
(IESE) 
Global 
Cities 
Index 2018 
(A.T. 
Kearney) 
Global 
Financial 
Centres 
Index 
(GFCI) 
2018 
(Z/Yen) 
Global 
Power City 
Index 2018 
(MMF) 
Quality of 
Living City 
Ranking 
2018 
(Mercer) 
Global 
Liveability 
Index 2018 
(Economist 
Intelligence 
Unit) 
Sustainable 
Cities Index 
2018 
(Arcadis) 
1 London New York London London Vienna Vienna London 
2 New York London New York New York Zurich Melbourne Stockholm 
3 Amsterdam Paris Hong Kong Tokyo Munich Osaka Edinburgh 
4 Paris Tokyo Singapore Paris Auckland Calgary Singapore 
5 Reykjavik Hong 
Kong 
Tokyo Singapore Vancouver Sydney Vienna 
6 Tokyo Los 
Angeles 
Shanghai Amsterdam Düsseldorf Vancouver Zurich 
7 Singapore Singapore Toronto Seoul Frankfurt Toronto Munich 
8 Copenhagen Chicago San 
Francisco 
Berlin Geneva Tokyo Oslo 
9 Berlin Beijing Sydney Hong Kong Copenhagen Copenhagen Hong Kong 
10 Vienna Brussels Boston Sydney Basel Adelaide Frankfurt 
Source: Cities in Motion Index 2019. 
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Second, and relatedly, Europe seems to be performing 
relatively well in terms of the creation of start-ups. According to a 
report presented by Atomico, a venture capital firm started by 
Skype founder Nicholas Zennstroem, $19 billion were invested in 
European start-ups in 2017; the Global Innovation Index published 
by Cornell University, INSEAD and WIPO reported that 8 out of 10 
of the world’s most innovative markets are now located in Europe. 
Companies like Google, Facebook, Apple are launching incubators 
to reap the benefits of this cultural change: Google now has 
campuses in Berlin, London, Madrid and Warsaw, which launched 
start-ups that raised over €260 million in capital and created more 
than 4,600 new jobs; Facebook’s Startup Garage in Paris is the 
world’s largest start-up campus. Where Europe seems to have a 
problem is in scaling up, rather than starting up: this is why the 
European Innovation Council is being set up, to help existing small 
ventures access the whole of the single market and even go global.28  
Third, it is a myth that Europe is always more precautionary 
than the US; and it is also a myth that the precautionary principle 
always kills innovation. While Vogel (2010) and others have 
reported Europe’s more precautionary approach based on a limited 
number of specific, selected cases, a ten-year-long research effort 
that culminated in the publication of a thorough report (Wiener et 
al., 2010) found that the reality is more complex, and there are 
important cases in which US regulation is considerably more 
precautionary than that of the EU.29 More recently, Wiener et al. 
(IRGC, 2017) reiterate that “it is not EU precaution versus US 
reaction, or ex ante versus ex post legal systems, or civil law versus 
common law, or uncertainty-based versus evidence-based 
regulatory systems”. Moreover, since the early publications of 
Nicholas Ashford (1986) and later Porter and van der Linden (1995), 
scholars have shown overwhelming empirical evidence that 
regulation is often an enabler, not a killer, of innovation: especially 
stringent regulation and standards, properly designed, have 
stimulated new products, processes, and work practices that would 
not otherwise have occurred (Ashford et al., 1985; Porter & van der 
Linden, 1992; Pelkmans & Renda, 2014; OECD, 2016; Ashford and 
Renda, 2016). However, transformative, disruptive innovation often 
comes from sources beyond the incumbent producers or providers, 
which implies that care must be taken in order to prevent 
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incumbents and special interests from unduly influencing either the 
industrial or the regulatory policy process.  
Fourth, Europe’s diversity, freedom of movement of people 
and cooperation between member states is potentially an unrivalled 
source of innovation. The number of professionals working in other 
EU countries is on the rise, the Erasmus programme contributes to 
increased mobility across borders, and EU cities are becoming 
increasingly diverse. Recent research has confirmed that cultural 
diversity, when supported by inclusion policies, significantly 
promotes innovation. For example, the Boston Consulting Group 
found that increasing the diversity of leadership teams leads to 
more and better innovation and improved financial performance;30 
a study for Bertelsmann-Stiftung (2018) finds that businesses that 
hire people of diverse cultural backgrounds are better positioned to 
develop ideas for new products, services and processes;31 McKinsey 
(2018) examined proprietary data sets for 366 public companies 
across a range of industries in Canada, Latin America, the UK and 
the US in order to explore the relationship between financial results 
and the composition of top management and boards, and found that 
companies in the top quartile for racial and ethnic diversity are 35% 
more likely to enjoy financial returns above their respective national 
industry medians. However, Europe does not seem to be fully 
capitalising on its diversity, in particular since many member states 
are still extremely reluctant to attract talent from abroad, be that 
another EU country or a non-EU one. Ambitious past initiatives 
such as the Blue Card Directive, which aimed at establishing an 
easy-to-use, universal visa programme for highly skilled workers, 
have not produced the desired results, and the review of the Blue 
Card was a priority for the Juncker Commission.32 Currently, the EU 
is not able to attract a large share of highly educated residents, as 
shown in Figure 11 below.  
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Figure 11. Distribution of foreign-born residents with low versus high level of education, by OECD destination country, 
2015-2016, in% 
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Due, inter alia, to mounting anti-immigration sentiments, the 
revision of the Blue Card Directive has proven to be a daunting task. 
Among the major blocking issues: the scope, the harmonisation of 
the EU Blue Card scheme on the EU level, the recognition of 
professional experience, the minimum wage threshold, the long-
term mobility, the labour market test and the eligibility for the long-
term resident status. Other issues such as equal treatment, 
permitted period of unemployment, procedural deadlines and 
recognised employers’ schemes, are also awaiting compromises 
among political leaders in Europe. As a result, despite the changing 
attitude towards foreign talent in the US, Europe is currently not in 
the position to fully uncover this hidden treasure, further nurture 
its entrepreneurial community, and boost its innovation 
performance.  
Fifth, academic literature is thoroughly revising the concept 
of innovation, reaching the conclusion that not all innovation is 
equally relevant for society. Entrepreneurship and innovation are 
means, not ultimate policy goals: and innovation is useful to society 
when it helps in achieving societal goals (Konnola et al., 2016). This 
means that public policy, besides striving to create a suitable 
environment for entrepreneurship, should seek to incentivise those 
entrepreneurial ventures and innovation efforts that help in 
addressing unresolved societal challenges. The emerging debate on 
the crisis of Silicon Valley, with The Economist even announcing the 
forthcoming “death of the Valley” (as opposed to the widely 
acknowledged problem of the ‘Valley of death’), focuses in 
particular on the fact that Silicon Valley tech companies have lost 
contact with real societal needs, and increasingly develop 
inventions that are good for ‘deep pockets’, further exacerbating 
inequality. The Valley is now criticised as being too expensive, 
chaotic, and tough for small companies as big tech giants pay their 
employees so generously that start-ups struggle to attract talent.33 
Most importantly, the ‘Silicon Valley model’ focuses on the 
commercialisation of relatively mature technologies for specific 
markets: this model is considered hardly suitable for emerging 
societal challenges, which require a more orchestrated, disruptive, 
ecosystem-led approach to problem solving and innovation (Satel, 
2018).  
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Finally, there is emerging consensus among academics that 
Europe does not have a problem with innovation, but rather with the 
diffusion of innovation (Ashford and Renda, 2016). Public policy in 
support of innovation should then look beyond the ‘innovation 
deficit’, to encompass the ‘diffusion deficit’ that prevents new 
technologies and business models from reaching the market or 
becoming affordable for the majority of consumers. The Staff 
Working Document published by the European Commission in 
2015 on “Better Regulation for Innovation-Driven Investment” 
acknowledged the key role of public policy in removing obstacles to 
the commercialisation and diffusion of existing technologies, which 
lack a sufficiently large market in Europe.34 Rodriguez-Pose et al. 
(2017) observe that “many European firms, regions and countries 
have problems in absorbing and exploiting new knowledge from an 
economic point of view and are not particularly able to turn 
knowledge generation into innovation. This is especially true in the 
more peripheral regions in the EU where R&D is often spatially 
fragmented, concerns mainly public, not private R&D, and is 
concentrated disproportionally in scientific disciplines like Social 
Sciences and Humanities”. The authors, members of the RISE 
advisory group to Commissioner Moedas, advocate a public policy 
that focuses on enabling diffusion through nurturing the innovation 
ecosystem. These include increasing the absorptive capacity of local 
firms; promoting the presence of ‘related variety’ in regions, which 
enhances local knowledge spillovers and diversification; a suitable 
set of formal and informal institutions, as embodied in high quality 
of government and bridging social capital (Cortinovis et al., 2016); 
agents of change offering better support for private R&D; building 
on ‘pockets of excellence’; and dealing with global value chains and 
digitalisation.  
4.1 A misrepresented gap? 
Against this background, the gap between the US and the EU 
appears to be at once exaggerated due to the outstanding 
performance of selected, extremely large tech giants in the US (and 
also China); and exacerbated by Europe’s problems in harnessing 
all its potential. More precisely, the gap may be exaggerated due to 
the exorbitant performance of the top tech firms in the US, which 
led Apple and Amazon to break the roof of $1 trillion in terms of 
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capitalisation, and the rest of the economy. The market cap of the 
top 5 S&P 500 companies is slightly greater than the market cap of 
the bottom 282 S&P 500 companies.  
As of 1 July 2018, one stock alone was responsible for more 
than a third of the market’s year-to-date (YTD) performance: 
Amazon, whose 45% YTD return had contributed to 36% of the S&P 
total return of 3%, including dividends. Goldman Sachs also 
calculated that the return of the Top 10 S&P 500 stocks of 2018 
amounted to 122% of the S&P total return in the first half of the year. 
Amazon, Microsoft, Apple and Netflix were responsible for 84% of 
the S&P growth in 2018: without the FAANGs, as estimated by Bank 
of America, the S&P 500 return in the first half of 2018 would have 
been -0.7%. 
Figure 12. Excluding FAANG stocks, index returns would have been 
negative in 1H2018 
 
 
Below the so-called FAANGS, 95% of the most advanced US 
companies (part of the S&P500) have not improved their 
productivity in the past decade. Van Ark et al. (2018) observe that 
“technology and especially digitisation have led to inflated early 
expectations of faster productivity growth. While new digital 
technologies have rapidly diffused across the economy, their 
HIDDEN TREASURES | 69 
 
absorption and translation into better business performance has 
been quite slow and uneven”. This leaves the prospects for the 
future of US capitalism uncertain, despite an overall sustained 
productivity growth; and further raises the issue of whether 
European capitalism is (or should be) different (as we observed 
above in Chapters 2 and 3).  
The gap between the US and the EU is, of course, also 
exacerbated by several contradictions and imperfections in policies 
and strategies undertaken by the EU and its member states. These 
must be overcome for Europe to achieve leadership in large-scale, 
socially relevant innovation, our proposed hidden treasure. Several 
causes can be identified. 
 The European Commission has highlighted the need to 
improve the creation and diffusion of high-quality new 
knowledge and innovation in Europe. Technology transfer 
between universities and businesses seems to encounter 
significant obstacles and is only partly addressed by existing 
EU policies (Renda et al., 2019, forthcoming). Knowledge 
diffusion between business and academia remains lower in 
the EU than in the US, as public-private co-publications per 
million-population stand over 35 points lower than in the US. 
 Too often policies are not aligned with the goal to promote 
socially relevant innovation. For example, Ashford and 
Renda (2016) show the existing misalignment of policies that 
should promote decarbonisation at various levels of 
government in the EU. The role of the state is essential in these 
cases, given that investment in sustainable technologies and 
market solutions creates positive externalities, which are not 
reaped by investors absent a specific intervention to correct 
the market failure. This is to be coupled with the poor 
performance of carbon pricing in Europe’s ETS framework. 
The EU’s stated goal to mainstream the Sustainable 
Development Goals into all aspects of EU policymaking 
(European Commission 2016, 2019) is currently far from being 
implemented: suffice it to think about the lack of orientation 
towards SDGs in the semester; and also the relatively 
‘unsustainable’ footprint of many of projects funded by the 
first years of the ‘Juncker plan’.35 
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 Demand-side policies such as the strategic use of public 
procurement to promote socially beneficial innovation are 
under-developed. This is due, inter alia, to the lack of 
coordination of public procurement at the EU level (Renda et 
al., 2014), as well as the fact that procurement, even when it is 
most innovation-friendly, rarely looks at more disruptive 
innovation products and services, and concentrates on 
incremental ones (Czarnitzki et al., 2018). In addition, the 
diffusion of SME-friendly procurement is still very uneven in 
the EU, as shown by recent studies for the European 
Commission.36 The often-evoked financing problem of SMEs 
would at least be mitigated if governments at all levels helped 
in offering facilities for testing prototypes, or acted as 
launching customers.  
 Innovation funding is still very complex and burdensome for 
SMEs. Scientists and product developers spend up to 30% of 
their time preparing requests for subsidies, supported by a 
whole cottage industry of subsidy experts, although the last 
Multiannual Financial Framework has seen some marked 
improvements in this respect, reducing the time spent for 
Horizon 2020 projects to an estimated 5%-10%.37 The 
European Commission also estimated that it costs Horizon 
2020 applicants €636 million annually to write proposals, for 
a total of €1,908.9 million during the first three years. Of these 
costs, it is estimated that €1.7 billion was spent on writing 
proposals that did not obtain funding, including €643 million 
for non-funded high-quality proposals alone.38  
 The transition from innovation to the creation of economic 
value could be made smoother if applications for funding 
included an ‘early market test’, such as commitments by 
private parties to bring a project to a next level of 
development if and when certain R&D milestones are 
achieved. So far, the bridging of research and innovation in 
Horizon 2020 has led to mixed results: as reported by 
Simonelli (2016), the share of SMEs among total applicants, 
funded applicants and granted funds were all higher in the 
previous Framework Programme (FP7) than in the Horizon 
2020 calls completed in 2014, the first year of Horizon 2020.  
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Figure 13. SME funding: the first year of Horizon 2020 versus FP7 
 
Source: Simonelli (2016), based on data from eCorda. 
 
Possible explanations to the limited involvement of SMEs in 
Horizon 2020 can be found in some barriers still hindering their 
participation. The CEPS Task Force on Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship, which concluded its work in 2016, pointed out 
that SMEs: i) are often unaware of the (complex system of) existing 
support schemes; ii) face substantial obstacles in drafting 
convincing proposals due to limited time and resources and 
inadequate access to skills and knowledge (including linguistic 
skills); iii) have considerable difficulties in finding partners and in 
building and managing international consortia; iv) have limited 
access to finance to complement EU funds when required (e.g. in 
Innovation Actions and SME Instrument). Other, more general 
problems relate to the excessive focus on quantitative goals, rather 
than on checking that SMEs actually participate in the research and 
innovation activities. For example, Simonelli (2016) analyses the 
new ‘SME instrument’ introduced by Horizon 2020 and finds that 
the lion’s share of applications received so far have been submitted 
by single entities, a finding that is in line with the concern that the 
instrument might end up discouraging cooperation since it does not 
allow the submission and/or implementation of two or more 
projects at the same time by the same applicant. In the future, this 
instrument could be accompanied by strategic procurement tools 
such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small 
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Business Research Initiative (SBRI), which produced positive results 
both in the US and in European countries such as the Netherlands 
(and to some extent, the UK) (Granieri and Renda, 2010).39  
The role of pro-innovation regulation, the “innovation 
principle” and “innovation deals” has been limited. So far, the 
adoption of the “SME test” and of the “innovation principle” at the 
EU level has not been fully satisfactory. This is also because these 
screenings tend to become last-minute concerns and box-ticking 
exercises in the overall policy process (Renda and Simonelli, 2019). 
Similarly, the attempt to translate the Dutch “green deals” into 
“Innovation Deals” has produced less than a handful of meaningful 
applications to date, and the instrument itself seems to be affected 
by an excessive emphasis on ‘less is more’; a rather toothless set of 
possible remedies in case the deal is successful (only “clarification” 
of rules is contemplated); and an overall design that is ill-suited for 
more disruptive, systemic innovation. In fact, due to their 
negotiated nature, innovation deals can suffer from an 
“incumbency” problem, and as such would lend themselves more 
easily to incremental innovation, rather than substantial market 
reshuffling.  
4.2 Towards a mission-oriented approach to 
innovation 
In the era of digitally-enabled, open innovation, socially relevant 
breakthroughs require a massive transformation of many 
industries, the use of both money (spending programmes) and 
policies, a joint effort of the public and the private sector, and a 
contribution from citizens and users in co-creating solutions (Soete 
et al., 2017). No leap forward can be achieved without the unique 
contribution of different parties: therefore, much more needs to be 
done to forge coalitions. Such coalitions should be established on 
the basis of the contributions each member makes to the project, and 
would ideally also include non-EU partners.  
We believe that the power of mission-oriented coalitions 
could be exploited further, through better governance and 
enhanced consolidation: this is why we include them in our hidden 
treasures. The European Commission has experimented with such 
coalitions in the past two decades, generating all sorts of platforms 
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and corresponding acronyms: KETs, FETs, KICs, JUs, JTIs, RIs, EIPs, 
RIAs, and many more. However, on only a few occasions has the 
participation of different communities (researchers, entrepreneurs, 
students, policymakers, local administrations, investors, etc.) led to 
the expected, or desired, results. One good example is provided by 
the Knowledge and Innovation Communities, which incorporated 
research, innovation and also education components, and have in 
some circumstances led to remarkable, inclusive results (e.g. 
ClimateKIC and InnoEnergy, more than the others). But overall, the 
lack of a clear set of milestones, the lack of discretion in simplifying 
procedures and selecting a portfolio of projects with varying levels 
of risk-reward, and a lack of citizen engagement have undermined 
the full success of these initiatives.40  
Moreover, in two recent evaluation exercises, the European 
Commission has found added value in large institutionalised 
partnerships that aim at advancing the EU’s agenda in specific 
sectors, addressing specific societal challenges. Partnerships such as 
CleanSky2, Shift2Rail, SESAR, FCH2, IMI2, BBI, ECSEL have been 
generally successful, but have also faced a number of challenges that 
would need to be effectively addressed in the future governance 
arrangements. Among the common challenges are the need to 
include a wider range of stakeholders either in the governance 
structures or in submitted proposals; the limited interaction 
between the Governing Boards and their advisory bodies; 
alignment with policies at EU, national and regional level; the 
choice of the Key Performance Indicators used to measure specific 
impacts; the need to include indicators related to the global 
competitiveness of the relevant industrial sectors; the participation 
of SMEs; the low participation rates of the EU-13 member states; and 
the need to improve and enforce communication activities and, in 
particular, to ensure effective dissemination of project results.  
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Figure 14. Evolution of existing Joint Undertakings 
 
Source: European Commission Interim Evaluation, SWD(2017) 338 final. 
 
Article 185 initiatives have been shown to contribute to a 
more integrated and coordinated R&I programming in Europe; at 
the same time, they require a dedicated implementation structure, 
which in and of itself involves a considerable investment in 
administrative management and governance. The financial 
commitment expected from the EU and its partners is also much 
larger than any of the other options, given its longer life cycle 
compared to other options and the administrative burden of 
establishing and implementing these partnerships.  
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Figure 15. Article 185 Partnerships launched to date 
 
Source: Meta-Evaluation of Article 185 Initiatives Report of the Expert Group. 
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A meta-evaluation of existing 185 Partnerships in 2017 
highlighted, inter alia: the need to use Article 185 as a strategic 
opportunity to enable policy cooperation between MS and the EU; 
the need to develop a coherent process for identification and 
selection of initiatives, the need to define an exit strategy from the 
outset; important margins of improvement in term of efficiency, 
especially through the creation of a single structure, preferably a 
public body, to serve all of the active Article 185 initiatives; the need 
to re-orientate the Article 185 more towards outcomes and impacts; 
the need to acknowledge more the needs and priorities of less 
research-intensive countries in shaping these initiatives, and to 
accommodate better and more actively the priorities and needs of 
the less R&D intensive countries; the need to exploit synergies with 
Structural Funds; and the need for the Commission to play a more 
proactive role without compromising member states’ ownership. 
The meta-evaluation also called for more coherence and a reinforced 
international dimension. 
Figure 16. The new landscape of Partnerships in Horizon Europe 
compared to Horizon 2020 
 
Source: European Commission. 
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Against this background, the European Commission, backed 
by experts such as Pascal Lamy, Mariana Mazzucato and two 
groups of advisors (RISE and ESIR), decided to propose the 
transition towards a more consolidated group of Partnerships and 
a limited number of Missions in five domains.  
As regards Partnerships, a major (and highly needed) 
simplification is expected with the transition from Horizon 2020 to 
Horizon Europe in 2021.  
The budget increase foreseen (from €80 billion to more than 
€100 billion) and the consolidation of the ‘partnership’ form are 
extremely good news for the future of European innovation, and 
bring back to the forefront of the debate another of Europe’s hidden 
treasures: the ability to promote and achieve innovation through 
large coalitions and public-private initiatives.  
The new Partnerships will be flanked by a brand new type of 
initiative, the so-called Missions in which selected agencies, with 
agile governance, will be called on to merge education, research 
innovation and industrial policy into large, dynamic coalitions that 
will seek maximum impact, generate spillover effects, provide input 
to policies, and reach out to the general public to co-create solutions. 
Nested in the Sustainable Development Goals, the forthcoming 
Missions should follow a constant cycle of road-mapping, 
consultation, planning, experimentation, monitoring, evaluation, 
learning and feedback into the road-mapping exercise (see ESIR 
second memorandum, Soete et al., 2018). This should be a constant 
cycle, that spins as fast as the Mission allows, and should be fed by 
as many researchers and entrepreneurs as possible. The five areas 
selected for Missions include “Adaptation to climate change 
including societal transformation”, “Cancer”, “Healthy Oceans, 
Seas, Coastal and Inland Waters”, “Climate-Neutral and Smart 
Cities” and “Soil Health and Food”, and will be led by well-known 
figures, who will act as Chairs of the respective Mission boards. 
These Missions are expected to boost the impact of EU-funded 
research and innovation by mobilising investment and EU-wide 
efforts around measurable and time-bound goals concerning issues 
that affect citizens’ daily lives. Each Mission board will consist of 15 
experts, including the chair.  
Partnerships and Missions are a ‘once in a generation’ 
opportunity for Europe’s unique approach to innovation, and may 
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be coupled with other initiatives between member states and 
industry, called Important Projects of Common European Interest 
(IPCEI), as perfectly exemplified by the recently launched “Battery 
Alliance” and Microelectronics projects (see box below). These 
industrial policy projects must also be scrutinised under EU state 
aid rules. The 2014 Communication on Important Projects of 
Common European Interest observes that where private initiatives 
supporting innovation fail to materialise because of the significant 
risks such projects entail, member states can jointly fill the gap to 
overcome market failures and boost the realisation of innovative 
projects that otherwise would not have taken off. In order to qualify 
for support under the IPCEI Communication, a project must: (i) 
contribute to strategic EU objectives, (ii) involve several member 
states, (iii) involve private financing by the beneficiaries, (iv) 
generate positive spillover effects across the EU that limit potential 
distortions to competition, and (v) be highly ambitious in terms of 
research and innovation. 
 
Box: the “IPCEI” in batteries and microelectronics  
Batteries 
Batteries will represent a high proportion of the value added in cars of 
the future. Since the car industry is a major player in the European 
economy, it is essential to retain as much value creation in Europe as 
possible. However, currently, the EU has no capability to mass produce 
battery cells, and relies for this on foreign, mainly Asian suppliers. 
Batteries can also be a major source of jobs, economic growth and 
investment for the EU.  
For this purpose, a European Battery Alliance (see Figure 17) was 
launched in October 2017 by Vice-President Šefčovič, gathering the 
European Commission, interested EU countries, the European 
Investment Bank, key industrial stakeholders, and innovation actors. 
The immediate objective is to create a competitive manufacturing value 
chain in Europe with sustainable battery cells at its core. According to 
some forecasts, Europe could capture a battery market of up to 
€250 billion a year from 2025 onwards. Covering the EU demand alone 
requires at least 10 to 20 ‘gigafactories’ (large-scale battery cell 
production facilities). 
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Figure 17. The European Battery Alliance 
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Two years later, in 2019, cross-border, large-scale integrated 
consortia are being established in EU countries across all segments of 
the EU value chain: raw materials (Sweden, Finland, Portugal); 
chemicals (Belgium, Poland, Germany, Finland); battery cells 
production (Sweden, France, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic); 
battery pack, software, machine tools and engineering (Germany, 
France, Spain, Slovakia); and recycling (Belgium, Germany). According 
to InnoEnergy, €100 billion have already been announced as being 
invested in flagship projects covering the entire supply chain. Public 
authorities – namely, the European Commission, member states and 
the EIB – are joining forces to support this venture. 
 
Microelectronics 
Investment in research and innovation in microelectronics carries a 
considerable element of risk, and therefore public support is 
appropriate and necessary to incentivise companies to carry out these 
ambitious research, development and innovation activities. 
Microelectronics are considered by the Commission as a Key Enabling 
Technology, which are technologies that have applications in multiple 
industries and will help tackle societal challenges. The Commission 
thus concluded that the IPCEI on Microelectronics notified jointly by 
France, Germany, Italy and the UK was in line with EU state aid rules, 
and kick-started the process of its creation. The IPCEI (see Figure 18) is 
expected to unlock an additional €6 billion in private investments in the 
microelectronics sector. This was the first integrated IPCEI in the field 
of research, development and innovation approved by the Commission 
since the adoption of the Communication in 2014. The IPCEI on 
Microelectronics involves 29 direct participants from the four member 
states. Direct participants could receive from their respective national 
administrations a total of up to approximately €1.75 billion in funding. 
More specifically, France has sought approval to grant aid to provide 
funding of up to €355 million, Germany up to €820 million, Italy up to 
€524 million and the UK up to €48 million. 
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Figure 18. The IPCEI on Microelectronics 
 
Source: European Commission.  
 
Based on trust and an ongoing relationship between leading 
academics and universities, governments, administrations, 
businesses and civil society, coupled with funding from various 
sources, these large coalitions can achieve something that is seldom 
obtained by other large superpowers: giving adequate, consistent 
direction to research and innovation, steering them towards societal 
challenges and future sustainable development. Upcoming 
governance choices and strong results-orientation will be essential 
for these coalitions to deliver their full potential, as well as address 
important problems that have already emerged such as excessive 
focus on incremental innovation, the lack of sufficient diffusion of 
innovation, and the difficulty in scaling up the most promising new 
firms. This is why a new debate on the need for a new, modernised 
EU industrial policy is emerging. If these problems were effectively 
addressed, Europe’s concerns about the need to boost venture 
capital and follow in the footsteps of Silicon Valley would become a 
distant memory, replaced by a new, more socially relevant way of 
designing and implementing innovative ventures.  
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4.3 Policy recommendations 
Against this background, Europe may be disregarding a possible 
hidden treasure for innovation, which would be extremely precious 
in restoring a path to future growth. At a time when the United 
States is drowning in various forms of inequality, and many EU 
companies are starting to display a relatively encouraging 
productivity trend, Europe could be on the verge of what Harberger 
(1998) called “yeasty growth”,41 but it needs to create the right 
ecosystem to accompany this possible renaissance. Van Ark et al. 
(2018) subscribe to this view but opine that Europe’s productivity 
glass may still be seen as either half full or half empty. Europe’s 
hidden treasure can be summarised with an old saying, according 
to which “if you want to fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go 
together”. And indeed, Europe seems to display lower levels of 
inequality compared to the US (Gros et al., 2018). However, it needs 
to get rid of several obstacles to the diffusion of technology across 
firms and society. These obstacles include the persistence of 
“zombie firms” in many markets (Veugelers, 2016); the existence of 
powerful incumbency interests that often stand in the way of 
innovative business models (OECD, 2015); the lack of policy 
alignment towards innovation and grand societal challenges 
(Ashford and Renda, 2016; Renda, 2017); the reluctance to attract 
talent from other EU countries, as well as the rest of the world; the 
difficulty in involving SMEs in fruitful collaborative projects 
(Simonelli, 2016); and the failure to fully embed innovation in the 
policy process (Renda, 2017).  
Despite these layers of dust, Europe has the potential to “go 
together” in innovation and is actively pursuing it. Beyond the veil 
of Europe’s inferiority complex about innovation lies a wealth of 
opportunity. Not only are European cities leading the world in 
innovation; but the more global challenges appear prohibitively 
difficult, complex and multi-sectoral, the less individual, venture-
capital-backed solutions à la Silicon Valley will be fit-for-purpose. 
This requires some fixes to current policies and programmes, which 
we outline below.  
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4.3.1 Blend instruments and consolidate programmes, especially for 
SMEs 
The European Commission should devote time and resources to 
bring the right partners together and to cut a path through the forest 
of grants, loans and equity. The ongoing consolidation along 
Partnerships, Missions and IPCEI (among others) will have to be 
carefully monitored and possibly lead to further, strongly multi-
level coordination, along with ongoing monitoring and evaluation 
at all stages of implementation. In addition, the technology transfer 
component between large and small companies should be 
strengthened, since otherwise the ambition to strengthen EU 
competitiveness in research, innovation and industry will fall prey 
to incumbent interests, losing agility and the potential to bring 
forward new competition in the generation of ideas and innovative 
solutions.  
There are far too many funds, both in the private and public 
sector, with the mandate to finance innovative SMEs in one way or 
another. Consolidation is thus required to increase the maximum 
contribution, reduce management cost and improve the quality of 
the staff devoted to this crucial activity.  
4.3.2 Beyond money: provide infrastructure and facilities to 
innovative SMEs 
EU institutions and national governments should provide SMEs 
with more than money, and more than mere advice. SMEs very 
often need infrastructure for innovation: laboratories, ICT facilities, 
office buildings, even legal and IP support. An adequate level of 
assistance on these fronts would substantially lower the threshold 
for start-ups and open up the field for part-time entrepreneurs. The 
associated cost would be modest in comparison with the investment 
in infrastructure triggered by large investments in large companies.  
In addition, the financing of innovative SMEs becomes far, far 
easier when a prototype is successfully tested in real-life settings. It 
falls on governments at all levels to provide such experimental 
settings. This form of investment has an extremely high return and 
involves government at the cutting-edge of technology and 
innovation. In fact, such an approach reduces the technical risk for 
investors, and helps government agencies reduce the commercial 
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risk by acting as launch customers. This powerful demand-side tool 
to stimulate innovation may require a clarification of competition 
rules, in order to avoid a ‘chilling effect’ due to the often-false 
perception that these rules hamper support to individual SMEs by 
member states. 
4.3.3 Bring innovation to the core of policymaking 
As technology accelerates, alongside product and process 
innovation, policymakers will increasingly be affected by a ‘pacing 
problem’: technology and the market changing faster than 
legislators, and even more so EU legislators, are able to cope with. 
Thereby, legal rules often end up being too rigid, and hardly in line 
with what entrepreneurs and innovators need to be able to fully 
deploy their potential. The European Commission has tried to 
address this problem by increasingly looking at alternative forms of 
regulation, including less prescriptive regulatory frameworks, co-
regulation, and market-based instruments. Part of the European 
Commission experimented with an “innovation principle” and 
“innovation deals”, which however have produced few results to 
date, and would deserve a better design and formulation within the 
domain of EU better regulation (Renda and Simonelli, 2019), as well 
as a stronger involvement of civil society throughout the process. 
These tools await a better mainstreaming into the policy process, 
and clear guidance from the Commission: the issue at stake is not 
the reduction or elimination of regulation, but rather the redesign 
and recast of regulation in ways that can facilitate product, service 
and organisational innovation in the Union. Perhaps the creation of 
a permanent group, similar to the Group of Regulatory Innovation 
advisors established in Canada, would provide an interesting 
avenue to spur innovation embedding European values. 
More precisely, the EU should establish new ways to connect 
the increasingly important domain of Partnerships and Missions for 
innovation to the policy process. In 2018, the second ESIR 
Memorandum proposed the creation of a joint board comprising the 
Chairs of all Missions, which would select, on a yearly basis, the 
proposed policy actions to be submitted to the European 
Commission Secretariat-General for inclusion in the yearly agenda 
of the Commission (and based on the new Inter-institutional 
Agreement on Better Law-making, also in the new three-year rolling 
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legislative plan of the three institutions involved). Based on this 
scheme, there would be two major inputs to shaping of the EU 
yearly legislative and work programme: the ones validated by DG 
RTD, coming from mission agencies; and the ones proposed by the 
REFIT platform. The policy cycle activity, as well as the 
experimentation activities of the missions, would then lead to 
feedback into the overall Agenda 2030, which underpins the whole 
exercise, in the name of policy alignment and coherence.  
Regardless of the mode of implementation, it is essential that 
innovation and the specific challenges faced by entrepreneurs do 
not remain an afterthought, however highlighted, in the EU policy 
process. Rather than devoting resources to checking impacts on 
innovation after a policy problem has been selected, after policy 
alternatives have been compared, and often even after a preferred 
policy option has already been chosen, the need to promote 
innovation should become an input into the policy agenda. Such 
inputs could also be linked to new forms of experimental 
policymaking, such as sandboxed or randomised controlled trials, 
which could be developed at the EU level to help SMEs test their 
new business models and innovative solutions.  
Finally, funding instruments for research and innovation 
should become much more streamlined in the future: instruments 
such as large-scale partnerships, strategic value chains, IPCEI 
projects are hard to reconcile and frame into a consistent strategy, 
which in turn makes it difficult to assess whether public money is 
complementing or crowding out, private investment. The next 
Commission should engage in a further consolidation exercise, 
seriously rethinking the criteria and evidence base underpinning 
funding and governance decisions in this crucial domain. Likewise, 
the Commission should develop its mechanisms so as to obtain the 
right balance between grants, loans, equity funding, bottom-up and 
top-down funding processes. All this should be aimed at 
developing a more comprehensive evidence base for the overall 
design of the funding policy, rather than adopting ad hoc, 
uncoordinated decisions for each instrument and strategy. 
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4.3.4 Behind the curtains of open innovation: the EU needs a 
dedicated policy for SMEs 
An important finding in our analysis is the need to ensure that open 
innovation does not become a trap for SMEs. The outsourcing of 
R&D solutions from large to smaller companies is, in fact, only 
apparently a brilliant solution for all. Rather, it may be accompanied 
by new forms of exploitation of large companies’ superior 
bargaining power vis-à-vis smaller companies or individual 
entrepreneurs. As outlined above, in Chapter 1, while Europe can 
rely on a legal system that would in principle perfectly fit the need 
for trust-based relationships in complex innovation projects, the 
lack of suitable access to justice and redress for smaller companies 
can frustrate these attempts, often leaving SMEs in a corner, with 
few alternatives to remaining in the commercial relationship, 
despite the fact that conditions are unfair. 
Not surprisingly, many SMEs still have fears about the 
widespread use of open innovation practices: for instance, many 
small companies worry about the unauthorised use of IP or the 
unfair sharing of costs and profits. We recommend that the 
European Commission launches a study into the use of open 
innovation by smaller businesses in Europe, and possible fears and 
solutions associated to these problems. Already five years ago, the 
Commission found that an “open” atmosphere can lead to the 
leakage of a company’s core competences (European IPR Helpdesk, 
2015): the misappropriation of this information may lead to the 
complete downfall of a company. Given the different bargaining 
position of larger and smaller companies, which can translate into 
economic dependency especially when large companies widely 
purchase R&D solutions from smaller partners to foster their widely 
known brands, and small firms undertake transaction-specific 
investment to best fit the innovation process of their counterpart, 
there seems to be room for strategic, hold-up behaviour to the 
disadvantage of smaller players.  
This situation reaches extreme scenarios in the case of digital 
platforms, as will be explained in more detail below in Chapter 10. 
There, strong direct and indirect network effects lead to a significant 
accumulation of power in the hands of the platform owner (thanks 
to the ‘winner-takes-all’ effect); and often to a lock-in situation for 
smaller players that do their business through the platform. This 
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situation has prompted action by the European Commission, in the 
form of the Platform-to-business (P2B) Regulation, which aims at 
remedying cases of unfair or non-transparent practices applied by 
online platforms to the businesses that act as their customers. 
However, once again the P2B Regulation, however welcome, does 
not adequately address the problem of redress. In this respect, SMEs 
involved in repeated interactions with large platforms would need 
to think twice before voicing their concerns about unfair practices, 
if anything for fear of being demoted, or de-listed. Analogous to 
what has been introduced by some countries (e.g. the UK) in the 
grocery sector, the possibility for smaller businesses to lodge 
confidential complaints with a central European authority would 
greatly improve access to justice in these delicate situations, thereby 
restoring trust in the system, and in open innovation arrangements 
(Renda et al., 2014).  
Once again, as will be recalled below in Chapter 6, there 
remain gaps in the legal remedies and solutions available to SMEs 
in Europe, which are in stark contrast with the emphasis that is very 
often placed on the need to focus on SMEs as the real engine of 
growth in the Union. We recommend that EU institutions consider 
the creation of a dedicated authority in charge of policing unfair B2B 
commercial practices.  
4.3.5 Learn from failures, and terminate projects that do not 
produce results 
In managing research projects, EU institutions should become more 
inclusive (through the partnership and mission models outlined 
above), but also more agile. This means that multi-stakeholder 
partnerships should feature enhanced forms of portfolio 
management, in which projects that appear unlikely to produce 
results are promptly terminated, freeing resources for modified or 
entirely new projects. For example, whenever it appears clear that 
the basic assumptions that were part of the proposal are no longer 
valid, the project should be immediately abandoned: to provide an 
incentive to the parties involved, funds that have not been spent 
could be used for other, related programmes. In any event, the 
inevitable programme failures should be evaluated, financially, 
technically, organisationally and in terms of the quality of 
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cooperation, in order to enable enhanced learning on the side of 
institutions that manage the projects (Luetjens and t’Hart, 2018).  
The evaluation of grant and project proposals would also 
benefit from other practices. Applications for EU grants could be 
screened for interesting combinations of (parts of) programmes and 
possible blending of funds. The applicants involved should then be 
invited to submit a revised plan that will most likely be funded. And 
the evaluation of the technical parts of the proposals could become 
partly double-blind, as an experiment, in order to avoid that 
incumbency issues percolate through the evaluation process.  
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5. PATENTS: A NOT-SO-HIDDEN 
TREASURE, NOW AT RISK 
Patents are essential to innovation, as they reward investment in 
R&D with exclusive rights for a specified period of time, and in 
exchange for disclosure of the technical solution backing the 
innovation. The ‘social bargain’ behind the patent system is aimed 
at promoting the generation and safeguarding the diffusion of 
innovation: this requires that inventors file an application claiming 
that the sought-after patent is a new solution, which implies a real 
inventive step. Chen (2015) uses historical panel data of the US and 
14 west European countries from 1600 to 1913, finding a significant 
positive effect of patent laws on economic growth by using different 
models. More generally, since the 1950s economic studies have 
consistently found that patents foster innovation: notable recent 
studies include Arora et al. (2007), which found that firms earn on 
average a 50% premium over the “no patenting” case, ranging from 
60% in the health-related industries to about 40% in 
electronics; Acemoglu, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar (2011), who observe 
that “patents improve the allocation of resources by encouraging 
rapid experimentation and efficient ex post transfer of knowledge 
across firms”; and Lévêque and Ménière (2006), who found that 88% 
of US, European, and Japanese businesses reportedly rely upon the 
information disclosed in patents to keep up with technology 
advances and direct their own R&D efforts.  
5.1 Quality: where European patents lead 
In this context, Europe is normally considered as having a very high 
quality patent system compared to other parts of the world such as 
the US or China. As reported by Chien (2016), industry surveys 
conducted since 2010 have consistently found the EPO to have the 
90 | PATENTS: A NOT-SO-HIDDEN TREASURE, NOW AT RISK? 
highest ratings among the five leading Patent Offices around the 
world. This perception is robust across the subgroups surveyed – 
companies, patent lawyers, and non-practising entities. In an earlier 
contribution, Drahos (2010) interviewed 140 examiners from all 
over the world between 2004 and 2008, and found that the EPO had 
the best reputation, including for its research capabilities and esprit 
de corps – the personal pride examiners took in the quality of their 
work. Van Pottelsberghe (2011) finds that the comparison of the 
patent offices in Europe (EPO), Japan (JPO) and the US (USPTO) 
shows that their operational designs differ substantially: the EPO 
provides higher-quality and more expensive services than the 
USPTO, while the JPO is in an intermediate position. In her 
empirical analysis, Chien (2016) finds that “at every stage in the 
patent lifecycle, the US system tilts towards a higher quantity patent 
system than does the EPO”.  
The difference between the EPO and USPTO in terms of 
patents awarded is striking and nurtured by a number of 
concomitant factors. First, patent (and more generally IP) protection 
in the United States is generally stronger than in Europe, where the 
social function of property (Foster and Bonilla, 2011) is rooted in 
many national constitutions, and where competition law typically 
trumps intellectual property when the two clash, as in the case of 
‘refusal to deal’ cases (Renda, 2010).  
Second, and relatedly, the patentable subject matter in the US 
has traditionally been much broader than in Europe, peaking in the 
1980s when the Supreme Court and Congress championed the view 
that “anything under the sun made by man” could be patented 
(Granieri and Renda, 2010). This led, inter alia, to the expansion of 
patents on methods of doing business, as well as software patents, 
never fully endorsed at the EU level (and rejected after years of 
discussion of a proposed proposal on computer-implemented 
inventions) despite relative openness shown by the EPO. Since 2006 
the United States has exceeded Japan and Europe in patent 
applications, mostly due to the rise of foreign patenting activity in 
the United States (Leydesdorff, Etzkowitz, and Kushnir, 2016). 
Increasing volume has led to a current backlog of 522,149 
applications at the USPTO.42 More recently, the Supreme Court 
decision in Alice Corp. v CLS Bank International, by increasing the 
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benchmark for what can be considered ‘patentable’, had a direct 
effect on lowering the total number of patent applications. 
Third, strong patent protection in the US led to the use of 
patents as both a ‘sword’ and a ‘shield’, to claim exclusivity, as a 
bargaining chip to license technology, to create a protective layer 
around a given product or service, or as an asset to accumulate and 
then use strategically when an opportunity arises. Patents are 
bought, sold, brokered, accumulated, left idle, used to blackmail 
rivals, and to threaten litigation for which costly insurance is 
regularly sold. Patent intermediaries and brokers such as Ocean 
Tomo and Yet2.com have seen their business grow, with limited 
impact on overall social welfare. All this created what Carl Shapiro 
(2001) defined as a “patent thicket”, i.e. “a dense web of overlapping 
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way 
through in order to actually commercialize new technology”.  
All in all, since the 1980s the USPTO has been flooded with a 
number of applications it could hardly manage. The backlog was so 
unsustainable that Berkeley Professor Robert Merges (1999) 
denounced, with an ironic quotation from Alice in Wonderland, the 
likelihood of seeing of “As many as Six Impossible Patents Before 
Breakfast”. Since then, and even more after the eBay v MercExchange 
case (Castro, 2011), the diffusion of patent trolls and other strategic 
intermediaries have led the system close to collapse. Especially in 
the pharmaceutical and biotech sector, and increasingly in ICT, 
over-patenting has become a way to secure long-lasting protection 
and a remarkable breadth of exclusivity for many large 
corporations. For example, pharmaceutical company AbbVie, the 
patent holder for Humira, the world’s best-selling drug, has filed 
247 patent applications for the product in order to potentially secure 
at least thirty-nine years of patent protection for the drug (the 
primary patent for Humira expired in 2016). In March 2019, a 
welfare benefit fund filed antitrust claims against AbbVie and a 
number of its competitors, alleging that they created a “patent 
thicket” by applying for a number of patents for Humira since the 
drug was developed, as a means to block competition in the US 
market.43 Pfizer, the patent holder for Lyrica, a drug used to treat 
neuropathic pain, has employed product hopping with over-
patenting to potentially extend its market control beyond the 
mandated term of patent protection. Revlimid, developed to treat 
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multiple myeloma (and which has also been indicated for treatment 
of other cancers), has been patented by Celgene, which has sought 
to expand its control of the market for up to 40 years by filing over 
100 patent applications on the drug. 
All in all, the patent thicket has become much denser: the 
solution proposed by the Obama administration took the form of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which marked the move 
from a “first-to-invent” to a “first-to-file” patent system, and a one-
year commercial use limitation for any patent applicant to use an 
invention prior to filing an application for a patent. The AIA is 
reportedly having damaging effects on innovation in the US 
(Campbell, 2016), leading to a reduction in patent quality and a 
surge in patent applications (as reported by the USPTO). In 2015, 
The Economist newspaper published an editorial decrying the state 
of the patent system, and condemning the “parasitic ecology of 
trolls” that has bruised the patent system. The magazine added that 
“today’s patent regime operates in the name of progress, instead it 
sets innovation back”.44 
In China, conversely, the patent system is clearly on the rise, 
and the dramatic increase in quantity is slowly being coupled with 
an increase in the quality of the patents awarded. China occupied 
the second position a source of international patent applications 
filed via WIPO in 2017, and is projected to become the first by 2020. 
Domestically the system is booming: the State Intellectual Property 
Office of the People’s Republic of China (SIPO) received 1.3 million 
patent applications in 2016 – more than the combined total for the 
USPTO (605,571), the JPO (318,381), the KIPO (208,830) and the EPO 
(159,358). 
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Figure 19. Total Patent Applications in the top 5 Patent Offices, 1883-2016 
 
Source: WIPO (2017).45
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The rise of Chinese patents mirrors the strong emphasis 
placed by the government on innovation since 2012, the strong 
leadership of companies like Huawei and ZTE in global markets, 
and the increased strategic interest placed in sectors such as green 
tech, 5G and quantum cryptography (more on these in Chapter 10). 
But the quality of Chinese patents is still far from that of European 
patents. Virtually none of the applications originating in China are 
“triadic patents” (patents filed jointly in the patent offices of Japan, 
the United States, and European Union). Some 76% of the patents 
filed in China by Chinese nationals cover only minor improvements 
and changes; and that the rate of abandonment of patents is 
exceptionally high: in 2018, 91% of design patents granted in 2013 
became invalid because their holders failed to pay maintenance fees. 
After five years, the rate of abandonment for utility model and 
invention patents were 61% and 37%, respectively (in the US, the 
same rate was 14% for patents). In the first half of 2019, the trend 
showed a decline in patent applications (649,000, down 9.4% from 
2018), but an increase in the number of patents approved (238,000 
invention patents granted from January to June 2019, up 9.9% year-
on-year). Looking inside these patent applications, it is important to 
note that the overwhelming majority of filings comes from Chinese 
companies, but the success rate for these applications was only 26% 
in 2018, whereas it reached 68% for non-residents (in the US, the 
success rate is broadly equal, at around 50% for both categories). 
5.2 Europe’s long run towards the unitary patent  
Europe has struggled a lot to develop a common patent system. The 
Commission has been advocating a Community (then Unitary) 
patent since the Lisbon Strategy;46 but in reality, attempts to build a 
unified European patent system date back to 1959 (Granieri and 
Renda, 2010). In 2009, under the Swedish presidency of the Union, 
the Commission took a number of significant steps, such as the 
publication of a Draft Agreement and Statute for new Unified Patent 
Litigation System, and a Recommendation to the Council to open 
negotiations for the adoption of the Agreement creating the UPLS. 
Finally, at the end of 2012, agreement was reached between the 
European Council and European Parliament on the two EU 
regulations that made the unitary patent possible through enhanced 
cooperation at EU level. Today, all EU member states except Spain 
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and Croatia participate in the enhanced cooperation for a unitary 
patent. 16 member states have already ratified the Agreement on a 
Unified Patent Court and there is good reason to believe that the 
new system will start with close to 20 states, in mid-2019. A study 
published on 14 November 2017 by the EPO found that the Unitary 
Patent could significantly enhance technology transfer in the EU 
through more trade and foreign direct investment (EPO, 2017). 
Behrens et al. (2018) estimate that the cost savings due to the 
introduction of a Unitary Patent might stem from lower translation 
costs, lower fees for publishing the patent (incl. agent fees), and 
lower renewal fees.47  
However, now that the unitary patent and the related 
litigation system are finally becoming a reality, interest in the 
prospective benefits appears to be hitting a new low. A simple 
Google trends analysis of the words “unitary patent” (Figure 20, 
below) shows that the estimated interest is today one quarter of 
what it used to be in 2012, when the agreement on the unitary patent 
was reached.  
Is the unitary patent a real hidden treasure? The estimates 
show that the unitary patents, if well designed, implemented and 
enforced, could be a game changer for innovation in the EU, 
especially if coupled with a streamlined, mission-oriented research 
and innovation policy with clear technology transfer rules (see 
above, Chapter 4). At the same time, there seems to be room to make 
the European Unitary Patent a strategic asset for the EU: as the US 
drowns in the crisis of its patent system, and seems far from 
developing a solution to its patent backlog; and as China still 
struggles with gigantic numbers and limited quality of the reviews, 
European patents could be used as a true ‘quality seal’, which 
guarantees novelty and a true inventive step. In other words, 
obtaining a European patent could become a way to escape the 
‘noise’ generated by bad quality patents around the world, just like 
obtaining a certification of compliance could become an export 
product for new technologies such as artificial intelligence (see 
below, Chapter 10).  
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Figure 20. Google trends chart for “Unitary Patent”, 1/1/2010 - 24/08/2019 
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However, just as the unitary patent enters its last mile, the 
European Patent Office seems to have experienced a deeply 
problematic phase over the past few years, also due to the fact that 
the Office was in deep financial trouble back in 2010. Since then, 
attempts to improve the efficiency of the patent examination process 
have been criticised as potentially leading to a drop in the quality of 
the review: recent cases in which this risk has surfaced include, inter 
alia, the Perindropil case.48 In March 2018, a letter from nearly 924 
patent examiners denounced a fall in patent quality, mostly 
attributed to an intentional push by EPO management to approve 
more, rather than better patents. Examiners complained that they 
are evaluated based on criteria, such as the number of ‘products’, 
which are not a correct lens through which to assess their 
performance. Moreover, renowned law firms recently criticised the 
drastic cuts in the time allocated to the examination of patents, 
which negatively reverberated on quality. The main concerns are 
that the new incentive system and internal directives at the EPO 
increasingly lean towards rewarding or even requesting rapid 
termination of proceedings and a correspondingly higher 
productivity. This, according to a prominent German law firm, 
resulted in penalisation of detailed and thorough assessment of 
cases.49  
In conclusion, it seems essential to put measures in place to 
protect and relaunch a high-quality patent system in Europe: this 
could improve patent justice and certainty and restore the patent 
system in Europe as a catalyst of innovation efforts and investment. 
This move may imply an increase in the quantity and quality of 
staff, as well as a change in the performance evaluation criteria 
examiners are subject to. Below, we offer some policy 
recommendations to strengthen the European patent system in its 
role as a world-class ‘quality seal’. 
5.3 Policy recommendations 
5.3.1 Time is of the essence: expand the resources available to the 
EPO to allow for fast, high-quality handling of applications 
For large and small companies, when it comes to intellectual 
property protection timing is at least as important as cost. A number 
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of measures could be implemented, which would improve the 
functioning of the European patent system in this crucial respect.  
First, ideally the handling of patent applications in the EPO 
should feature a fixed term. As the granting of a patent is crucial for 
SMEs to attract finance and subsequently expanding, a fixed term 
greatly facilitates negotiations and planning, including in the 
context of negotiations with larger companies (see above, Chapter 
4). In order to avoid losses in quality, this would require an 
expansion of the EPO divisions.  
Second, the appeals process in the case of decisions that reject 
patent applications should be re-designed to offer more 
transparency and efficiency. At present, the appeals board is not 
bound by any deadlines, and procedures can last up to four years. 
This is again a matter of resources: in 2016 the Board of Appeals had 
as many as 23 vacant positions for Technical Members. These 
positions appear to have been filled in 2018, as the Administrative 
Council of the EPO approved 23 additional technically qualified 
member posts for the 2019 budget, and has positively noted the 
request for another 16 of such posts for the 2020 budget. In view of 
these developments, the Board of Appeals observed in its latest 
Annual Report that it is well on track to meet its five-year objective 
to settle 90% of cases within 30 months of receipt and to reduce the 
number of pending cases to less than 7,000 (EPO, 2019). However, 
due to a large increase in incoming cases, backlog and pendency will 
nevertheless continue to grow in the short term, and a careful 
monitoring of this issue is warranted if the EU is to keep its 
leadership in the quality of the patent system.  
5.3.2 A more SME-friendly patent system 
SMEs require a patent system suitable to their needs. A recent study 
by the EPO and EUIPO (2019) confirms that SMEs with prior IPR 
activities are more likely to grow than other SMEs. More 
specifically, SMEs that have filed at least one IPR petition are 21% 
more likely to experience a subsequent growth period, and 10% 
more likely to become a high-growth firm. Importantly, the 
likelihood that an SME experiences a high-growth period is 17% 
higher for SMEs that have filed at least once. Filing a European IPR 
petition therefore provides a positive indicator of an SME’s 
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readiness to scale up its business to the European level. This is even 
truer for SMEs that use bundles of trade marks, patents and designs.  
There is a growing consensus that the Unitary Patent will lead 
to a more SME-friendly system. According to the European 
association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(Eurochambres), the new patent system will prove more efficient 
than the current patchwork of national regimes and will 
significantly increase access to patents for SMEs. In this respect, it 
would further help if the EPO, while maintaining high standards of 
review, lowered the cost of patent applications and maintenance for 
SMEs, to be compensated by higher fees for larger companies.  
Another area in which improvements are possible is in 
intermediation. There, the Commission should work with member 
states to stimulate competition among commercial patent lawyers, 
since in many member states oligopolies have been established, 
which increase the cost for SMEs. Alternatively, government 
agencies could provide application services as part of “soft support 
infrastructure” for SMEs (see above, Chapter 4). Such services are 
already provided by the Technology Transfer Offices of many 
universities: these offices could be consolidated to improve service 
levels and to introduce specialisation. Available evidence confirms 
that uncertainties related to the patenting process can affect the 
propensity of individual researchers and SMEs to make full use of 
the patent system and engage in licensing activities (Renda et al., 
forthcoming). The European Commission is reportedly working on 
creating a network of intermediaries formed by public or private 
entities involved in IP and/or business support, and will provide 
information on the European patent, on the availability of this 
funding scheme and will channel financial support to successful 
candidates among innovative SMEs. A coordination office will be 
set up to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the 
measure.  
More generally, the European Commission has been working 
on supporting the use of the patent system by SMEs, which is 
considered to be “minimal” at present. This includes providing IP 
pre-diagnostic services to innovative SMEs and improving SMEs’ 
access to patent protection, to secure better returns on investment 
for innovative and creative SMEs. As stated by the European 
Commission, “providing information on the business use of patents 
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and providing financial support for European Patent registration 
costs, external legal advice costs, as well as patent litigation 
insurance costs will contribute to promoting access to other markets 
within the EU as well as growth amongst European SMEs”. This 
support will be provided for the Unitary Patent only.  
Finally, there is a need to work on SMEs’ access to justice 
when it comes to IPRs. Evidence shows that while the cost of filing 
court proceedings to enforce IPRs, and in particular patents, is 
relatively low, the total cost of those proceedings is beyond the 
reach of many SMEs.50 Moreover, in the case of controversies with 
large companies it becomes prohibitively costly for SMEs to sustain 
litigation for a long time. Once again, as in Chapter 1, we stumble 
against access to justice as a key problem that prevents a hidden 
treasure (the EU patent system) emerging and achieving its full 
potential to contribute to EU growth. Specific measures that can 
mitigate this problem include the introduction of court fees discount 
and reimbursements for SMEs, support measures to pay for 
lawyers’ costs, lowering the ‘loser pays ceiling’ for SMEs and 
issuing guarantees/bonds required from SMEs seeking provisional 
measures such as injunctions.  
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6. COMPETITION POLICY:  
SHOULD EUROPE BEG TO DIFFER? 
6.1 A transatlantic divide 
The European Union developed a body of antitrust rules long after 
the United States, but competition rules have existed in different 
forms and shapes in many European countries since the early 20th 
century. Antitrust in its modern conception was born on the other 
side of the Atlantic, with the first laws enacted in Canada (1989) and 
the United States (1890). The Sherman Act, still probably the most 
prominent and influential piece of antitrust legislation worldwide, 
was essentially a piece of tort law, passed by Congress to challenge 
the crystallisation of power in heavy industries such as oil and steel 
at the end of the 19th century. There was no competition authority 
(it would come only in 1914, with the FCT Act), and there was no 
plan to enforce antitrust law as part of administrative law. The 
underlying logic of US antitrust law was essentially that of the 
invisible hand, or “private attorney generals”: by empowering 
individual firms and citizens to sue for damages caused by 
infringements of the Sherman Act, the public interest in competitive 
markets would essentially be served by the private interest in 
having damages compensated.  
The scope of the Sherman Act remained intimately connected 
with this original rationale: subsequent refinements, with the 
exception of the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act, which was gradually 
discarded by courts, were in the direction of maximising the 
deterrence potential of antitrust rules by sharpening procedures 
and creating an overall, pro-plaintiff environment. Treble damages, 
opt-out class actions, one-way fee-shifting rules, the use of 
contingency fees to remunerate lawyers, as well as the discovery 
process, gradually distanced US antitrust from a culture of 
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compensation, towards a culture of litigation (Renda et al., 2008; 
Renda, 2016).  
Today, despite the existence of a public prosecutor (the 
Federal Trade Commission), US antitrust remains essentially a 
matter for private enforcement and FBI investigations (in the case of 
cartels): more than 90% of the cases are private, and almost all of 
them are settled before trial, very often confidentially. Companies 
routinely purchase before-the-event insurance, knowing that 
litigation will come. In terms of scope, the legislation became 
gradually sharper and more minimalistic, with a clear influence 
from the Chicago School of economics (overall, rather conservative 
in contemplating intervention in markets), even if later mitigated by 
so-called post-Chicago approaches (Crane, 2009; Hovenkamp, 
2009). Today, scholars often consider the coverage of EU antitrust 
law as insufficient to guarantee competitive markets. Gutierrez 
Gallardo and Philippon (2017) observe that since the early 2000s US 
industries have become more concentrated and profitable and find 
evidence in favour of decreasing domestic competition among 
possible alternative explanations. 
On this side of the Atlantic, and particularly in continental 
Europe, the evolution of competition legislation was completely 
different. Already in 1909, Germany adopted an Unfair Competition 
Act (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb, UWG), which was rooted in 
civil law and thus left to private enforcement. The UWG gave 
competitors the right to take action for injunctive relief and damages 
regarding unfair competition: the concept of fairness, based on the 
concept of boni mores, was completely separate from the notion of 
neoclassical economic efficiency that underpins antitrust 
intervention both in the US and (officially) in the EU today. Rather, 
it was related to the protection of competitors from defamation and 
misleading advertising and aimed at protecting a sound rivalry 
between enterprises based on reasonably good behaviour. In 
England, the common law system conceived of unfairness in a 
totally different way: on several occasions judges in England and 
Wales reiterated the difficulty of defining what is ‘fair’ and what is 
not; and to use fairness as a litmus test for any finding of tort.51 In a 
nutshell, as observed by Wadlow (2007), the positions of civil and 
common law on fairness, fair trading and fair competition have 
traditionally exhibited “the polarity of irreconcilable opposites”.  
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The largest divergence between the two approaches is the 
clear focus on the consumer in English law, reiterated in the US 
through landmark decisions. In Germany, the duty of fair trading 
imposed under UWG 1909 was primarily owed to one’s competitors 
(interpreted in the broadest possible sense) and to the relevant 
business community at large, and was enforceable by them and by 
various trade associations dedicated to stamping out trade practices 
that their membership or their executive considered undesirable. 
The unfair competition rule spread through several countries in 
continental Europe and is present in the Civil Codes or Commercial 
Codes of several member states, generally as part of tort law, and 
normally focused on misleading advertising and conduct aimed at 
intentionally discrediting rivals (Ullrich, 2005). This more protective 
approach towards competitors also explains why, in continental 
Europe, legislation on comparative advertising took so long to be 
introduced, and still faces important challenges in its 
implementation. 
The ‘European difference’ in the approach to competition was 
also clearly visible and influential when the Treaty of Rome was 
drafted. In particular, scholars have attributed the specific wording 
and overall meaning given to Article 86 (today Article 102 TFEU) to 
the influence of Ordoliberalism (aka the “Freiburg School”), mostly 
led by Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm in the 1930s, and partly 
developed in opposition to the Nazi regime (Larouche and Schinkel, 
2014; Gerber, 1998; Akman, 2009; Patel and Schweizer, 2013). Not 
surprisingly, Article 102 TFEU explicitly includes “unfair trading 
conditions” and “unfair prices” within the prohibition. This would 
explain, at least partly, the persistence of diverging approaches and 
concepts in EU as opposed to US antitrust, which remain 
notwithstanding the similar wording of the provisions on abuse of 
dominance or monopolisation contained in Chapter 2 of the 
Sherman Act and in Article 102 TFEU. For example, EU antitrust 
enforcers regularly apply the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine whenever 
competitors cannot easily replicate an asset or an information set 
held by a dominant player; whereas this doctrine was never 
endorsed by the US Supreme Court (Renda, 2010). Moreover, EU 
antitrust still attributes a special responsibility to dominant firms, 
which in some CJEU decisions such as Telia Sonera even implied a 
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de facto responsibility to ensure the profitability of smaller 
competitors (Petit, 2014).  
Furthermore, the enforcement of EU competition law is 
dramatically different from that of US antitrust. While the 
overwhelming majority of cases are privately enforced (and settled) 
in the US, more than 95% of cases are publicly enforced by 
competition authorities in the EU, and do not end with requests for 
damage awards, but rather with administrative sanctions. A much 
lower share of cases is settled in the EU, and procedural rules for 
private enforcement are much less oriented towards deterrence, and 
much more towards corrective justice (Renda, 2016). This difference 
remains despite the adoption of a Directive on Private Antitrust 
Damages Actions (2014/104/EU, entered into force on 26 December 
2014), later complemented by a Commission Recommendation on 
collective redress and a Practical Guide on quantifying antitrust 
harm in damages actions, and only very recently implemented by 
some member states.  
Figure 21. Countries with rules on abuse of economic dependence, 2011 
 
Source: Renda (2011). 
thatRules that significantly diverge from Article 102 TFEU
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But divergences do not end here. Outside of competition law, 
and outside of unfair competition, a different stream of legal rules 
emerged over time in the interstice between contract and tort law, 
to capture those cases in which despite the absence of a clear 
antitrust concern, one party in the contract can be considered as 
having a superior bargaining position, and/or the other party a 
position of economic dependence. Renda et al. (2011) map the 
emergence of these rules in EU member states, finding a wide 
variety of rules as shown in Figure 21 above. Very often, these rules 
are enforced by the competition authorities, as it the case for the 
Bundeskartellamt in Germany, and the AGCM in Italy.  
Besides general provisions on significant imbalances in 
commercial relationships, which initially focused mostly on cases of 
industrial subcontracting, legislators in member states have also 
gradually focused on specific sectors, such as food and retail. In 
these sectors, small suppliers are often in a situation of economic 
dependence vis-à-vis large retailers, and generally refrain from 
suing their large counterparts in cases of unfair trading practices 
(e.g. de-listing, risk-shifting, unfavourable contract renegotiation, 
etc.), for fear of retaliation (Renda et al., 2014). Over the past three 
decades, many member states have tackled this problem, either by 
stretching antitrust law beyond the rather narrow boundaries of 
Article 102 TFEU, by relying on unfair competition laws, laws on 
abuse of economic dependence, rules on the abuse of “relative 
dominant position” (e.g. in France), contract law, or simply ad hoc 
legal provisions for the agri-food or the general retail sector (like the 
UK Grocery Act) (Boy, 2006).  
The stark divergence between US and EU competition rules is 
mirrored by the divergence between the provisions on dominance 
contained in Article 102 TFEU and those applied, both within and 
outside the realm of antitrust legislation, at the member state level. 
But the real surprise is that, while until the middle of this decade 
the orientation of DG COMP was towards reducing this level of 
fragmentation by bringing back national competition rules to 
converge with the (narrower) scope of Article 102 TFEU, in line with 
what Regulation 1/2003 already had achieved for Article 10152; the 
past four years, in particular with Commissioner Vestager’s tenure, 
have led to an important new set of developments.  
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6.2 A new ‘age of fairness’ in EU competition law? 
Commissioner Vestager has made frequent reference to the concept 
of fairness as an inspiring principle of her mandate as Competition 
Commissioner. In her speeches, the word ‘fair’ appears to be far 
more recurrent than the word ‘efficient’. Vestager also argued that 
the concept of fairness plays a “substantial role” in helping the 
Commission to prioritise cases. She even evoked in a speech the 
Code of Hammurabi, arguing it ensured “the market worked fairly 
by regulating the prices for things like hiring a ferryboat”.53 She also 
added that this “doesn’t mean that just because something is unfair, 
it’s automatically also against the competition rules”. But her 
overall approach have left a clear impression that fairness is more 
central to the rhetoric and scope of competition law in Europe than 
it was in the past.  
Fairness was high on the agenda also on the regulatory side, 
especially if one considers the recent proposed directive on unfair 
trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the food 
supply chain (COM/2018/0173 final, presented in April 2018); the 
P2B Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for 
business users of online intermediation services, on which a 
political agreement was finally reached in 2019; and to some extent 
the Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2). Both initiatives 
acknowledge the need to capture, through regulatory measures, 
situations in which EU antitrust law cannot be invoked, but the 
imbalance of bargaining power nevertheless creates the need for 
restorative measures, or the prohibition of certain practices.  
The latter proposal appears the most indicative of the change 
of approach in the Commission. In its impact assessment of the draft 
regulation, the Commission identifies as problems the 
multiplication of P2B unfair terms and practices, an enforcement 
gap and a fragmentation of the digital single market (De Streel, 
2018). It proposes more transparency on the terms and practices of 
the online intermediation platforms and, in some cases, online 
search engines, as well as better dispute resolution mechanisms.  
What seems to emerge from these developments is that the 
Commission has spotted a hidden treasure: rather than over-
stretching traditional antitrust tools that have become increasingly 
difficult to apply, especially in the digital world, the Commission 
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can tap into an extremely rich national experience that extends the 
reach of competition-related rules way beyond the remit of Article 
102 TFEU: and rather than being an obstacle, this now seems to be 
an opportunity. In fact, in the US a similar, but far more timid 
development has led to the re-discovery of a provision, Chapter 5 of 
the FTC Act, which prohibits, among other things, unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the marketplace (Davis, 2019). 
6.3 Should Europe be ashamed of protecting smaller 
competitors? 
A mantra in each and every antitrust debate around the world is 
that competition rules are there “to protect consumers, not 
competitors” (Fox, 2003). Students of antitrust learn this on the first 
day, practitioners repeat it whenever useful and strategic. However, 
the meaning of these words changes depending on time, place and 
backing interests. Ultimately, the rationale behind this statement is 
controversial, for two main reasons.  
First, there is still a heated and unresolved debate in the 
domain of competition law on whether antitrust rules should 
pursue consumer welfare, or total welfare. Some commentators 
have even argued that the first and foremost advocate of the 
consumer welfare standard, Robert Bork, improperly used the term, 
creating a false dichotomy with the total welfare one (Blair and 
Sokol, 2012; Werden, 2014). In reality, if one considers antitrust law 
as a public policy intervention triggered by a market failure, it 
would make sense to adopt a total welfare standard, in line with 
what happens for all efficiency-oriented public policies in the 
United States and, to a large extent, in Europe (Renda, 2018). 
Neoclassical economics traditionally disregard distributional 
impacts, which would otherwise be embedded in a consumer 
welfare standard (Hovenkamp, 2019).  
Second, while the original emphasis on consumer welfare can 
be justified, and can be traced back to the years of the ‘discovery’ of 
consumerism, today the evolution of markets portrays situations in 
which, alongside cases of exploitative abuses in the form of high 
prices and welfare-decreasing discrimination, some of the most 
important cases are related to the exploitation of sheer size, 
economies of scale and network effects to preserve and consolidate 
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dominance, depriving competitors of sufficient scale to operate 
viably in the market. When this happens on a sufficient scale, the 
protection of competitors becomes essential to ensure that the 
competitive constraints exercised by rivalry are preserved in the 
relevant product market: thence, the dichotomy between consumers 
and competition vanishes, and protecting competitors becomes a 
way to protect the competitive process, and therefore ultimately 
consumers.  
Accordingly, different competition authorities have adopted 
diverging approaches to the ‘consumer harm’ standard in antitrust, 
and the latter has become so widely debated that some authoritative 
commentators even proposed its replacement with more easily 
interpretable alternatives. For example, Steinbaum and 
Stucke (2018) argue in favour of an “effective competition standard” 
as an alternative to the consumer welfare standard, explaining that 
the “price-centric” approach that flows from the consumer welfare 
standard misses important metrics such as harm to quality, privacy, 
innovation, and input providers, including workers54. In a widely 
read article that inspired the so-called Neo-Brandeisian antitrust 
movement, Lina Khan (2018) made a similar point by arguing that 
“the current framework in antitrust – specifically its pegging 
competition to ‘consumer welfare’, defined as short-term price 
effects – is unequipped to capture the architecture of market power 
in the modern economy”. Glick (2018) takes sides with the Neo-
Brandeisians, but rather than attacking the consumer welfare 
standard for its unacceptable outcomes, it argues that such an 
approach is “theoretically flawed and unrigorous from the start”. 
More sceptical, equally authoritative views have been provided by 
Hovenkamp (2019) and Melamed and Petit (2019). 
Third, regardless of the merits of competing approaches in 
antitrust, one could also observe that not only the underlying 
theoretical approaches, but also the economic structure of markets 
and individual preferences is different in Europe compared to the 
United States, and that the consumer welfare versus total welfare 
debate may not be a perfect fit for EU competition law, which may 
well look at the protection of smaller competitors (more important 
in Europe than in the US in relative economic terms, as shown in 
Chapter 2) in order to avoid that the accumulation of market power 
in a few hands ends up disrupting the otherwise-preferred 
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fragmentation and pluralism as key features of truly competitive 
markets. In other words, if one considers that EU competition law 
is still deeply rooted in Ordoliberalism, then it may well be the case 
that approaches that are rejected in the United States become viable 
when it comes to Europe. Or, put differently, if it is true that Neo-
Brandeisian antitrust is based on an untested assumption (i.e. that 
citizens prefer higher prices and more firms than lower prices and 
a more concentrated market), it is equally true that in Europe, 
citizen preferences may look different from how they appear in the 
United States. Should, then, Europe beg to differ? 
6.4 Uncovering the hidden treasure: policy 
recommendations for the future of EU antitrust 
Sound competition rules are essential for a smooth functioning of 
the market. In particular, in the age of open innovation and the 
platform economy, many SMEs depend on larger counterparties for 
access to the market, and in more industrial sectors also for more 
practical reasons, such as testing their prototypes technically and 
commercially and also to scale production, marketing and 
sales. They often lack the financial resources and specialised staff to 
deal with more than one potential partner at a time, and this further 
exacerbates their situation of economic dependence and the 
transaction-specific investments they have to face to establish a 
suitable commercial relationship with larger companies.  
Whether this situation is becoming more widespread, and the 
imbalance of bargaining power more evident over time, should be 
subject to a specific investigation of the Commission. If the extent of 
the problem is as significant as it seems, this could mark the official 
introduction of B2B and P2B unfair commercial practices in the 
scope of EU competition rules and should be accompanied by an 
extension of the enforcement powers of DG COMP to include such 
practices.  
Below, we provide some policy recommendations for the next 
European Commission.  
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6.4.1 Extend the scope of EU competition rules to protect SMEs 
against unfair commercial practices 
SMEs are not adequately protected by existing competition rules, 
despite the ongoing debate about Europe’s tendency to protect 
smaller competitors. As observed in the previous chapters of this 
book, the emergence of new organisational forms for innovation, 
from open innovation to platforms, can put SMEs in a position of 
unprecedented advantage, but also creates a risk of their being 
subject to abuse in their relationship with larger corporations. 
Accordingly, rules on abuse of economic dependency and abuse of 
superior bargaining power may not only be needed in specific 
sectors such as retail and digital platforms; rather, the Commission 
could consider proposing their introduction in all sectors, provided 
that they are accompanied by adequate provisions for access to 
justice, support for IP litigation, and a clear indication of the types 
of behaviours that are considered to be exploitative, discriminatory 
or simply unfair.  
In this respect, some European countries (most recently, 
Belgium) have decided to extend the scope of the EU Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD), originally focused on B2C 
relationships, to also cover B2B settings. Recently, with respect to 
the P2B Regulation, the Commission observed that consumer law 
instruments were not considered appropriate to deal with B2B 
relations, since extending consumer law to P2B issues would be 
disproportionate. Moreover, the Court of Justice specifically dealt 
with the issue of the possible application of the UCPD in B2B 
settings in its ruling on the case C-295/16 Europamur Alimentación 
SA, but the case was mostly about jurisdiction issues, rather than on 
substantive policy.  
The European Commission reported in 2015 that only “four 
Member States currently apply, with some modulation, the UCPD 
also to B2B relations”, and that “the extension, at EU level, of the 
scope of the UCPD to B2B relations has been mooted in the past by 
some stakeholders mainly with a view to solving the problem of the 
practices of Misleading Directory Companies affecting mainly small 
enterprises and independent professionals”, practices that are 
already forbidden by Directive 2006/114/EC on misleading and 
comparative advertising. Meanwhile, however, other countries are 
joining the list (recently, Belgium). The Commission should reopen 
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this dossier, with a view to providing adequate protection to SMEs 
beyond digital platforms and large retail markets.  
Finally, ensuring adequate protection and legal certainty for 
SMEs also requires suitable enforcement arrangements. In most 
countries that have enacted rules that capture imbalances of 
bargaining power in commercial or industrial relationships, the 
competition authority has been tasked with enforcement. Whether 
the same could be done in Europe, or a separate authority located 
outside DG COMP would be the best place to address these 
controversies, is an issue that we leave to EU institutions, and to 
future research. 
6.4.2 Consider the adoption of an effective and sustainable 
competition standard in antitrust decisions 
As recalled by Ezrachi (2018), “the promotion of consumer well-
being and the prevention of consumer harm have long been 
established as the prime goals of competition law”. The General 
Court observed in Österreichische Postsparkasse and Bank für Arbeit 
und Wirtschaft v Commission that “the ultimate purpose of the rules 
that seek to ensure that competition is not distorted in the internal 
market is to increase the well-being of consumers… Competition 
law and competition policy… have an undeniable impact on the 
specific economic interests of final customers who purchase goods 
or services”. Mario Monti famously observed, when dealing with 
the Microsoft case, that “competition policy puts markets at the 
service of consumers… After all we say the consumer is king!”; his 
successor Neelie Kroes observed that “the Commission has made an 
important choice in putting consumer interests at the centre of our 
competition work”; and Commissioner Almunia also said that “all 
of us here today know very well what our ultimate objective is: 
competition policy is a tool at the service of consumers.” 
However, it is important to clarify that the focus on 
consumers does not mean legitimising conduct that thwarts 
competition to offer short-term relief in terms of lower consumer 
prices. Conduct such as predation, but also controversial cases of 
above-cost predatory pricing, can be configured as ultimately 
detrimental for consumers’ well-being (Edlin, 2002; Elhauge, 2003). 
This is why the Commission and the Courts have often juggled with 
the concept of consumer welfare, in order to avoid that it becomes a 
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straitjacket, or even an obstacle towards the realisation of the 
Commission’s own vision of the single market. In some cases, e.g. 
in Telia Sonera, the Court of Justice even ventured into rather 
acrobatic interpretations of the principle of the “special 
responsibility” of dominant firms, another doctrine that is well 
established in Europe, and nowhere to be seen in the United States. 
Moreover, market integration is included as one of the overarching 
objectives of EU competition law, alongside economic efficiency: 
but which type of market integration should be placed at the 
forefront of competition law enforcement? And in what way would 
market integration interact with economic efficiency? 
In the forthcoming reform of EU competition rules, it would 
be extremely useful if the Commission could clarify what is the role 
of antitrust in pursuing economic efficiency, fairness and market 
integration, and how will the interplay between these concepts be 
approached in the future. Note that this is a direct consequence of 
our reasoning in the first five chapters of this book: if Europe 
chooses to ‘dance to a different drummer’ in its economic policy, 
and pursue a more SME-centric policy leading to a less concentrated 
market structure and thus more choice for consumers, then its 
approach to antitrust will not resemble the one advocated by the 
Chicago School in the US, in which monopolies should not be 
stopped when they are essentially the result of fierce competition, a 
view that was perfectly summarised by the views of Judge Scalia in 
cases like Trinko.55 The idea of loosening antitrust rules to promote 
more innovation has not proven its full worth in decades of antitrust 
history. Even in the US, an authoritative Chief Judge, Diane Wood 
of the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, recently 
expressed concerns about the political consequences of 
monopolisation, and observed that the distribution of power “is 
essential not just in economic markets but for political stability”. 
Not far from what the Freiburg School argued when thinking about 
competition and market structure.  
6.4.3 Refrain from political oversight of antitrust decisions 
Competition rules are, and should remain, essentially a 
technical field. Antitrust is not supposed to achieve industrial policy 
goals, and the independence of antitrust authorities was not only 
practised by the European Commission in past decades, but also 
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preached to member states. The so-called ECN+ proposal of the 
Commission, tabled in 2017, is aimed at ensuring that competition 
authorities in member states “act independently when enforcing EU 
antitrust rules, i.e. without taking instructions from public or 
private entities”. Directive (EU) 2019/1 to empower the competition 
authorities of member states to be more effective enforcers and to 
ensure the proper functioning of the internal market was eventually 
signed into law on 11 December 2018, and aims to ensure that 
national competition authorities have the appropriate enforcement 
tools in order to bring about a genuine common competition 
enforcement area.  
However, when the stakes become too high, the temptation to 
take over competences otherwise allocated to technical bodies is 
always strong. This is currently the case, especially after DG 
Competition, led by Commissioner Vestager, decided to reject the 
proposed mega-merger between Alstom and Siemens. The French 
Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs Bruno Le Maire 
described European competition rules as obsolete, while German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed doubts on the EU’s ability to 
create global players. France and Germany published a joint 
manifesto to revive EU industrial policy around three pillars, which 
included the revision of European competition rules. The manifesto 
proposes the creation of a “Phase III” in merger review, which 
would amount to a political review of merger decisions, possibly by 
the Council (although the body tasked with the review is not 
specified in the manifesto).  
This move, in our opinion, would be a fatal mistake. Europe 
does not need to subvert its credo on competition rules to return to 
meaningful industrial policy. And as already explained, achieving 
size by artificially creating large players that would end up 
capturing massive market shares is not the best way to serve the 
interest of European citizens, consumers and SMEs. In many 
sectors, consolidation across borders is of course possible, especially 
where there are no significant overlaps between national markets, 
and the merger thus simply contributes to ‘bonding’ the single 
market closer together by enabling businesses to cross intra-EU 
borders. At the same time, as will also be recalled in Chapter 10, in 
many sectors of the economy, and in particular those where 
digitalisation is happening fast, the creation of European giants is 
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not the only way to create a dynamic and prosperous single market. 
Our claim is that EU institutions can chart their own path towards 
an approach to competition rules that is tailored to the legal and 
economic traditions of the Old Continent, rather than emulating the 
United States, or China. 
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7. TAXES: CAN EUROPE OUTPERFORM THE 
REST OF THE WORLD? 
Taxation is one of the pillars of the modern organisation of the state. 
Through direct and indirect tax collection, governments internalise 
externalities, provide services of general interest, and achieve 
redistribution of resources among citizens and businesses. 
Principles such as fair and progressive taxation are widely 
acknowledged in all developed countries, and lay the foundation 
for social cohesion, economic prosperity and overall sustainability. 
In the context of the EU’s single market, the reduction and 
elimination of barriers to cross-border trade and the protection and 
promotion of the ‘four freedoms’ created the need for cooperation 
between national authorities, mostly to avoid double taxation of 
enterprises. In addition, the need to coordinate taxation policy to 
create a level playing field in the single market has emerged as a 
necessity, alongside the need to avoid that companies, in particular 
multinationals, exploit loopholes and divergences in the EU tax 
system to artificially reduce their tax exposures.  
Minimum standards have been achieved on the quality of tax 
code and tax rulings in the EU-27. However, as observed by the 
European Parliament in 2016, the current state of tax policy 
worldwide is increasingly characterised by massive evasion and 
avoidance, to the detriment of social justice. The ‘Panama Papers’ 
and the ‘LuxLeaks’ scandal have raised awareness of the need to 
fight tax evasion, tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning more 
effectively. In January 2016 the European Parliamentary Research 
Service published a study that assessed the loss of tax revenue to the 
EU through aggressive corporate tax planning to be between 
€50 billion and €70 billion per annum, which becomes three times 
bigger if one adds special tax arrangements, inefficiencies in 
collection and other practices. The Commission provided a much 
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less conservative estimate, placing tax evasion and avoidance at 
€1 trillion per year. Most aggressive tax planning exploits loopholes 
and enforcement deficiencies in bilateral tax treaties and 
mismatches in cross-border accounting practices, openings abused 
in particular by multinational groups and resulting in profit shifting 
towards jurisdictions with lower tax rates.   
Since June 2013, the Commission has been investigating 
individual tax rulings of member states under EU state aid rules. It 
extended this information inquiry to all member states in December 
2014. This ongoing trend should not overshadow the overall good 
quality of tax administrations and rulings in the EU, which largely 
surpasses that of the US. The US continues to rank at the top of 
financial secrecy indices.56 Since the 1920s, the US has adopted 
measures aimed at attracting foreign capital to the country: today, 
the US still refuses to comply with the emerging global standard of 
multilateral information exchange, the OECD Common Reporting 
Standards (CRS), and maintains its Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act (FATCA) model, rather than adhering to the CRS. 
As observed by Noked (2018), the experience so far raises numerous 
questions about the effectiveness of FATCA’s reporting regime.57  
Against this background, Europe seems to fare a lot better 
than the US when it comes to the reliability and effectiveness of the 
tax system. This treasure is however hidden due to the great 
heterogeneity of tax regimes and, most importantly, the overall lack 
of cooperation between member states, which leaves numerous 
loopholes that multinationals can exploit to reduce their overall tax 
exposure, and thereby also undermine tax justice in the EU. Years 
of calls and attempts to improve cooperation have merely created 
an appearance of cooperation. Only real legislative action, such as 
that started by the 2003 harmonisation of taxation of savings, can 
lead to effective progress. A clear perspective in the EU integration 
process towards more fiscal union is needed for this to happen. The 
recent ‘leaks’ may have advanced the debate about EU and global 
initiatives to tackle tax evasion, but this is only the beginning of a 
huge agenda.  
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7.1 Tax harmonisation in the EU: an historical account 
A process for more cooperation amongst tax authorities started with 
the Monti Group, that was only recently re-launched, in the context 
of the debate around tax avoidance scandals, affecting both 
corporations as individuals. So far, it has led to soft, rather than hard 
actions, with the exception of the tax on personal savings.  
The 1992 programme in the area of direct taxation produced 
two directives and an arbitration convention, while several other 
proposals had to be abandoned. The two directives deal with the 
abolition of double taxation of associated enterprises operating on a 
cross-border basis in the EU. The parent/subsidiary directive 
(90/435/EEC) exempts dividends paid between associated 
companies from taxation, the merger directive (90/434/EEC) eases 
cross-border company restructuring operations from a fiscal 
perspective. Both directives, while being useful, were narrow, and 
earlier attempts by the European Commission in 1993 to expand 
their scope failed. Moreover, the implementation by member states 
has given rise to doubts. The Arbitration Convention created a 
mechanism for the settlement of disputes between enterprises and 
tax administrations related to the level of taxation. The limited 
success of harmonisation in the field of corporate taxes 
demonstrated that the EU would first need to institute more 
cooperation between enterprises, if it wished to achieve more 
convergence in tax regimes. 
An EU process for effective cooperation amongst tax 
authorities was initiated by the then Commissioner Mario Monti, 
with the creation of the code of conduct or Primarolo group in 1997, 
named after the UK Paymaster General, to bring about more 
convergence among corporate tax regimes in the EU. A code of 
conduct was agreed between the member states composed of a 
‘standstill and rollback’ process to stop aggressive and harmful tax 
competition between member states and abolish the most distortive 
schemes. But the process stalled, and the ‘Luxleaks’ controversy of 
late 2014 indicated that not much had been achieved. Member states 
compete as much with each other as with third countries to attract 
foreign direct investment or facilitate business development and 
want to maintain their freedom to create the conditions to do so. 
Although this process is harmful in relation to less mobile factors of 
taxation, such as labour, and to other member states, it seems that 
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this has not yet led to more tax harmonisation. While it could be 
argued that such a process stimulates fiscal discipline, the excesses 
revealed by Luxleaks indicate that it erodes tax revenues and should 
be seen as contrary to what the EU stands for. 
7.1.1 The Savings Tax Directive 
Progress was however made in the domain of personal savings 
taxation, with the adoption in 2003 of the Savings Tax Directive. 
This directive instituted a system of automatic exchange of 
information amongst member states about interest income obtained 
by their residents in other member states. It was the result of a long 
negotiation process, starting in 1989 with the agreement on the 
liberalisation of capital movements. Initially, it was envisaged to 
have full and automatic exchange of information, but certain 
member states, including Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
wanted to maintain bank secrecy and requested a similar agreement 
with third countries, most importantly Switzerland and other small 
offshore financial centres. In the end, a transition period was agreed 
during which these three member states would transfer a part of the 
tax on interest income to the resident’s home member state without 
revealing the identity of the beneficiary, which in the case of Austria 
ended only in 2014. The same arrangement continues to apply to 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein, and other offshore jurisdictions. 
Seen in hindsight, the 2003 agreement was probably of merely 
symbolic importance. It only covered interest income and was not 
applicable to dividend income or capital gains, which in today’s low 
interest rate environment are much more important. It was also 
calculated that the information shared about interest income had 
serious shortcomings, or that the revenues transferred from the 
countries that did not apply the automatic exchange of information 
was limited, meaning that the enforcement left much to be desired 
(Corry and Mather, 2012). However, it contributed to the overall 
acceptance of the principle of exchange of information in the EU, a 
trend that has spread more widely in the meantime.  
The Savings Tax Directive was followed up by the 2011 
directive (2011/16/EU) on administrative cooperation between tax 
authorities, and the October 2014 Council agreement that bank 
accounts have to be transparent for tax authorities of other member 
states, something that was unthinkable only a few years before. The 
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latter agreement brings interest, dividends and other income within 
the scope of cooperation. Its importance is highlighted by the fact 
that it was adopted by unanimity in the Council, as is required for 
tax matters. It was also followed up more recently by an agreement 
with Switzerland on 27 May 2015 on the automatic exchange 
information on the financial accounts of each other’s residents, 
starting in 2018, extending the scope of the agreement equally to 
other forms of income, and thus doing away with the previous 
agreement.58 The latter agreement indicates that the trend towards 
more tax cooperation will also be increasingly applied with third 
countries, which is a priority of the G-20 as well. 
7.2 Recent moves towards coordination among EU 
corporate tax administrations 
After years of quasi-standstill, the EU managed to make progress in 
international and European tax coordination in the follow-up of the 
media campaigns on wide-scale tax avoidance and evasion by 
corporations and wealthy individuals. The G-20 mandated the 
OECD to implement a series of measures to address base erosion 
and profit shifting (BEPS) and set a minimum tax transparency 
standard, to be reviewed regularly, as a basis for more automatic 
exchange of information. This was translated at EU level into the 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD), that was rapidly adopted by 
the member states, and in the action to blacklist non-cooperative 
jurisdictions around the world. 
The basis was the Commission’s 2015 White Paper ‘Towards 
a fair and efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union’, 
which outlined five key areas for action, with the CCCTB as the end-
objective. The current system, the European Commission states, is 
no longer fair, as taxes are not equally spread, and large 
corporations shift their profits to low tax jurisdictions, whereas 
others are subject to double taxation. It is no longer efficient either, 
as the tax bases are not adapted to the intangible economy, and tax 
systems favour debt over equity finance.  
The ATAD was agreed in five months on 21 June 2016, which 
is an absolute record by EU standards, and even more remarkable 
as EU tax measures require unanimity among member states. The 
directive is limited in scope, but is still far-reaching, as it sets a limit 
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on interest costs that can be charged (in high tax jurisdictions), 
prevents exiting tax rules and limits the use of controlled foreign 
company rules to avoid taxes. It sets general intra-EU anti-hybrid 
(tax constructions) and anti-abuse (of tax systems) rules. During the 
same period, the EU also agreed on a directive as regards 
mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of 
taxation, addressed specifically at tax practices of multinational 
corporations.  
Coordination between member states was also improved 
through progress in the completion of double taxation agreements. 
This is a precondition to achieving a more harmonised system in the 
context of the single market. By the end of 2014, the proportion of 
double taxation agreements among the 28 EU member states 
reached 96%, up from 58% in the year of the creation of the single 
market (1992) in an EU of 12.59 Bilateral double taxation agreements 
do not require the EU, however, as they are concluded with third 
countries as well. But they institute a high degree of cooperation 
among the tax administrations of the countries concerned, albeit on 
a bilateral level, i.e. every agreement is different. 
7.3 EU tax policy today: between a utopian Common 
Consolidated Tax Base, and state aid rules 
The next step is to agree on a more EU-wide corporate tax system, 
and to do away with the distortions that have been so widely 
publicised. In 2016, the European Commission proposed re-
launching the 2011 CCCTB project by splitting it into two separate 
proposals.60 CCCTB would allow corporations to consolidate their 
profits and losses in a single country in the EU following a 
harmonised tax base. Profits would then be apportioned to the 
different member states, in view of certain operational criteria, such 
as revenues, factories, workers, etc., and taxed according to the local 
rate, thus implying a high degree of cooperation among the member 
states. The 2016 proposal formally drops the 2011 one, and also the 
consolidation, given the problems this still causes, but makes a 
common corporate tax base (CCTB) mandatory. It adds rules for 
calculating the corporate tax base, including certain provisions 
against tax avoidance and on the international dimension of the 
proposed system. A second proposal adds rules on consolidation, 
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awaiting agreement on the first proposal. Given the lukewarm 
reception by member states when it was first proposed in 2011, it is 
questionable whether the European Commission will be more 
successful this time. It is also seen as a difficult fit with the overall 
priority of the Juncker Commission to limit intrusive harmonisation 
proposals. 
The European Commission’s competition watchdog DG 
COMP nevertheless reacted to excessively generous tax practices in 
certain member states under the powers of the EU Treaty to tackle 
illegal state aid. Subsidies given to enterprises that result in very 
generous tax treatment distort the single market, and can be 
considered as illegal state aid. In October 2015, the Commission 
concluded that Luxembourg and the Netherlands had granted 
selective tax advantages to Fiat and Starbucks, respectively. As a 
result of these decisions, Luxembourg recovered €23.1 million from 
Fiat and the Netherlands recovered €25.7 million from Starbucks. 
Later, in January 2016, the Commission concluded that selective tax 
advantages granted by Belgium to at least 35 multinationals, mainly 
from the EU, under its “excess profit” tax scheme are illegal under 
EU state aid rules. The total amount of aid to be recovered from the 
35 companies is estimated at approximately €900 million, including 
interest, of which over 90% of the aid has already been recovered. 
In August 2016, the Commission concluded that Ireland granted 
undue tax benefits to Apple, which led to a recovery by Ireland of 
€14.3 billion (the amount was paid by Apple to the Irish tax 
authorities in summer 2018). In October 2017, the Commission 
concluded that Luxembourg granted undue tax benefits to Amazon, 
which led to a recovery by Luxembourg of €282.7 million. In June 
2018, the Commission concluded that Luxembourg granted undue 
tax benefits to Engie of around €120 million. The Commission also 
has one ongoing in-depth investigation concerning tax rulings 
issued by the Netherlands in favour of the Inter IKEA Group, and 
one investigation concerning a tax scheme for multinationals in the 
United Kingdom. 
7.4 Can code succeed where politics have failed? 
Corporate taxation is one of the areas where the degree of 
harmonisation has not matched the level of market integration or 
the progress achieved in other areas. Under the banking union, for 
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example, the ECB becomes the single supervisor of all large banks 
in the euro area, but the tax treatment of these banks, and of the 
products they sell, remains entirely national and diverse. These and 
other developments, such as the unique competence for the EU to 
negotiate investment treaties, will increase the pressure for further 
progress in the tax field, but this is likely to continue to advance 
slowly, more through improved cooperation rather than in outright 
harmonisation, as was the case over the last 20 years. While it is true 
that tax coordination has advanced over the last two to three years, 
it must be recalled that this was the result of widely publicised cases. 
The ATAD and state aid investigations by DG COMP tackle the 
most flagrant cases, but concrete progress will only be achieved 
with the adoption of CCCTB, which remains a distant dream. The 
latter would also level the playing field between SMEs and large 
corporates, and remains therefore a priority. 
Recently, legislative progress was made thanks to the Anti-
Tax-Avoidance Package, which besides proposing the introduction 
of anti-avoidance rules, also aims to prevent profit shifting by 
introducing public Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR) through 
an amendment of the European Accounting Directive.61 All EU 
parent companies with a consolidated revenue of more than 
€750 million as well as subsidiaries of non-EU companies with a 
consolidated revenue above this threshold would be required to 
publish relevant information on an annual basis, both on their 
webpage and in a public register of the European Commission. The 
required information includes a list of all subsidiaries, the pre-tax 
profit, cash taxes paid, the amount of stated capital, the number of 
employees and several other details. All of these items have to be 
attributed to the individual taxing territories in which the reporting 
company operates.  
This emerging framework could easily be coupled with 
RegTech solutions in the future, as is already happening in the 
market. The availability of tech-enabled solutions will enable the 
creation of an automatic data-sharing sandbox, into which 
multinationals could (voluntarily) enter to start exchanging data 
with the administration for compliance verification purposes. This 
system would, of course, have to be adequately coupled with 
technical, semantic, organisational and where possible legal 
interoperability between administrations, something that the ISA2 
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programme is trying to achieve (purely on a voluntary basis) under 
the leadership of DG DIGIT, and the auspices of the Tallinn 
Declaration of October 2017 (Renda et al., 2019). The automatic 
collection of direct and indirect tax across the single market would 
enable easier cross-border compensation and detection of 
aggressive tax planning schemes. This, in turn, would help Europe 
uncover its most hidden treasure: a high-quality tax system, 
oriented towards competitiveness and distributional justice.  
7.5 Policy recommendations 
Europe is potentially looking at a significant opportunity when it 
comes to taxation. The US system features a triple challenge: a 
highly complicated tax code, a common-law-based legal system 
turning a complicated code into a quagmire, and reliance on 
draconian measures to enforce compliance, necessitated by an 
antagonistic attitude to the state in general and taxes in particular, 
let alone a highly politicised discussion on tax rates as fuelling 
inequality. Chatzky (2019) recalls that US President Donald Trump 
signed major tax legislation, notably reducing the top rate levied on 
corporations from 35% to 21% and lowering individual income 
taxes to bring the top marginal income tax rate down from 39.6% to 
37%.62 Following the publication of Piketty’s (2014) book Capital in 
the 21st Century, several scholars have produced new estimates of 
long-run trends in wealth concentration around the world. Gros et 
al. (2018) show the different patterns of inequality in the EU and in 
the US, with the latter featuring a constantly falling share of labour 
income, and a constant rise of inequality since the 1980s. 
7.5.1 Rebalance the tax treatment of large and small corporations 
The EU should tackle existing differences in the treatment of large 
companies and SMEs. The European Parliament has observed that 
recent reforms at the national level “have shifted the tax incidence 
from wealth to income, from capital income to labour income and 
consumption, from multinational enterprises to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), and from the financial sector to the real 
economy”, adding that this “has had a disproportionate impact on 
women and low-income people, who typically rely more on labour 
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income and spend a higher proportion of their income on 
consumption”.63  
7.5.2 Establish tax incentives for the Societas Europaea, and tailor 
it to SMEs 
Adopting the form of a Societas Europaea (SE) allows important 
simplifications in the area of company law, decreasing the cost of 
the companies operating in the single market, eliminating a web of 
different jurisdictions and legal framework applying to different 
subsidiaries. However, the SE does not solve the complexity of 
taxation, due to the lack of common regulations and full 
implementation across member states. Nerudova (2007) observed 
that adopting the SE form does not provide any meaningful tax 
advantage, since the SE Regulation does not cover taxation, and 
thus maintains the applicability of national tax law. As such, an SE 
must be treated as a national company, and each of its subsidiaries 
or branches is subject to the tax law of the country within which it 
is situated.  
The absence of tax provisions in the SE statute never 
corresponded to the will of the European Commission, as stated, 
among others, by Commissioner Bolkestein. Extensive articles 
existed in the original proposal dated 1970, and were later gradually 
removed. Werlauff (2003) suggested that integration-friendly 
institutions such as the European Parliament could have wished to 
see uniform taxation of SEs both with respect to tax base (the 
calculation of taxable income), and tax rate. As stated by Meiselles 
and Graute (2017), “the lack of appropriate tax rules significantly 
reduces the practical attractiveness of the European Company 
Statute”. The lack of such provisions also weakens the SE statute, 
leading companies to adopt it mostly for tax advantages, 
exacerbating tax competition inside the EU. Hornuf et al. (2017), for 
example, show that the stock price reaction is positive when the 
decision to incorporate as a Societas Europaea involves moving the 
firm’s registered office towards jurisdictions with significantly 
lower corporate tax rates. Evidence suggests that corporate taxes in 
the countries of origin were significantly higher (27.5%) relative to 
the country of destination (21.8%). 
Tax provisions for the SE could also be tailored to SMEs, if a 
dedicated SE statute is introduced for smaller companies (see above, 
HIDDEN TREASURES | 125 
 
Chapter 3). Over the next five years, the European Commission will 
have an opportunity to explore these reforms as a package, to 
ensure that European SMEs can profit from a more sustainable and 
balanced business environment, and are effectively shielded from 
both tax and regulatory disadvantages vis-à-vis larger corporations.  
7.5.3 Effectively tackle aggressive tax planning in the EU 
Tørsløv et al. (2018) find that almost 40% of multinationals’ profits 
are shifted to tax havens globally each year, with and multinational 
companies can pay up to 30% less tax than domestic competitors, 
adding that “aggressive tax planning distorts competition for 
domestic firms, in particular SMEs”. Importantly, of the 
approximately $600 billion in multinational foreign profits shifted 
to tax havens in 2015, 30% were moved to tax havens within the EU; 
and 80% of the profits shifted from EU countries end up in EU tax 
havens, primarily Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. These 
countries accounted for a total of $210 billion in profit shifting. 
Oxfam estimated that “France, Spain, Italy and Germany lost 
around €35.1 billion in tax revenues in 2015 alone”. 
That means, that despite significant progress in tax 
enforcement in the EU there still remains a massive problem in the 
fairness of taxation and the possibility for aggressive tax planning 
across member states. This erodes the solidarity principle, as well as 
the European social model, since companies, especially large 
corporations, are still able to engage in forum shopping when 
deciding where to pay their taxes. We recommend that EU 
institutions tackle this issue starting from a clear standpoint on the 
Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR) rules, which are still stalled 
in the ordinary legislative procedure, and notably in the Council – 
the European Commission tabled the proposed legislation in 2017 
and the European Parliament massively approved it (534 to 98), 
even mandating that the information be published as open data to 
allow anyone to use it. The official reason for not proceeding with 
proposed rules is that public CBCR “could damage investment, by 
imposing additional compliance requirements and costs on 
companies, and forcing disclosure of sensitive taxpayer 
information”. In addition, some stakeholders have observed that 
public CBCR would ignore existing differences between accounting 
rules and the non-harmonised tax regimes in different member 
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states and globally. Moreover, CBCR rules would only cover EU 
member states.  
However, all these concerns are not insurmountable 
obstacles, if the principle of tax transparency is shared across the 
spectrum of stakeholders. Once again, in order to effectively lead 
the debate on fair and transparent taxation at the global level, the 
EU should first do its homework properly: as part of a package 
aimed at promoting sustainable and fair business in the EU, the 
move towards enhanced CBCR appears to be meaningful and likely 
to restore the basic conditions for the European social model, as well 
as those for European SMEs to thrive in the single market.  
Finally, the move towards a CCCTB, re-proposed in October 
2016 after a first attempt in 2011, could provide a more level playing 
field for all companies operating in the single market. Investments 
such as the deployment of RegTech for regulatory monitoring and 
compliance purposes can help Europe exploit the quality of its tax 
system, coupling it with efficient and effective enforcement. 
Expectations are that the CCCTB would lift investment in the EU by 
3.4% and growth by up to 1.2%. But formal adoption by the EU’s 
Council of Ministers is not expected any time soon. 
 | 127 
 
 
8. A COMMITMENT TO ERADICATE 
CORRUPTION  
North-western EU member states rank consistently among the top 
performers in the world in terms of corruption control. Taking the 
EU as a whole, even though there are gaps in performance, the bloc 
comes out ahead of most of G20 countries, as reflected in a range of 
indicators like the Corruption Perception Index, the Global 
Competitiveness Report, or the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
This makes Europe a better place for effective policymaking as well 
as for doing business. However, on average, the EU is outperformed 
by the US. More should be done to reduce performance gaps 
between member states and ultimately improve overall EU 
performance. 
8.1 The plague of corruption 
Corruption is dishonest or fraudulent conduct entailing the abuse 
of public or private power for private gain.64 It includes, inter alia, 
active and passive bribery of public officials (also including elected 
and appointed officials), active and passive bribery in the private 
sector, undue influence peddling, abuse of function, embezzlement, 
conflicts of interest and favouritism. Corruption has widespread 
economic and social implications.  
Corruption reduces public finances and depletes public 
investment, thus hampering economic and social development. 
From a social standpoint, it erodes trust in government, institutions 
and democracy, harms the rule of law and ultimately endangers 
human rights. By reducing efficiency, it also increases inequality. In 
a wider sense, corruption impinges on policymaking and policy 
implementation, thus limiting the ability of a state to deal with e.g. 
global warming, environmental degradation, security and 
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organised crime and, ultimately, to achieve sustainable 
development objectives. From an economic standpoint, corruption 
discourages private investments, increases companies’ uncertainty 
about day-to-day operations, harms the functioning of the single 
market, and burdens firms, disproportionately SMEs, with 
additional transaction costs, potentially leading some to exit the 
market (Gupta et al., 2016). The negative effects go beyond the 
reported economic impact, as corruption also brings with it the 
hidden costs related to inferior decisions, such as the poor allocation 
of capital, the development of sub-optimal products and the 
appointment of the undeserving. 
While a number of EU member states (mainly concentrated in 
north-western Europe) rank very high (and better than the US) 
when it comes to preventing and fighting corruption, some member 
states still perform very poorly. Corruption in the EU costs up to 
€900 billion per year65 and affects both citizens and businesses. 
Interestingly, most EU countries feature state-of-the-art rules 
against corruption; therefore, uneven enforcement explains the 
large variance across member states. In this context, an EU action to 
combat corruption could reduce the distance between leaders and 
laggards, cut corruption costs and favour economic growth and 
cohesion. 
8.2 An Evolving Regulatory framework 
According to the Treaties, the EU does not have direct competence 
in the field of corruption; however, it has a general right to act in the 
field of anti-corruption policy to ensure a high level of security. 
More specifically, article 83.1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
EU (TFEU) includes corruption in the list of “particularly serious 
crimes with a cross-border dimension” and allows the European 
Parliament and the Council to adopt directives in order to establish 
minimum rules for the definition of criminal offences and sanctions 
to combat such a crime on a common basis. In addition, in the 
context of the Stockholm Programme,66 all EU member states (and, 
where appropriate, the Commission) were requested to improve the 
prosecution of corruption in the private sector; the Commission was 
also given the mandate to measure member state efforts in the fight 
against corruption, increase cooperation between member states 
and develop a comprehensive anti-corruption policy in cooperation 
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with the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption 
(GRECO). Table 5 provides an overview of the main EU instruments 
to fight against corruption. The EU is also in the process of 
establishing the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), an 
independent and decentralised prosecution office with the 
competence to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment crimes 
against the EU budget, including corruption. 
Table 5. Main EU instruments to fight against corruption 
Instrument Purpose 
Convention on the fight 
against corruption involving 
officials of the EU or officials of 
Member States (1997) 
Criminalising active and passive 
bribery 
Council Framework Decision 
on combating corruption in the 
private sector (2003) 
Criminalising active and passive 
bribery in the private sector 
(implementation across member 
states remains uneven) 
Directive on the fight against 
fraud to the Union's financial 
interests by means of criminal 
law (PIF Directive 2017) 
Criminalising active and passive 
bribery 
The European Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF) 
Tasked with detecting, 
investigate and stop fraud and 
corruption against the financial 
interests of the EU 
European Partners Against 
Corruption (EPAC) and 
European contact-point 
network against corruption 
(EACN) 
Platforms for experience-sharing 
and cooperation among anti-
corruption practitioners from EU 
member states and Council of 
Europe members 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
Furthermore, other EU instruments are indirectly relevant to 
tackling corruption, as they incorporate anti-corruption elements. 
For instance, the EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive (the fifth 
update having been adopted in April 2018) is meant to increase the 
transparency of financial flows in the EU. The latest update is 
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particularly relevant in light of the tax evasion and hidden wealth 
brought to light by the Panama Papers. In this context, the directive 
targets, among others, the letterbox companies set up for corrupt 
purposes. In the same vein, the 2014 Public Procurement Directive 
includes a number of anti-corruption measures. In fact, corruption 
related to public procurement generates very high direct and 
indirect costs: by way of example, direct costs were estimated at 
€2.2 billion when looking at only five sectors (road and rail, water 
and waste, urban/utility construction, training, and research and 
development) and eight member states in one single year (2010).67 
Against this background, first and foremost the directive increases 
transparency, which can be considered the worst enemy of 
corruption. It ensures equal treatment of bidders, allows for an 
objective evaluation of tenderers and ensures compliance with the 
contract and the tender proposal. It introduces, inter alia, minimum 
standards for an EU-wide definition of conflicts of interest, the 
obligation of EU countries to take appropriate measures to detect, 
prevent and tackle fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, as well 
as mandatory e-procurement.  
Finally, when it comes to monitoring the progress of member 
states, the annual country reports under the European Semester 
include detailed analyses of country risks and challenges related to 
corruption. Furthermore, in the specific case of Bulgaria and 
Romania, the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, which has 
been in place ever since their accession to the EU, sets benchmarks 
and tracks developments in the areas of judicial reform and fight 
against corruption, with the aim of supporting ongoing reform 
efforts. 
 
Box - Highlights of EU and US anti-corruption legislation  
Is either the EU or the US a definitive leader in anti-corruption 
legislation? According to the Global Integrity Report,68 the US has a 
stronger anti-corruption legal framework and enforces it more 
effectively in comparison to EU member states. However, the data 
available is relatively old (2006-2011) and not all member states are 
covered by the study, the focus being more on emerging and 
developing economies. Taking this into account and going into more 
detail, two Transparency International studies point out why a clear 
answer in this matter is difficult to substantiate. 
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The Anti Money Laundering Directive provides a good example 
of the good results stemming from EU-level interventions to tackle 
corruption. According to a 2017 study on beneficial legal frameworks 
in the G20 countries,69 France, Italy, Spain have very good frameworks 
in place, with Germany following closely behind, while the US 
performs less well in this respect. All four EU member states have 
central beneficial ownership registers (in line with the fourth Anti 
Money Laundering Directive), thus addressing the issue of incomplete 
or difficult-to-access information, as is the case in the US where a 
central registry is absent. 
The situation is reversed with regard to the implementation of 
the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention aiming to curb global corruption. 
From this viewpoint, the US is a clear leader, followed by Germany.70 
The majority of EU member states, however, are experiencing 
significant enforcement difficulties. Transparency International reports 
little to no enforcement of the provisions of the Convention in 11 
member states: Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Poland, Denmark, the Czech 
Republic, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and 
Estonia. 
8.3 Corruption indicators 
Corruption indicators compiled by Transparency International, the 
World Bank, or the World Economic Forum point in a clear 
direction: the EU performs very well in terms of corruption control 
in comparison to most G20 economies. A consistent group of 
member states usually ranks among the top countries in the world 
and ahead of the US across all relevant corruption indicators. 
However, there are still member states where corruption is a rather 
significant issue that needs to be addressed (see Table 6). 
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by 
Transparency International, in 2017 the EU included nine out of the 
20 ‘cleanest’ countries in the world. The US ranks 18th, ahead of 
Ireland but after Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Belgium. However, a number 
of EU member states perform quite poorly. For instance, Italy, 
Slovakia, Croatia, Greece, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria are all 
positioned below the 50th place in the ranking. The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) provide a similar pattern with respect 
to the control of corruption in 2016. Ten member states rank higher 
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than the US (Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Belgium, Austria, and France). 
While differences do exist inside the EU, the poorer performers still 
rank ahead of major economies like China, Russia, or India, 
according to this indicator. 
Table 6. Overview of corruption indicator scores across the EU and the 
G20 countries71  
Country CPI 2017 
Corporate 
ethics 
(GCI 
17/18) 
Public 
institutions: 
Ethics and 
corruption 
(GCI 17/18) 
Control of 
corruptio
n 
(WGI 
2016) 
Overall 
score 
Finland 85 6.24 6.31 2.28 89.11 
Denmark 88 6.08 5.74 2.24 86.62 
Sweden 84 5.98 5.66 2.22 84.78 
Luxembour
g 82 5.76 6.01 2.08 84.08 
Netherlands 82 5.95 5.95 1.95 84.00 
Canada 82 5.61 5.46 1.98 80.68 
United 
Kingdom 82 5.46 5.57 1.88 80.01 
Australia 77 5.68 5.51 1.77 78.92 
Germany 81 5.33 5.28 1.83 77.79 
Ireland 74 5.59 5.48 1.63 76.91 
Japan 73 5.68 5.31 1.51 75.74 
Austria 75 5.44 4.93 1.54 73.84 
Belgium 75 5.35 4.94 1.60 73.80 
USA 75 5.36 5.08 1.33 73.06 
France 70 4.94 4.73 1.37 68.80 
Estonia 71 4.81 4.82 1.21 68.10 
EU-27 GDP-
weighted 
average  
69.32 4.77 4.55 1.24 66.51 
EU-27 
average 64 4.49 4.21 0.98 61.32 
Saudi 
Arabia 49 5.01 5.25 0.23 60.33 
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Portugal 63 4.31 4.14 0.96 59.92 
Malta 56 4.21 3.92 0.72 55.62 
Lithuania 59 4.19 3.77 0.67 55.41 
Slovenia 61 3.97 3.65 0.80 55.15 
Cyprus 57 3.95 3.79 0.82 54.76 
Poland 60 3.92 3.60 0.75 54.26 
Czech 
Republic 57 3.96 3.38 0.51 51.52 
Latvia 58 3.75 3.27 0.49 50.36 
India 40 4.57 4.38 -0.30 49.95 
Spain 57 3.59 3.31 0.52 49.78 
South Korea 54 3.55 3.65 0.37 49.52 
China 41 4.16 4.38 -0.25 48.74 
Indonesia 37 4.27 3.90 -0.39 45.55 
Greece 48 3.74 3.16 -0.05 44.66 
Italy 50 3.49 3.17 0.05 44.62 
Turkey 40 3.56 3.87 -0.20 44.10 
Croatia 49 3.44 2.86 0.19 43.61 
Slovakia 50 3.35 2.76 0.24 43.32 
Romania 48 3.41 3.04 0.00 43.04 
South Africa 43 3.79 2.67 0.05 42.07 
Bulgaria 43 3.54 3.02 -0.16 41.44 
Hungary 45 2.90 3.01 0.08 40.43 
Russian 
Federation 29 3.79 3.48 -0.86 37.42 
Argentina 39 2.87 2.54 -0.31 34.91 
Brazil 37 2.93 2.11 -0.44 32.20 
Mexico 29 3.16 2.36 -0.77 30.57 
Notes: Higher indicator values reflect a better performance. The EU-27 GDP-
weighted average is calculated using 2017 GDP data provided by Eurostat. The 
overall score is a composite indicator built using the four corruption indicators 
presented in the table. The individual indicators have been normalised on a 
scale from 0 to 100 and then aggregated into a measure that reflects the average 
standing of each country. The values of the overall score range between 0 
(weakest overall performance) and 100 (strongest overall performance). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat, Transparency International, the 
World Bank, and the World Economic Forum.  
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While the CPI and WGI focus particularly on corruption in 
government, the World Economic Forum, through its Global 
Competitiveness Report (2017)72 and the underlying survey of 
business executives, better conveys the impact of corruption on 
business. In Finland, Ireland, Austria, Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Estonia and France, business 
executives perceive corruption as the least or among the least 
problematic factors for doing business from a list of 16 potential 
issues. Conversely, in the US, corruption raises more concerns, as 
businesses indicate corruption is the fifth most problematic factor 
from the same list. In fact, the US could also be at some 
disadvantage compared with the EU because of the number of 
elected law enforcement officers at the state and county level. For 
instance, the system of accountability through elections that applies 
to sheriffs leaves room for discretionary decisions and potential 
conflicts of interest (Tomberlin, 2018). 
No major differences exist between the public and the private 
sector in terms of ethics and corruption when we consider the top 
performers from the EU alongside the US.73 While north-western 
member states have a lead in rankings worldwide, scoring ahead of 
the US, the situation changes when EU averages are computed, with 
the US outperforming Europe. The heterogeneous level of 
corruption across the member states brings the overall average 
down, both when considering a simple average of scores, as well as 
when the measure considered is a GDP-weighted average of 
corruption. However, the EU tends to perform relatively well 
overall in comparison to most G20 economies. It is worth stressing, 
however, that differences do exist between US states as well. Alaska 
and California, for instance, are top performers, particularly with 
regard to lobbying disclosure, ethics enforcement agencies, and 
legislative and executive accountability; by contrast, Delaware, 
Wyoming and Michigan, being more prone to corruption, lag 
significantly behind in most aspects related to public sector 
transparency and accountability.74 
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Box - The “revolving door” phenomenon and associated corruption risks 
A phenomenon contributing to the perceived levels of corruptions in 
the public sector is the flow of former public officials (particularly high-
ranking) into private and non-profit sector positions that involve 
lobbying activities. This “revolving door” phenomenon raises a 
number of concerns such as the extent to which public officials are 
influenced in their decisions by a potential high-paying career, or the 
trading of policy information and strategic contacts in the executive and 
legislative branches. Washington D.C. is particularly affected by these 
practices. A study conducted for the 1998 – 2008 timeframe estimates 
that 42% of lobbyists in the US capital had prior government 
experience. Moreover, their activity represented roughly 60% of 
lobbying firm revenues (Draca, 2014). In the EU, the phenomenon has 
only recently been brought to public attention. Considering only high-
ranking officials, 50% of former Commissioners and 30% of former 
Members of the European Parliament work for organisations in the EU 
lobby register.75 From this perspective, the US could be more prone to 
corruption in terms of conflict of interest. 
 
The EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) attaches numbers to the instances of 
bribery in the business sector. According to 2013-2014 data,76 firms 
in Central Europe and the Baltics reportedly paid bribes (“informal 
payments to move things along”) that amounted to less than 1% of 
total annual revenues, down from almost 6% in 2008-2009. This 
figure is lower than the one reported in Russia, where informal 
payments amounted to 1%. Surveys of small, medium, and large 
enterprises at the global level, as UNODC notes, show that the 
smaller the company the more corruption is perceived as a 
significant obstacle.77 In addition, people working in SMEs are more 
likely to report that they were asked for bribes from the local 
government than those working in large enterprises.  
SMEs are particularly vulnerable to corruption given their 
size as well as limited financial and bargaining power.78 From a 
financial standpoint, informal payments in dealing with local 
government, for instance in exchange for permits, put a 
disproportionate burden on SMEs compared to large enterprises. 
Despite this, bribes can be unavoidable in certain cases, as the 
refusal to pay can result in market exit. From a bargaining point of 
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view, SMEs lack the influence of large enterprises, which hinders 
their ability to oppose acts of corruption or better negotiate their 
position. Furthermore, special links between larger enterprises and 
the public authorities, whether legal or illegal, can have detrimental 
effects on the activities of SMEs.  
8.4 Corruption and public opinion 
A recent Special Eurobarometer (2017)79 shows that corruption is 
considered unacceptable in most EU countries. More than two 
thirds of Europeans believe that corruption is widespread in their 
country, especially among political parties, politicians and national 
public institutions. Less than 50% of Europeans think that the level 
of corruption in their country has increased over the last decade; 
however, most of them believe that more should be done to tackle 
corruption. Nevertheless, Europeans exposed to corruption do not 
report it and this is most likely due to the following reasons: (i) they 
do not know where to report corruption; (ii) they think corruption 
is difficult to prove; (iii) they believe corruption is not really 
punished; and (iv) they argue there is a lack of protection for those 
reporting corruption. There are large differences between EU 
countries on all dimensions. 
With respect to businesses, the last Flash Eurobarometer 
(2017)80 on the topic emphasises that while 40% of EU companies 
consider corruption to be a problem when doing business, it is not 
the main problem. Over two thirds of EU companies confirm that 
corruption is widespread in their country and that close links 
between business and politics are a matter of concern, especially 
when it comes to public tenders. However, compared with previous 
surveys, the number of companies believing that corruption in 
national/regional public procurement is widespread is declining. 
Corruption affects SMEs the most and has diverse impacts on 
different economic sectors (e.g. it is more frequent in the 
construction or healthcare sectors). Companies tend to be 
pessimistic about the way corruption is tackled in their country. 
Once again, differences between EU countries are very wide. 
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8.5 Implications for future EU policy 
The 2014 EU Anti-Corruption Report published by the European 
Commission81 acknowledged the detrimental effect of corruption on 
the economy and society as a whole. It also showed that while all 
EU member states have the legal instruments and institutions in 
place to prevent and fight corruption, enforcement is insufficient in 
a number of countries, leading to unsatisfactory results and 
generating direct costs in the region of €179 billion to €990 billion 
per year.82 The report also emphasised that there is no ‘one size fits 
all’ solution to this problem and identified key areas of risk in the 
Union. Interestingly, by accounting for the broad diversity among 
EU member states, the initial commitments to publish follow-up EU 
Anti-Corruption Reports every two years has been replaced by 
more “versatile approaches” entailing the analysis of corruption 
issues in the European Semester country reports as well as the 
introduction of anti-corruption experience-sharing programmes.83  
8.5.1 Leverage the European Semester to promote anti-corruption 
initiatives 
The European Semester should be the active tool of the EU anti-
corruption strategy, consistently and continually featuring 
corruption challenges in the country reports and in the specific 
country recommendations. As an additional way of bolstering 
credibility, the EU could resume talks and set a timeline for joining 
the GRECO as a full member. Progress should be monitored and 
made public. There is a significant gap between the perceived level 
of corruption and the actual level of reporting. To increase trust and 
to encourage citizens to report acts of corruption, the EU could 
provide more coverage to the progress made by member states in 
adopting and enforcing rules against corruption. Prominent cases 
illustrating the progress made could be included in the country 
reports, alongside the risk analysis, as part of the European 
Semester. Together with this, the EU-wide collection of data on 
corruption offences could be a useful tool and efforts could be made 
in order to harmonise the data available at the national level. In 
addition, better protection for whistle-blowers should be 
guaranteed, including clearer and safer reporting channels as well 
as prevention of retaliation.84  
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8.5.2 Tackle the enforcement gap 
Enforcement is the key issue to be tackled. A comprehensive legal 
framework is in place both in the member states as well as at the EU 
level. Variations in performance across countries are mainly due to 
implementation issues. As such, in order to bridge the existing gaps, 
member states could improve their national rules and, more 
important, effectively enforce the frameworks already in place. This 
will require a considerable increase in the budgets for law 
enforcement, prosecution and, potentially, specialised courts. These 
investments would curb not only the reported economic cost of 
corruption, but also the hidden cost of inferior decisions. In this 
context, as the world’s 300 metropolitan economies account for 
about 50% of global GDP85 and corruption follows power and 
money, there is an increasing need to better equip regional and local 
administration with rules and instruments to fight against 
corruption. For instance, city-level anti-corruption units could be 
introduced. 
Anti-corruption strategies could be designed by taking into 
account the particular case of SMEs. As SMEs often interact with 
local and regional authorities, this is the level where they are also 
most prone to corruption. As mentioned, member state 
governments should ensure that national corruption strategies are 
effectively implemented at the local level as well. Considering the 
importance given to SME competitiveness as part of the EU 
innovation and growth agenda, the EU could encourage member 
states to take appropriate measures and devote sufficient resources 
to the right levels of government in order to support the fight 
against corruption. In addition, SMEs should have access to clear 
information about rules and regulations in place in order to protect 
themselves against corrupt acts.  
8.5.3 Leverage public support  
The EU could capitalise on the public support for the fight against 
corruption as well. A clear EU-wide strategy against corruption 
could raise public support for the Union alongside effectively 
lowering corruption. This is a unique chance to bolster the position 
of the EU at a time marked by Brexit and populist movements 
gaining momentum.  
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9. TRADE AND THE SINGLE MARKET: 
EXPLOITING SYNERGIES FURTHER 
The competitiveness of business in Europe is strongly and 
permanently stimulated by the combination of EU trade policy and 
the single market. Both are well-known features of European 
economic integration, but it is the combination of the two which is 
a treasure in search of greater recognition. For all practical purposes, 
the two form a couple, with overlaps in policy areas, commonness 
in strategy and very frequent interaction in many ways. The two are 
inextricably linked, so much so that the Commission (2006) wrote: 
“Globalisation is collapsing distinctions between domestic and 
external policies”.86  
This chapter assesses EU trade policy, its links with the single 
market, and its actual and potential contribution to economic 
growth, jobs, productivity and the competitiveness as well as 
resilience of European business.87 The focus on business 
competitiveness, however, should not be interpreted as a lack of 
interest in the social protection of workers or a lower priority for 
inclusive development. In fact, it is entirely possible to combine 
these legitimate concerns with a permanent stimulus of 
competitiveness. In the long run, it is wise for the EU and its 
member states to maintain a balance between these two aspects so 
that the EU economy can engage in ‘responsible globalisation’ for 
its workers as well as for stakeholders in developing countries. 
Moreover, in line with what we have observed throughout this 
book, social and environmental protection is needed to strengthen 
the sustainability of Europe’s economic policy over time: trade 
measures and the single market must become more consistent and 
aligned with this sustainability goal (Ashford and Renda, 2016).  
The first section of this chapter summarises the many 
economic benefits of an EU open to the world economy, while also 
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paying attention to temporary losers having to adjust. 
Subsequently, the EU regime enabling this economic openness will 
be set out. The second section elaborates the close connections 
between EU trade policy and the single market, with the deepening 
of the latter helping the EU’s trade and investment strategy, in turn 
creating powerful incentives for permanent improvements of 
competitiveness as the basis for EU’s prosperity. The third section 
sketches the nature and substance of EU trade policy, emphasising 
critical trends of multilateralism and bilateral trade agreements over 
the last few decades. The fourth section concludes, with 
recommendations for EU trade policy and the single market 
underpinning it.  
9.1 Economic benefits and costs of EU open trade and 
investment policy 
Opening up the (European) economy for trade and investment 
generates many and sizeable economic benefits, but it also requires 
adjustment, in particular of firms losing out in terms of 
competitiveness for several reasons. The broad thrust is that the 
economic benefits tend to be far larger than the costs of adjustment; 
benefits are also permanent whereas adjustment costs are typically 
temporary. However, both need careful attention. The present 
contribution is not the place to go into the rigorous economics of 
trade and investment. Figure 22, based on Petersen (2016)] shows 
the so-called static effects of lowering barriers to trade, 
supplemented by the dynamic effects when productivity improves 
due to exposure to globalisation.  
This diagram shows that the static effects work via two 
channels: reducing trade barriers lowers the price of imported 
goods and services while such reductions also increase cross-border 
trade. Trade barriers consist of tariffs (nowadays, after decades of 
reductions, often quite low or even zero) and usually much higher 
‘trading costs’ due to disparities or non-recognition of regulation 
and certification between two or more trading partners. The lower 
import prices work their way through (higher) purchasing power 
and lower prices of inputs via increased domestic demand to higher 
production (and, with a time lag, to higher investment) and hence 
more jobs. Greater imports due to lower barriers and more demand 
for inputs similarly increase output and jobs. 
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Figure 22. Trade Liberalisation and economic growth 
 
Source: Petersen (2016). 
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The dynamic effects refer to changes in production 
technology and/or better intra-firm solutions (e.g. learning from 
competitors or pushed by import competition) as well as 
innovation, for example prompted by a desire to be better capable 
of penetrating foreign markets via trade and/or investment. 
Dynamic effects can be cost reducing, too, but might also imply 
quality changes and new ways of doing things, all of them helping 
economic growth in various ways.  
The literature on the economic effects of trade and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) is extensive. Below we provide a few critical 
highlights of the benefits in quantitative and qualitative form; we 
then discuss temporary adjustments for specific groups, in 
particular for those dubbed ‘losers’ from globalisation).88 
First, trade is a very important source of job creation. EU trade 
with non-EEA countries generates some 31 million jobs, which is 
around 14% of EU employment; this is 12.5 million jobs more than 
in 1995.89 Each €1 billion of extra-EU exports adds 14,000 jobs. 
Though too often ignored, extra-EU imports also generate jobs, in 
two ways. One way is via logistics, wholesale and retail as well as 
supporting financial and professional services. The other way is a 
result of European and global value chains: one consequence of such 
value chains is that components and other intermediate goods (and 
services, where relevant) are imported for use in production, much 
of which is exported again: extra-EU imports as a share of EU 
exports in 1995 amounted to nearly 9%, and this share increased by 
half to reach 13% in 2015. Value chains have the effect of spreading 
the benefits of extra-EU exports all over the EU, because what e.g. 
Germany or Italy exports incorporates intermediate goods and 
services from many EU countries. It is therefore misleading to pay 
attention solely to final export data.  
The long-run EU benefits from exposure to globalisation 
include dynamic effects. Among the many available estimates, a 
prudent one for the EU found that a 1% increase in economic 
openness yields a 0.6% increase in labour productivity, but other 
studies have found a much higher impact.90 Another benefit from 
imports is what is known as the ‘pro-poor bias’, generated 
especially by imports from emerging economies led by China. EU 
imports from China and other industrialising developing countries 
consisted of a high share of ‘mass consumer goods’ at lower retail 
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prices than those prevailing in Europe. For China in 2014, this 
amounted to EU imports of no less than $124 billion of such goods 
implying an increase in the purchasing power of poorer consumers 
(as they rely heavily on such cheap consumer goods) of possibly up 
to €600 per year.91  
A real powerhouse in EU trade policy is the increasing web of 
free trade agreements (FTAs) between the EU and its international 
trade partners. These agreements are not just about imports and 
exports, but contain a plethora of provisions, regulatory 
cooperation measures and conditionalities, which the EU 
increasingly uses to ensure that its principles and safeguards are 
also applied outside its borders. In 2006, when the EU resumed 
FTAs after a moratorium of seven years, the existing FTAs covered 
some 25% of extra-EU trade; in 2015, this had increased to some 36% 
(these additional FTAs were deeper and more comprehensive, too); 
if the 2015 FTA strategy of the EU is completed, FTAs in the future 
would cover as much as 66% of all extra-EU trade; however, the 
latter figure appears unlikely since it includes, among others, the 
suspended negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, suspended for the time being.  
FDI, both inward and outward, is also crucial for EU trade. 
Depending on the type of goods or services, outward FDI can 
substitute for exports or complement trade by altering exports of 
final goods to exports of components and imports of final goods. 
Due to the spread of global value chains, the difference between the 
two is no longer clear-cut – even if final goods are exported from the 
EU, much of the value added may in fact originate elsewhere inside 
or outside the EU, and – when outside – often from foreign affiliates 
of EU companies.  
FDI is a key component of business and competitiveness 
strategies of European enterprises. At the same time, inward FDI is 
huge as well because the EU is a magnet, precisely because of its big 
single market. The investment regime of the EU is amongst the most 
liberal of the world. The EU is the largest FDI source and recipient 
in the world for decades, measured by FDI stocks. Without counting 
intra-EU FDI, the EU accounts for 36% of all FDI in the world, 
dwarfing any other economy (even the US, the largest FDI investor 
in the EU by far). Although it is good to observe that dynamic 
emerging economies have themselves become international 
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investors, in particular in South-South relations, the public debate 
on FDI in Europe or in the US can be disproportionate to the realities 
in markets. Thus, Chinese FDI into the EU has become a major issue 
due to some spectacular takeovers (like robotics firm Kuka and 
pharma giant Syngenta – Swiss but with a strong presence in the 
EU) and in a dubious fashion (with investment funds dominated by 
state-owned enterprises). But 2016 Chinese FDI stock in the EU 
amounted to just €44 billion, compared to a stunning €2,350 billion 
from the US. Chinese FDI stock in the US is barely higher than in 
the EU, compared to EU FDI in the US of no less than €2,720 billion.  
The EU is therefore a major and active ‘globaliser’. For the 
most part, this is beneficial for companies, workers and consumers, 
and has generated extra economic growth and jobs while improving 
productivity, innovation and product variety. Nevertheless, one has 
to be conscious of the mechanisms generating such multiple gains. 
The more open an economy, the more the EU’s comparative 
disadvantages are going to be exposed as well, which will sooner or 
later lead to shrinking market shares in such sectors and eventually 
job losses, closures or re-localisation of plants abroad. In some cases 
(and dependent on the business cycle), workers will find new jobs 
easily and adjustment costs are small or negligible, indeed, not 
necessarily different from jobs lost for many other reasons 
(including bankruptcies due to lost market shares or technological 
progress or demand shifts, etc.).  
Of course, such a ‘re-allocation of resources’ – as economists 
call this – yields a gross benefit for the economy at large as relatively 
inefficient firms exit the market and more efficient ones take over. 
But the net benefit depends on how many jobs are lost and not 
immediately replaced by new jobs for the displaced workers; wages 
might well be lower in the new jobs due to less experience in the 
other sector or lack of sectoral skills. The period of adjustment (e.g. 
in a crisis) as well as the uncertainty can be a rather painful 
experience which should be cushioned by welfare state social 
spending (paid by the much larger gains from trade). In addition, 
‘active labour market policies’ (or ALMP) can greatly facilitate 
finding another job without losing too much wage premium from 
previous sectoral skills. However, regional differences in the 
prospect of finding other meaningful or skill-relevant jobs can add 
to the misery of the unemployed. In the extreme it might even cause 
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hysteresis – a structural form of unemployment which may have the 
effect of eventually eroding individuals’ competencies, thereby 
reducing further the prospect of finding a job in the near future.  
The contrast between the EU and the US in this respect is quite 
sharp. Recent work by David Autor and co-authors,92 and the 
debate triggered by Donald Trump blaming China for their job 
losses and indeed their prospects for new jobs, has revealed that the 
US offers little cushioning with its minimal welfare state, and only 
minor and selective trade adjustment programmes (rather than 
ALMP).93 In the EU, welfare states do cushion and for quite a long 
time, thereby reducing income uncertainty for workers and buying 
time for re-skilling and thorough job searches. However, this does 
not mean that all is fine in the EU because there are considerable 
discrepancies in social support and ALMP between member states. 
The EU has a European Globalisation Adjustment Fund:94 however, 
this Fund suffers from minimal funding and considerable eligibility 
questions. Eligibility is very hard to decide because usually there 
are several reasons why workers suffer a massive lay-off: moreover, 
why would globalisation be a more exceptional reason than far 
more crucial reasons for job losses, namely, technology and 
digitalisation? It remains critical for the EU to pursue ‘responsible 
globalisation’, both at home (via ALMP and the welfare state) and 
abroad (in terms of corporate governance and ‘decent work’). The 
latter is supported by the EU’s manifest preference to pursue 
‘sustainable development’ in FTAs and, where possible, in the WTO 
via plurilateral agreements or other means.95  
9.2 How EU trade policy and the single market hang 
together  
There are three crucial ways the EU single market acquis and policies 
hang together with EU trade policies.  
First, there is a consistency requirement between internal and 
external policies. There is a common EU trade policy because 
independent national policies and powers would distort and/or 
prevent the EU single market from being fully established and 
functioning properly. Thus, the Treaty of Rome incorporated a 
customs union – no longer national tariffs, but a common external 
one – and implied common quotas, if any. Over time, exceptions to 
common quotas – namely, national quotas for selected third-
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country goods (e.g. Japanese cars) – were removed. By 1993, the EU 
single market was incomparably more ambitious than a customs 
union. Thus, for consistency, EU trade policy required EU-level 
powers in e.g. services (itself a huge conglomerate of distinct 
markets) and for a wide spectrum of regulatory issues.96 Indeed, 
tariffs and quotas became a relatively minor part of trade policy 
(except perhaps in agriculture) and ‘regulatory trade policy’ took 
centre stage. The trade policy response in the Uruguay Round 
(ended in 1994) confirmed the shift to regulatory issues, with the 
new GATS for services, besides a series of agreements on e.g. TRIPs, 
TRIMs, TBTs and SPS issues,97 subsidies, anti-dumping, etc.  
Subsequently, the CJEU gave its opinion about the scope of 
EU trade policy (in 1994), holding that a shift to more EU-level 
powers in these fields was justified, but in complex ways the 
member states still had to remain signatories in selected services, in 
some TRIPs (but not others) and in investment issues (not part of 
the Uruguay Round).98 This opinion revealed the inconsistency 
between the internal and external acquis (in terms of powers) which 
could only be overcome if all member states would be cooperative 
in each and every negotiation, at both multilateral and bilateral 
levels. Whether for purposes of credibility in trade negotiations or 
for pre-empting distortions or gaps in the internal market, this 
legacy of inconsistency from the past was unfortunate. It was 
repaired in the Lisbon treaty. All services as well as regulatory and 
investment treaty powers are now found at EU level and belong to 
EU trade policy. The lingering issues were dealt with in another 
opinion of the CJEU in May 2017: whereas portfolio investment and 
ISDS (arbitration for investment disputes) fall under shared 
competences, all six modes of transport, IPRs plus trade and 
development issues now fall under exclusive EU powers. This 
consistency requirement is not at all a trivial issue. Having no 
residual national trade policies in several domains creates a more 
predictable business environment in the single market for business 
in Europe, including foreign multinationals. The EU can now define 
and execute its EU trade policy strategically in all respects and will 
not be hindered by a lack of credibility when having to ‘deliver’ an 
agreement via ratification.99 Seen from within, the EU is entirely free 
to deepen and widen its single market the way it deems fit, and 
subsequently assume (if desirable) a forceful position in bilateral 
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negotiations and at the WTO. Last but not least, its internal 
experience and functional solutions may serve (and have already 
regularly served) as inspiration for WTO or bilateral policy options 
or regulatory approaches. This is indeed a hidden treasure because 
solutions deliberated between 28 member states in terms of 
regulatory and intra-EU liberalisation can serve as relevant and 
tested experiences for the WTO as well. It goes without saying that 
this tends to be beneficial and convenient for EU companies 
accustomed to these solutions.  
Second, and beyond mere consistency between internal and 
external, the qualities of the single market regime in the wider sense (i.e. 
including good regulation and most common policies)100 is a crucial 
factor for the EU’s trade and investment strategy and for the 
substance of its trade policy. The three fundamental qualities of the 
single market regime refer to its: (a) depth, i.e. how far-reaching 
commitments are in intra-EU cross-border liberalisation, 
accompanied by EU regulation where justified, and competition 
policy; (b) scope, covering all the five freedoms, with few if any 
exceptions, and hence being very broadly encompassing;101 and (c) 
credibility with market players, ensured by proper implementation 
and enforcement. The treaty regime gives the single market (in the 
wider sense) a central role in pursuing the socio-economic aims of 
the TFEU: it is the ‘superworkhorse’ which should deliver higher 
prosperity over time, conditioned by sustainability and other 
aspects. A higher prosperity that, with a splintered EU and a 
shallow, non-performing single market, would be impossible to 
attain. Now that free movements and free establishment are much 
better respected in the EU than a few decades ago, the quality of EU 
regulation in incentivising business to compete and invest becomes 
ever more crucial both for the single market and for trade policy.  
Box - The quality of EU regulation and its meaning for EU trade policy  
Single market regulation is very important for EU trade policy for two 
reasons. First, high-quality EU regulation combines effective solutions 
for market failures (its purpose) with the least possible costs in terms of 
resources for companies and citizens and/or in terms of lost options to 
act. Market failures prevent proper market functioning. Practically all 
market failures can be summarised with the acronym “SHEIC”: safety, 
health, environment, investor/saver and consumer protection. Markets 
on their own will not provide SHEIC; this is the assignment for EU 
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regulation. SHEIC regulation is essentially ‘risk regulation’. If EU risk 
regulation succeeds in overcoming market failures at the least possible 
cost, business can act responsibly without incurring unnecessary costs, 
thereby retaining its competitiveness. This is crucial for the EU in 
international trade and investment, both ways. However, at times EU 
regulation goes far beyond pure market failures, and seeks the 
realisation of long-term EU goals such as ambitious carbon-neutrality 
goals for 2050: in these circumstances, EU businesses may have to face 
higher costs than their counterparts in other regions of the world, and 
this has to be adequately reflected in a proactive trade policy that 
avoids the creation of a ‘race to the bottom’, or an emerging trade-off 
between short-term competitiveness and long-term sustainability.  
Second, high-quality risk regulation is also a major trade issue 
internationally, whether in the WTO, in bilateral FTAs, in sectoral 
agreements or in regulatory cooperation. The higher the quality of EU 
regulation, the better it can serve as a template or example for 
international trade negotiations. Negotiations over CETA, the EPA 
with Japan, the FTA with Korea, TTIP, Mexico, Singapore, Mercosur 
and today’s ongoing talks with Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand 
are all predominantly about risk regulation, much less about tariffs. The 
idea behind such regulatory trade talks is to minimise the ‘trading 
costs’ for business in accessing each other’s markets, that is, the costs of 
answering to different regulatory requirements in various markets. 
These trading costs are much higher than average tariffs nowadays.  
It is true that the preferences about risk reduction in regulation 
may differ between trading partners and this implies that the EU 
cannot always ‘export’ its regulatory experiences in their entirety. 
Moreover, sometimes, techniques and traditions of risk reduction 
might differ, too and these have to be accommodated somehow. 
Nevertheless, ‘good EU regulation’ is an asset in such negotiations, 
because its objective quality can be recognised and may well reduce 
‘trading costs’ significantly. This is further enhanced by the fact that the 
EU has systematically relied on many thousands of European technical 
standards which are very often identical to world standards (74% for 
electrical and 34% for non-electrical goods standards). 
Third, even when internal/external consistency is addressed 
properly and the fundamental qualities of the internal market (in 
the wider sense) have become ambitious, the competitiveness of firms 
inside the single market – say, vis-à-vis imports or locally produced 
goods or services from foreign companies – and outside, in the 
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world economy, is also determined by many other factors beyond 
the immediate control of firms themselves and beyond the single 
market regime. Such factors may consist of national measures 
concerning ‘Doing Business’,102 or a host of other aspects typically 
incorporated in so-called Competitiveness Indices.103 It is therefore 
entirely justified to broaden the policy perspective even beyond the 
single market in a wider sense to other determinants of companies’ 
competitiveness such as hard and soft infrastructures, the supply of 
a great variety of skills, the quality of higher education and training, 
incentives for innovation (other than typical single market aspects), 
regulatory and taxation aspects at national and local levels, local 
and national institutions (including the legal system and public 
administration) and additional aspects of the business environment. 
However, for the EU level of government, the question is whether 
and to what extent and with which ‘tools’ these aspects can be 
improved, given that they are mostly national and local 
prerogatives. Still, the gradually increased competitive rivalry in the 
single market for goods and services has induced a kind of soft 
emulation in terms of ‘Doing Business’ between member states, 
leading many of them to improve on such indicators.104  
But even if EU member states all say that they willingly 
cooperate on a range of such issues, is there a recognisable 
relationship with EU trade policy? Nowadays there surely is, due to 
the need to continually climb the ladder of dynamic comparative 
advantages. Especially for advanced economies like the EU, and 
given the awakening of the BRICs and many other emerging 
economies, a search for greater EU prosperity in the long run is and 
will remain very demanding in terms of the domestic economy’s 
capacity to stay close to the (shifting) technology frontier, to be 
repeatedly amongst the first movers of new or innovative goods and 
services, to be competitive and innovative in all kinds of services 
(especially those that cannot be easily outsourced), to deliver high 
quality based on high skills and design specialisation and to remain 
a high value added partner in global value chains. Clearly, market 
pressures go a long way towards inducing permanent exposure and 
incentives to anticipate and adjust, for companies, workers and 
indeed customers and consumers. But active and strategic policy 
making over a wide spectrum of determinants of competitiveness 
of firms are required as well. National reforms are also necessary, 
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given the lingering restrictiveness of product markets and – to some 
extent – labour markets. However, such reforms would also – and 
directly – help the single market to function better, which would 
render EU firms more robust and able to withstand competitive 
forces emerging from further globalisation. With respect to reforms 
in services and labour markets, some progress has been made in the 
EU but selectively only. The implementation of the wide-ranging 
2006 services directive was a significant contribution but recent 
progress has been insufficient.105 A lack of reforms raises the cost of 
adjustment, which, in turn, prompts political economy resistance to 
openness, which, in its turn, tends to reduce EU companies’ 
competitiveness in the longer run. EU trade policy makers are 
acutely aware of how urgent is the move towards greater dynamism 
and flexibility in the EU economy: they observe the rise of emerging 
economies, notice their high to very high growth rates, negotiate 
with them on quickly shifting agendas in accordance with their 
shifting comparative and competitive advantages and worry about 
the defensive reactions sometimes heard in Europe. Much better for 
the EU to systematically anticipate such changes and stimulate 
Europe’s progress up the ladder of comparative advantages.  
9.3 The nature, scope and trends of EU trade policy  
With the gradual completion of EU trade policy during the 1980s 
and 1990s and its formalisation in the 2009 Lisbon treaty, this 
important instrument has been better and much more intensively 
used by the Union, decisively helped by the size and deepening of 
the single market as well. Therefore, nowadays, EU trade policy has 
become very rich and interesting. It is multi-varied in international 
application, much more comprehensive in scope, and meanwhile 
includes investment besides trade, is ‘deeper’ in that international 
or bilateral commitments have fewer reservations and applies to 
both goods and services. 
For goods and services, the pursuit of EU trade policy is 
multilateral in the WTO, regional (mostly in Europe, in the future 
possibly with Mercosur and with ASEAN as groups), bilateral 
(mostly in FTAs and – in one case – with a customs union, namely 
Turkey) and unilateral. For investment, there is no international 
overarching multilateral treaty, although a tradition of BITs 
(bilateral investment protection treaties) has emerged resulting in 
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emulated international BIT ‘models’. Investment treaties have been 
negotiated at the EU level since 2010. The WTO has not changed 
much since its beginning in 1995, despite enormous efforts during 
the WTO Doha Round to deepen and widen commitments and 
scope, largely frustrated by some larger developing countries.106 
The EU is a strong protagonist of the WTO and the entire idea of a 
multilateral rules-based system, disciplining big and small 
economies equally. The EU’s activism in trade policy can be mainly 
found in bilateralism. The principal reason is that effective 
multilateralism has become very difficult with the manifold 
exceptions for developing countries and the refusal to deepen the 
WTO regime by large players like India, Brazil and sometimes 
China. Since 2017, it has been frustrated by the disruptive policies 
of the Trump administration. 
In 1999, the EU unilaterally declared a moratorium on FTAs 
in order to make it more attractive for other WTO partners to 
concentrate on multilateral trade liberalisation and facilitation in the 
Doha Round.107 But the EU turned out to be alone in this. Because 
multilateral progress became so difficult even in the Doha Round 
and most WTO partners frantically concluded FTAs with closer 
partners, despite the Round, the EU terminated its moratorium in 
2006. Since then it has concluded a series of new FTAs, deepened 
and modernised some existing FTAs and started negotiations with 
several countries on additional modern FTAs. The overall picture of 
EU FTAs is complex108 for the simple reason that the EU is a magnet: 
it is a very big market with high purchasing power and hence 
attractive for all trading partners. The search for access to its big, 
single market led to what Pelkmans & Brenton (1999) have called a 
‘me too’ drive:109 once a country A obtains better access to the EU 
via a FTA, its competitors B and C also plead to acquire similar FTA 
treatment, a domino effect stimulated by a fear of losing 
competitiveness for their firms in the big European market. Thus, 
the EU strategy of seeking better access to the most dynamic 
markets (East Asia in particular) is topped up with other FTAs due 
to the ‘me too’ logic. As a result, the EU has now FTAs of different 
generations, of different depth, with narrow and much wider scope 
and with partners in four continents, with the fifth continent 
(Australasia) having begun negotiations in 2018. An overview is 
provided in Table 7.  
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Table 7. Overview of EU’s FTAs in four categories 
Intra-European ‘old’ FTAs new FTAs FTAs/EPAs with APC 
EEA-3, Norway, 
Liechtenstein, Iceland 
(deepest FTA, in fact a 
single-market-minus) 
Southern Mediterranean 
countries (Israel, Lebanon, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, 
Morocco, Palestine, 
Jordan) 
South Korea (2011), deep 
and comprehensive 
EPA with Eastern & 
Southern African States 
(asymmetric, better 
market access for 
Africans, plus 
development aid) 
Switzerland (mimics the 
EEA-3 but not fully, and 
without solid 
governance) 
Chile (now under upgrade 
talks) 
Columbia, Ecuador & 
Peru (2013), deep and 
comprehensive 
EU/South Africa FTA 
(2000), in fact with the 
SADC 
DCFTAs (with Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia) 
Mexico (upgraded to 
‘deep and comprehensive’ 
in 2018) 
Central America (2012) 
(Panama, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador) 
Cariforum, Caribbean 
countries in the ACP 
Stabilisation & 
Association Agreements 
Western Balkans 
(Albania, Former 
 Vietnam (2016) 
 
Pacific islands in the APC, 
incl. New Guinea 
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Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Kosovo) 
Singapore (2015) (to be 
ratified, after a lengthy 
CJEU case upheld the 
treaty), deep and 
comprehensive 
Turkey (a CU, with 
advanced regulatory 
convergence in EU 
technical regulation for 
goods) 
 CETA (2016) (to be 
ratified), deep and 
comprehensive 
EPA with Ghana, Côte 
d’Ivoire & Cameroon 
  Japan (EPA) 2017, to be 
ratified, with investment 
separate; deep and 
comprehensive 
 
  Mercosur (2019), deep and 
comprehensive 
 
Under negotiation: Australia & New Zealand; ASEAN countries Malaysia (on hold), Thailand (on hold), Philippines (on hold), 
Indonesia; India and 6 Gulf countries (both negotiations have been stuck for many years).  
Notes: EEA = European Economic Area; DCFTA = Deep and Comprehensive FTAs in Association Agreements (Ukraine, Georgia, 
Moldova); CU = customs union; EPA = Economic Partnership Agreement (but with very different substance and obligations in the 
case of Japan than with ACP countries); SADC = Southern African Development Cooperation (South Africa, Swaziland, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Namibia).
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Table 7 shows the dynamism of EU’s bilateral liberalisation 
strategy and the active pursuit of sound (risk) regulation reducing 
regulatory disparities with trading partners. Both forcefully lower 
‘trading costs’ for companies interested in accessing markets in 
these countries. Given that SMEs are often not familiar with non-
European foreign markets and that the ‘trading costs’ of regulatory 
disparities in particular are relatively bigger for them, or indeed 
might be considered as prohibitive or too risky, the FTA strategy of 
pursuing ‘deep and comprehensive FTAs’ is beneficial for SMEs. It 
is likely to pull SMEs into exports to non-European markets and 
thereby renders such SMEs more resilient and possibly more 
productive too. The European Commission has set up several 
internationalisation programmes for SMEs and supports SME 
helpdesks in e.g. China.  
However, it is good to realise that EU trade policy 
encompasses more than FTAs. First, under multilateralism there are 
other recent accomplishments than just the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement. Although the WTO is a consensus-driven organisation, 
there are additional options for those ‘able and willing’. One option 
actively promoted by the EU are ‘plurilaterals’. In plurilateral 
agreements, a smaller group of WTO members covering a large 
share of world trade in the relevant sectors of activity commit to 
‘WTO-plus’ liberalisation and extends this opening up to all WTO 
members. Of course, this might invite ‘free riding’ which is only 
bearable if the trade share of the plurilateral is high (say, above 75%-
80% of world trade in the relevant activity) and no major player 
remains outside. There are two plurilaterals which work: the GPA 
(government procurement, considerable commitments to opening 
up) and ITA-2 (on ICT equipment or components, with zero tariffs). 
Two other ones are blocked half way in the negotiations: one on 
services (going beyond GATS commitments)110 and one on ‘green 
goods’.111 For services, the US is hesitant, not least because 
Washington and many other countries do want China in as well, but 
China’s six offers so far are insignificant.  
Second, there are many narrower or partial agreements which 
nevertheless lubricate trade or investment. One type of deals are 
bilateral MRAs,112 which can lower the trading costs of certain types 
of bulky or higher-risk goods. Another type includes narrow 
sectoral deals such as aviation treaties (greater opening up of the 
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skies of participating countries) or mutual recognition of aircraft 
safety rules and permitted manufacturing practices (as between the 
US and the EU) by their regulatory agencies. Yet another is the 
IMO,113 having fully harmonised the technical rules and standards 
of 49 critical types of equipment for sea shipping. A final example 
also offers an alternative to often cumbersome regulatory trade 
negotiations: recently, in medicines and (higher-risk) medical 
devices the national regulators have formed world fora, including 
industry as observers, where detailed ‘common guidelines’ are 
formulated on a voluntary basis, which are subsequently 
introduced into national legislation or practices. This substitution of 
trade negotiators by regulators (for the EU, in the single market) 
pre-empts lingering problems inside countries during 
implementation of trade deals.114 Moreover, national regulators 
tend to faithfully follow up their ‘own’ global guidelines at home, 
which results in very similar rules in many countries, drastically 
cutting trading costs. Another such non-WTO forum is the WP29 of 
the UN-ECE115 on technical automotive safety and environmental 
car regulations, which is leading to harmonisation of a large part of 
the technical elements of type approval of cars and trucks. The US 
is only very partially accepting of UN-ECE harmonisation on 
automotive, unlike Japan and Korea (large producers worldwide) 
and the EU above all, which is its biggest proponent. In Freund & 
Oliver (2015), a simulation shows that – if the US were to align with 
the UN-ECE WP29 rules – a gain of no less than $20 billion of lower 
trading costs and further benefits would be reaped, a non-trivial 
share of which would be benefitting EU exporters.  
Since 2010, the EU (rather than its member states) has been 
responsible for negotiating investment agreements. The member 
states have, altogether, negotiated some 1,300 BITs over the last five 
decades. Once aggregated at the EU level, this number would be far 
smaller but still sizeable. Most of these agreements concern the 
protection of foreign investors’ property and their reasonable 
expectations of local government action, without of course affecting 
the local ‘right to regulate’. Newer EU FTAs include investment as 
a separate chapter. However, EU member states were claiming that, 
under EU trade policy, powers on investment are ‘shared’ between 
the EU and national levels. In that case, a ‘mixed agreement’ is 
required with the risk that one single member state might block it 
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under ratification. For this reason, FTAs and investment agreements 
are nowadays split, in order to protect the FTA as an exclusive EU 
competence.  
The case of China is much more special, however. Already 26 
member states have a BIT with China. This shows that investment 
protection as such is not a major issue. The real and very important 
issue with China is what is called ‘post-establishment market 
access’: once a company invests in China, it might find that the 
market it wants to operate in is closed legally and/or de facto in a 
number of ways116 and the new EU/China Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment (CAI) tries to address this problem in 
earnest.  
 
Box - Brexit lays bare the interwovenness of the single market and trade 
policy 
The treasure of the ‘interwovenness’ of the single market and EU trade 
policy is demonstrated in a dramatic though unfortunate fashion by 
Brexit. The ‘red lines’ for the UK government include the departure 
from the customs union (part of both the single market and of EU trade 
policy), a greater degree of regulatory autonomy (‘taking back control’) 
and the ending of the supremacy of EU law via CJEU rulings. Knowing 
that the costs of giving up a good deal of the benefits of market 
integration with its biggest neighbour – the EU-27 – would be high, the 
UK wishes to retain far-reaching access to the single market. However, 
as a ‘third country’ (after Brexit comes into force), such far-reaching 
access to the single market would assume an EU trade policy vis-à-vis 
the UK very similar to that of the EEA-3, or at least that of Switzerland.  
Such almost complete participation in the single market is 
incompatible with UK red lines. The EEA-3 and Switzerland are not in 
a customs union but in a FTA (in terms of frontier controls); however, 
both accept a very far-reaching degree of regulatory alignment, which 
goes against ‘taking back control’, while allowing very light customs 
controls based on risk, and enforcement regimes that, in the final 
analysis, almost perfectly echo what the CJEU has ruled, which allows 
various forms of recognition and deep cooperation and also ensures a 
‘level playing field’ in areas such as labour regulations, environment 
and climate and state aid.  
Not being in the customs union, post-Brexit, gives the UK the 
freedom to develop their own trade policy and negotiate 
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‘independently’ bilateral FTAs. There is little doubt that opting to stay 
in the customs union and negotiate together with the EU would give 
the UK much more leverage and clout in commercial diplomacy, and, 
at the same time, largely remove the business costs of a disruption of 
EU-wide value chains in the single market. 
9.4 Policy recommendations 
After decades of gradual policy development, EU’s trade and 
investment legal regime and strategy has become a very 
comprehensive and pro-competitive set of instruments which 
greatly benefits the European economy and permanently stimulates 
the competitiveness of companies operating in the single market. As 
a result, the EU has become a leader in ‘responsible globalisation’. 
At the same time, there is concern for temporary ‘losers’, mostly at 
the member state level via ALMP and the cushioning of 
unemployed workers via the welfare state, and to a minor extent at 
EU level via a special Fund and regional programmes and subsidies. 
Brexit is a painful experiment revealing once again how crucial EU 
trade policy is for all member states and companies and how 
important are the links with the single market. It has also shown 
rather dramatically how interwoven companies’ value chains are in 
a market without internal borders and how costly it is to even 
threaten to disrupt such competitiveness-driven business models.  
The following selective recommendations should guide the 
EU trade and FDI strategy for the following legislature of the 
European Parliament and the new European Commission: 
9.4.1 Preserve EU’s exclusive power in negotiating agreements 
The exclusive power at EU level to conduct today’s rich and 
comprehensive trade and investment policy is a treasure that 
opportunistic national politicians ought not to challenge for 
parochial short-term and narrow purposes. Its value is found in its 
legal properties as well as in its economic effects – both static and 
dynamic, as shown before, in particular for the permanent 
competitiveness of EU enterprises – and its negotiation advantages 
with WTO trading partners.  
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9.4.2 Make trade negotiations more transparent 
For the three EU institutions involved (Commission, Council and 
EP), this exclusive power can only be exercised in a satisfactory 
fashion if, and only if, policy proposals and overall trade strategy 
are as public as possible and negotiations remain as open as 
diplomatically feasible so as to avoid accusations of being subjected 
to undue business pressures or sectoral lobbies or political pressures 
from trading partners. The European Parliament and stakeholders 
should remain involved on a regular basis. 
9.4.3 Don’t listen to the sirens of protectionism 
Given Trump’s aggressive mercantilist trade strategy, risking 
damage to the US economy in several ways while undermining the 
functioning of the WTO, it is often heard that the world economy 
has moved into protectionist times. This is wrong. Trump has no 
followers anywhere. The EU response to Trump, both bilaterally 
and multilaterally, of upholding the WTO and improving some of 
its rules while negotiating a limited WTO-compatible FTA with the 
US is the best possible, so far.  
9.4.4 China as EU’s greatest trade challenge 
By far the greatest challenge of EU trade strategy is China. The FTA 
strategy going back to 2006 is focused on dynamic East Asian 
economies, for the simple reason that growth prospects there are the 
highest. China is by far the most dynamic East Asian economy and 
it is by far the largest economy in that region. It follows that the EU 
strategy can only succeed if China is fully incorporated. The 
economic potential of this approach is great and many European 
businesses are keen. The EU’s formal policy position is that China 
and the EU must first agree on the CAI, with a firm set of legal 
commitments on ‘national treatment’ and other aspects of post-
establishment market access. For China, rightly or wrongly, this is 
considered as very intrusive, prompting significant and pervasive 
legal and policy changes. Once agreed, the EU would be ready to 
negotiate a FTA, as suggested by president Xi Jinping, under the 
condition that China would implement the profound reforms it has 
proposed itself in November 2013. These deep reforms would 
benefit the EU (and indeed other partners) but first of all private 
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business in China itself. For that reason, many specialists in China 
also advocate these reforms. This two-stage EU approach is more 
realistic today because of Trump’s trade war with China, bringing 
China and the EU closer together. China and the EU are the two 
trade giants in the world liable to assume leadership, if possible joint 
leadership (Hu and Pelkmans, 2017).117  
However, China’s trade partners – besides the EU, also the US 
and Japan as well as several others118 – insist that China profoundly 
alter its very restrictive trade and FDI policies and cement this in the 
WTO via legal reforms. The trilateral support of the US 301 case at 
the WTO about China’s discretionary practices to force involuntary 
technology transfer with numerous foreign companies investing in 
China forms a break with the past diplomacy of soft cooperation 
with China, also for the EU. The EU should carefully balance its 
China strategy in a jin-jang fashion: EU/China trade and investment 
has yielded enormous gains for both partners and this must be 
recognised and upheld, whereas China should no longer continue 
its highly interventionist practices (with little, if any, legal redress 
for companies) and pursue the deep reforms it proposed itself; it 
should also push relevant reforms in the WTO together with the EU. 
Overarching this, the EU and China have to assume joint trade 
leadership in earnest, and not just verbally, forging alliances to 
counter and neutralise US trade aggression as much as possible.  
9.4.5 Relentlessly pursue the reform and modernisation of the 
single market 
It is crucial, if EU trade policy is to remain effective for EU 
prosperity, to continue to pursue single market reforms that deepen 
and modernise the single market. This is most urgent for services, 
in particular reducing restrictions on professional services and those 
in construction and retail (Pelkmans, 2019). There is a double 
rationale for such reforms: overall, they stimulate higher growth in 
the EU for all, and they tend to lower costs and/or improve quality 
of services as inputs in value chains, in turn supporting the 
competitiveness of business in Europe vis-à-vis EU imports and for 
EU exports to world markets. Reforms for modernisation of the 
single market are manifold. They encompass hi-tech related aspects 
such as digital and new technologies (see below, Chapter 10), but 
also the widening of the social agenda at EU and member state 
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levels (harmonisation where artificial legal constructions allow 
extreme wage disparities – undermining the support for the single 
market; more ambitious upskilling of workers, especially in 
Mediterranean countries and weak regions in Central Europe) for a 
‘fairer’ single market.  
At first sight, the ‘fairer’ single market might be considered as 
a typical intra-EU issue, without much relevance for EU trade 
policy. But this would be mistaken. Precisely because of the 
economic openness of the EU and the interwovenness of the single 
market and EU trade policy, workers and labour unions justifiably 
perceive the single market, to some extent, as a reflection of 
globalisation. Since the EU prides itself on pursuing ‘responsible 
globalisation’, it should begin at home with a fairer single market, 
whether in subcontracting arrangements for value chains, labour-
intensive services linked to digital platforms or tackling the tax 
evasion by multinationals. Such reforms are critical for the 
continued support of workers, indeed of numerous EU citizens, for 
a deep single market and for an EU trade policy seeking to ‘harness 
globalisation’ – the title of a Commission communication on its 
trade strategy, see European Commission (2017).  
 
 | 161 
 
 
10. LEADING THE WORLD IN 
TECHNOLOGY RULES AND 
STANDARDS 
Digital innovation has already significantly impacted the way we 
live. The internet revolution has led us into growing social 
interaction online, as well as a massive digitalisation of 
telecommunications and media, and later many other sectors such 
as energy, manufacturing, transportation, healthcare, agriculture. 
The first information revolution is now paving the way for another, 
even more pervasive set of changes, represented by the emergence 
of a whole new ‘stack’ of technologies: high-performance 
computing (including the new generation cloud infrastructure, 
edge or fog computing, and soon quantum computing); 5G 
connectivity; the internet of things, with already ten billion 
connected devices globally, and an estimated one trillion by 2035 
(Gros et al., 2018); decentralised architectures such as the merging 
of peer-to-peer networks and the cloud, and where possible 
distributed ledger technologies (DLTs); and the rise of artificial 
intelligence as a pervasive, general-purpose technology that is 
poised to substantially revolutionise our working and private life 
(Renda, 2019).  
10.1 How the digital transformation can help uncover 
many of our hidden treasures 
While a full account of the potential and reality of these 
technologies would fall outside the scope of this book, it is 
extremely important to illustrate how digital technology can 
eventually help Europe uncover and leverage all its hidden 
treasures. In fact, digital technology is at the same time one of 
Europe’s hidden treasures and a boost to all the others. For example, 
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the emergence of smart contracts will increasingly affect contracting 
in online environments, in particular in complex relational contracts 
that require information sharing for compliance and verification 
purposes; embedding civil law in smart contract arrangements 
would then become both a question of political will, as well as a 
matter for standardisation and procurement when public 
authorities are involved (Cornelius, 2018). Blockchain/DLT and AI 
are expected to profoundly affect, among other sectors, corporate 
finance by enormously improving enterprise resource planning, 
streamlining procedures and improving accuracy of accounting and 
internal processes; and providing new opportunities for 
crowdfunding through initial coin offerings.  
Digital technologies are also affecting corporate governance, 
leading to more distributed, decentralised, ‘platformised’ structures 
than the original ‘Coasean’ firm, based on hierarchy; blockchain 
promises to further disrupt the original architecture of corporations 
by creating decentralised trustless governance systems (Fenwick 
and Vermeulen, 2018). Innovation is changing and accelerating 
thanks to the digitisation of all markets, and this, in turn, creates 
tensions in the way the EU regulates data flows, as well as text and 
data mining activities, as will be discussed below: the role of 
governments, in this context, becomes essentially that of facilitator, 
but also entrepreneur, in charge of giving direction to innovation, 
steering it towards tackling societal challenges. Patent strategies 
change in the digital sphere, veering towards open patents and 
requiring new tools for technology transfer, and being 
fundamentally challenged by the artificial intelligence age. EU 
competition policy seems to be better equipped than most 
homologous pieces of legislation around the world when it comes 
to tackling issues such as algorithmic collusion and discrimination, 
as well as market power and unfair practices in platform-to-
business relationships. The future of corruption control, as well as 
taxation policy, seem to be deeply linked to developments in 
blockchain/DLT technologies, and in particular RegTech solutions. 
Finally, trade policy is increasingly looking at digital goods and 
services and sees blockchain technologies as a possible engine of 
trust in complex global supply chains, in the Chinese Digital Silk 
Road, and even on the UK-Ireland border.  
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In other words, all our hidden treasures will be 
fundamentally affected by the digital transition. Uncovering them 
and bringing them to life means that the impact of digital 
technologies has to be fully taken into account, and that private 
governance through technologies does not develop as an alternative 
paradigm to EU law, but rather as a complement to it, and possibly 
a boost to its effectiveness, and to EU competitiveness. Importantly, 
digital technologies do not just change individual sectors, or bring 
new products and processes to the marketplace: the development of 
an entirely new “technology stack” (Renda, 2019) makes it possible 
to experiment with new forms of governance, which were 
previously considered to be prohibitively costly or inefficient. 
Accordingly, it also triggers a rethink of the single market in its very 
structure and modus operandi.  
10.2 Digital technologies and their contribution to 
economic performance 
The potential contribution to economic performance of new digital 
technologies can hardly be underestimated. Scholars and 
commentators are now convinced that the “Gordon paradox” (i.e. 
the fact that we see technology everywhere, but not in measures of 
productivity) is a thing of the past, and that new digital technologies 
will finally start massively contributing to productivity worldwide, 
including in the EU. Recent reports by Accenture/Frontier 
Economics, McKinsey and PWC conclude that technologies like AI 
will be game changers for total factor productivity and growth, by 
gradually rising as a third pillar of production, together with labour 
and capital. Chen et al. (2016) estimate the cumulative economic 
impact of AI from 2016 to 2026 as lying between $1.5 trillion and 
$3 trillion (0.15% to 0.3% of global GDP). Furman and Seamans 
(2019) review some of the most interesting literature on the impact 
of AI on the economy, which mostly finds that AI and robotics have 
the potential to increase productivity growth but may have mixed 
effects on labour, particularly in the short run. They also conclude 
that many economists believe that “AI and other forms of advanced 
automation, including robots and sensors, can be thought of as a 
general purpose technology (GPT) that enable lots of follow-on 
innovation that ultimately leads to productivity growth”; the fact 
that AI has not (yet) translated into large productivity gains, 
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according to Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson (2017), is due to a “lag 
between technological progress and the commercialization of new 
innovative ideas building on this progress which often rely on 
complementary investments” (Furman and Seamans, 2019) – a lag, 
these authors claim, that is particularly notable in the case of GPTs.  
The prospect of unprecedented productivity gains, and the 
certainty that “winter is not coming” for AI (Renda, 2019), have led 
countries around the world to launch dedicated strategies for the 
new family of digital technologies, and in particular on AI. The US 
and China are currently trapped into a digital arms race and making 
dominance in AI and related technologies (notably, quantum 
computing) the top strategic priority for the next decade. This, in 
turn, had led investment to skyrocket. Especially in the fields of 
high-performance computing, 5G/IoT and artificial intelligence, 
Europe risks being left behind by the scale of investment (including 
in the defence sector); the less precautionary approach to regulation; 
and the weaker importance attached to protecting users and citizens 
in countries such as China.  
For example, the EU currently provides about 5% of 
supercomputing resources worldwide but consumes one third of 
them, and member states have long been in dire need of expanding 
their supercomputer capacities. 119 A look at quantum computing 
patents and investment is also revealing. As shown in the Figure 
below, the US and China are in a race to patent quantum-related 
technologies, although the EU is the region in the world with the 
highest number of research publications in this field. China is 
particularly interested in quantum cryptography, which has 
immense implications for military operations. In June 2019, in an 
attempt to catch up with these developments, the European High-
Performance Computing Joint Undertaking (EuroHPC) selected 
eight sites for supercomputing centres located in eight different 
member states to host the new high-performance computing 
machines,120 for a total investment of €840 million. The Barcelona 
supercomputer called MareNostrum 6, in particular, will be faster 
than the fastest US-based supercomputer (200 petaflops against 
140), and may see the light by 2025.  
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Figure 23. Patents on quantum computing technology 
 
 
In the coming years, the race for developing a full digital 
technology stack will become even more hectic, as testified by the 
recent skirmishes between the US and China over 5G connectivity 
and wireless equipment. The most intensely competitive battlefield 
is probably artificial intelligence, given its pervasive, dual-use 
nature and the relevance it will have for all sectors of the economy. 
In this space, the debate at EU level is increasingly loaded with 
hopelessness: Europe has lost the B2C race; Europe does not have 
any of the technology giants; the data train has left the station, etc. 
There is some element of truth in these statements, but also 
excessive pessimism, which may become an alibi for policymakers 
not to take action to reverse the trend.  
More specifically, it is true that the B2C domain is currently 
dominated by large US tech giants such as Google, Facebook, 
Amazon, Apple, Twitter, Microsoft and Netflix, though this 
dominance is increasingly challenged by Chinese giants such as 
Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent and Huawei. The two superpowers hardly 
fight in each other’s backyard (at least when it comes to platforms); 
yet they compete at arms’ length in global markets. The US tends to 
dominate on the software and applications side, but Chinese 
companies dominate the infrastructure domain, and will 
increasingly need to serve non-domestic markets once its middle 
class has consolidated and related markets are saturated.  
In all this, it is widely acknowledged that Europe will not be 
able to compete on an equal footing with the United States and 
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China in terms of the sheer size of investment in new technologies. 
The Communication on Artificial Intelligence, adopted in 
April 2018, acknowledges the investment gap and highlights a 
possible alternative strategy for Europe, mostly based on a 
combination of competitiveness and ethical rules. In other, related 
fields such as 5G wireless communications, the internet of things, 
online platforms, high-performance computing and blockchain, the 
Commission has shown similar intentions, but so far relatively poor 
implementation. In yet another set of high-tech areas, such as 
genetics and genomics, the EU has remained almost silent despite 
the fact that the policy debate that emerged over the past few years 
was ethically loaded.  
Could Europe play a leading role in the setting of rules and 
ethical principles for the development and commercialisation of 
new technologies? As things stand, the answer cannot be positive. 
If one looks at the overall technology stack that is emerging as the 
so-called Web 3.0, Europe appears to be lagging behind other 
regions of the world in many crucial respects: not only the size of 
investment in R&D&I, but also in terms of fixed and wireless 
broadband deployment (very high capacity networks, as well as 
4G); level of per capita investment in e-communications 
infrastructure, relative presence in 5G standards; level of 
investment in AI, blockchain, the IoT; uptake of new technologies 
among consumers, as well as among firms; relative development of 
high-tech skills and competencies; ownership of patents in key 
enabling technologies; readiness for the quantum supremacy age; 
and even skills available in the public administration. All this 
weakens Europe’s potential authoritativeness when it comes to 
credibly proposing (let alone imposing) global standards.  
In all this, the recent entry into force (in May 2018) of the 
General Data Protection Regulation is considered by many as a 
possible exception, which may chart a new course in EU technology 
policy. By requiring strict standards of data protection, as well as 
restrictions on profiling, a right to data portability and to receive a 
meaningful explanation of how algorithms reached sensitive 
decisions, the GDPR seeks to establish a global standard in the high-
tech world, and to chart a new course in technology policy, making 
it more user-centric after many years of rather drastic laissez faire 
vis-à-vis data protection.  
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The GDPR has been implemented only recently, and 
significant uncertainty still exists as regards its success in terms of 
improved protection of end users’ right to data protection, as well 
as in terms of actual levels and modes of compliance. Accordingly, 
it is probably too soon to draw conclusions, but a few lessons can 
already be learnt. First, the GDPR has shown that courage pays at 
the EU level: the decision taken a few years ago on the need for a 
regulation on data protection has made the GDPR a path-breaking 
text in a world dominated by relatively lenient data protection rules. 
Second, Europe has successfully conquered the front pages of the 
international press, as well as grabbing the attention of top company 
CEOs through leveraging its ability to draft consistent, 
comprehensive rules, as well as its large and relatively rich internal 
market. Third, and relatedly, the EU has discovered that well-
conceived, sound technology rules can potentially translate into 
effective export products, although there is no certainty that this is 
actually happening with the GDPR. Assuming that the GDPR will 
eventually be a success, can the EU replicate this experience in other, 
related fields? One attempt, as already mentioned, is underway in 
the field of artificial intelligence, and this link is so explicitly made 
inside the European Commission that the slogan “AI is the new 
GDPR” is becoming increasingly popular. At the same time, Europe 
has no consolidated tradition in the ethics of AI, which would help 
it build credibility in a field in which it has certainly neither research 
and innovation leadership (with some exceptions), nor a very 
established infrastructure.  
10.3 Five reasons why Europe has a real opportunity to 
lead in digital technologies “for good” 
Europe can credibly claim to possess five potential opportunities 
when it comes to setting global standards on emerging technologies. 
The first is its solid, comprehensive legal framework, which appears 
more complete and more consistent than the one available in the 
United States and China. The second is the size of the single market, 
which remains for now (but not necessarily for long) the richest 
market in the world: this gives Europe the possibility to dictate 
conditions to those that want to acquire or preserve market shares 
in Europe. The third advantage is Europe’s potential leadership in 
the global quest for sustainable development, at a time in which the 
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United States is backtracking from human rights and SDGs, and 
China is not yet ready to lead. Fourth, it is false to state that the data 
train has left the station: the data needed to advance towards 
sustainable development through digital technologies still has to be 
created and collected, and data collection will not stop in the future, 
but rather will increase exponentially. Fifth, while Europe keeps 
complaining that it does not have tech giants, and that value 
extraction by online platforms is impoverishing the EU’s 
traditionally strong industrial sectors, technology is coming to the 
rescue, allowing for new forms of governance that can mirror, more 
specifically, the EU’s traditional way of approaching economic 
policy.  
All five are still to be considered as potential advantages: it is 
up to EU institutions and member states to leverage them, exploit 
the current opportunity, and avoid being doomed to irrelevance in 
the coming years. 
10.3.1 Europe has the most comprehensive legal framework on digital 
technologies, but needs to improve it in many respects 
No country has the quantity and quality of legal rules on emerging 
technologies that the EU has. The new e-Communications Code is 
now following a very comprehensive e-communications framework 
launched in 2002, and only slightly reviewed over the past sixteen 
years, while the US 1996 Telecommunications Act was gradually 
being set aside by piecemeal regulation in the United States. The net 
neutrality rules in place since 2016 appear stable and balanced, 
whereas in the United States they are still contested and have been 
changed very frequently in the past half-decade. Most importantly, 
the NIS directive, the Cybersecurity Act, the reformed copyright 
regime, the Audio-visual Media Services Directive, the e-Commerce 
Directive, the GDPR, the e-Privacy Directive and the new 
Platforms–to-business Regulation (see above, Chapter 6) and on the 
free flow of data are paving the way for a very comprehensive 
framework, in which the new technology stack could find a high 
level of regulatory quality and certainty. In addition to existing 
rules, interpretive communications and soft law may be needed to 
promote legal certainty in domains such as artificial intelligence 
(e.g. the products liability directive, the machinery directive may 
have to be clarified or even adapted). Beyond being very 
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comprehensive, the framework is also very protective of users’ 
rights: the GDPR, in particular, appears as a lone bright spot in a 
world dominated by aggressive use of personally identifiable 
information for marketing purposes. Yet, the new President of the 
European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has announced 
regulatory measures on ethics and AI in the first 100 days of the 
European Commission. 
Of course, Europe’s legal framework is far from perfect, and 
needs significant reform and updates. In a recent publication, one of 
us called for “AI fitness checks” aimed at bringing the EU acquis up 
to speed with new technological developments (Renda, 2019), a 
proposal that was later echoed by the EU High Level Expert Group 
on AI (AI HLEG, 2019b). More generally, the legal framework for 
investment in infrastructure should be reformed to allow for more 
flexibility at the national level, against specific targets in terms of 
connectivity, as well as penetration of both fixed and wireless (5G) 
networks; and spectrum policy should be far more coordinated, and 
centralised when it comes to the key frequencies needed for 5G.  
Most importantly, Europe should make sure that a suitable, 
consistent framework for data-driven innovation emerges 
throughout the continent, in order to facilitate data-hungry 
solutions such as those involving machine learning. This is a 
daunting task, given the need to strike a good balance between the 
free flow of data, the need to ensure national security (which is 
already an exception to the free flow of data), and the need to protect 
user privacy. The EU can strike a suitable balance by: adopting a 
full-fledged open data policy, which extends to publicly funded 
research as well as data held by public administrations; investing in, 
and endorsing, AI systems that do not make use of profiling based 
on personally identifiable data; and funding research and 
innovation projects on the condition that they include the use of 
privacy-by-design solutions; and establishing legal certainty on 
ethical rules for AI, including, inter alia, the transparency, 
explainability, accountability and liability of AI systems, so that 
developers will act in a less uncertain space. Moreover, at the 
sectoral level, the launch of ‘industrial data spaces’ could promote 
the sharing of data between competitors and new entrants, and at 
the same time ensure more a competitive environment by avoiding 
the accumulation of large datasets in the hands of a few large market 
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players. Finally, and more generally, EU policy at the sectoral level 
should prioritise two aspects: ownership of data by players that 
create value through producing goods and services along the 
supply chain (e.g. farmers); and control of personally identifiable 
data by the end users.  
10.3.2 Europe is still the richest market in the world  
Europe is still the largest, richest single market in the world, 
although its leadership is increasingly under attack by the US and 
even more so by China. Europe’s primacy as a market also means a 
lot in terms of policymaking: non-EU companies have a strong 
interest in serving Europe’s half-billion consumers, and will 
accordingly try to adapt to whatever (reasonable) regulatory 
constraints policymakers introduce in order to ensure that digital 
technology conforms to the highest standards of user protection, 
respect for core EU values and fundamental rights. Not 
surprisingly, the GDPR was well received by many international 
players, and many of the largest digital companies are complying 
with it, regardless of whether they are headquartered inside or 
outside the EU. The GDPR has reportedly already exerted a 
significant impact on multinational organisations: if anything, the 
problem is compliance by smaller companies, who are 
disproportionately affected by some of its provisions. Some 
companies who may have initially viewed the regulations as a 
hindrance to the way they can communicate with their audience, 
will have now realised that the GDPR forced them to think more 
carefully about how to reduce the amount of data that is being 
transferred, or how to secure data in case of a cyber-attack or a major 
disruption of their servers or networks. 
There are many ways in which the EU can leverage the 
attractiveness of its single market. Setting relatively strict rules is 
not going to be sufficient, if such rules are not fully enforced, and if 
they are not also applied to non-EU players that want to interact 
with European consumers. For example, in the case of the GDPR, 
the extent and mode of compliance with the rules introduced in May 
2018 will determine whether, and to what extent, the legislation will 
have been a success. In this respect, a lot will depend on the role of 
data protection authorities at the national and EU level, as well as 
national courts. In other fields, similar problems may arise for future 
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ethical rules on artificial intelligence: specifying that AI has to be 
transparent and non-discriminatory may be only a nice gesture, if 
no procedure is put in place to enforce these principles in a way that 
is compatible with the features of modern digital technologies: 
algorithms are constantly changed and updated, and simply 
requiring specific algorithmic features in legislation may not be 
easy, due to problems in verifying compliance.  
A possible and necessary improvement in current EU 
policymaking includes the transition towards principles-based, 
experimental legislation that adopts both ex ante and ex post 
technological means of enforcement. The principles-based nature of 
legislation ensures that as technology changes, market players and 
citizens are aware that the same set of overall principles and values 
are embedded in legislation, and that they are invariable to 
technological change. In the case of AI, as recently advocated by 
Renda (2019), this core set of rules should include EU core values 
and fundamental rights, principles of responsible AI generally 
accepted in the community of AI developers, as well as additional 
principles that will determine the EU’s specific approach to AI, 
which should include elements of complementarity between man 
and machine, responsibility in AI development, as well as 
sustainability.  
The experimental nature of EU legislation is essential in order 
to ensure that innovative services and business models have a 
chance to be tested before being admitted to the market, and that 
legislation is stringent enough to steer innovation, but flexible 
enough to allow new business models to enter the market and 
improve societal welfare. The use of techniques such as RCTs, real 
and virtual sandboxes, ideation sprints, regulation through browser 
extensions and third-party algorithmic auditing can help Europe 
strike the right balance between the precautionary principle and the 
innovation principle.  
Enforcement should also change: in data-rich digital 
environments, enforcement methods need to combine both ex ante 
and ex post techniques. Ex ante techniques include the obligation to 
leave audit trails in developing technologies, for future consultation 
by agencies and courts; the adoption of ‘privacy by design’ and 
‘fairness by design’ tools and standards in the development of AI 
systems; the adoption of blockchain-based solutions to ensure 
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decentralised control of compliance with legislation; and more. Ex 
post enforcement techniques increasingly require the use of bots to 
patrol internet traffic, the ex post auditing of algorithms, the 
imposition of strict liability rules and even compensation funds to 
ensure redress for users damaged by AI systems; and more. 
Most importantly, securing the single market through 
stringent, flexible and well-enforced legislation is only a first step 
towards leveraging the power of Europe’s 500 million consumers. 
In a world in which large superpowers are likely to adopt less 
stringent rules than the European ones, Europe will need additional 
tools to promote its laws and ensure that no ‘race to the bottom’ 
occurs in high-tech markets. These may include the use of 
certification (an ‘EU seal’ for high-tech products and services); the 
restriction to EU-certified products in public procurement; the 
introduction of specific safeguards in the use of high-tech products 
and services in trade agreements; and more. Only in this way, 
through a consistent set of rules and means to enforce them, can 
Europe aspire to becoming a global norm leader, offering market 
players a consistent, comprehensive environment in which new 
technologies are promoted, and users are adequately protected.  
10.3.3 Filling the empty throne: Europe as a leader in socially and 
environmentally sustainable technology 
It is often said, in the debate on new digital technologies and in 
particular on AI, that Europe lacks a ‘vision’ for the medium term. 
This, however, is not true. Europe already has a vision: Agenda 
2030, based on the Sustainable Development Goals. In launching 
Agenda 2030 back in 2016, and in renewing its commitment in 2019, 
the European Commission announced its plan to mainstream SDGs 
(in their European version, most likely more ambitious than the 
global one) in all aspects of EU policy, including the European 
Semester, cohesion policy, better regulation, and sectoral 
legislation. In the negotiations on the future Multiannual Financial 
Framework for 2021-2027, the EU institutions referred extensively 
to sustainable development in earmarking funds for specific areas 
of policy while the new EU research and innovation programme, 
Horizon Europe, widely refers to the SDGs. 
However, for some reason, when it comes to ‘mainstreaming 
SDGs’ in digital technology policy, there seems to be a reluctance on 
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the side of the EU institutions. This may be due to the need to 
preserve control of specific policy areas in specific parts of the 
European Commission, without subjecting technology policy to the 
control of DGs in charge of social and environmental sustainability. 
But the overall result is very regrettable, for two major reasons. First, 
Agenda 2030 will be weakened if digital technology policy lacks 
coherence with overall EU sustainable development strategy. 
Second, the rules adopted for digital technologies will also be 
isolated, and ultimately weaker. AI is a perfect example in this 
respect: asking what rules are best to promote European 
competitiveness in AI only provides part of the answer; much more 
important will be to ask how can AI help Europe reach its 2030 
goals. The latter include specific goals on decent work, reducing 
inequality, eradicating poverty and hunger, investing in human 
capital and eliminating gender bias; and on land use, water, the 
environment and energy among others. All these goals can be 
profoundly affected by AI developments, but the link is not being 
explicitly made, except by the global “AI for good” initiative 
launched by the United Nations. 
Developing a comprehensive policy framework to enable the 
contribution of digital technologies to the SDG agenda would 
ideally place the EU as global leader both in the SDG arena, as well 
as in the technological one. Other global powers have fewer 
incentives to go down this road, and are currently either in denial 
with respect to SDGs (US) or in a conflicted position that prevents 
them from adopting economically, socially and environmentally 
responsible rules (China).  
10.3.4 The data train has not (yet) left the station 
Too often EU policymakers complain that European companies 
cannot compete since data are firmly in the hands of a few large tech 
companies, mostly based outside Europe. And indeed, current 
figures show that the bulk of Western world data (an estimated 
92%) is currently stored in the United States, whereas only 4% is 
currently stored in Europe. If data, as many commentators say, were 
really the ‘new oil’, then there would be no possibility for Europe to 
compete on an equal footing with other superpowers. China is 
rising to the challenge by imposing data localisation requirements 
on all players that deal with Chinese consumers. In a nutshell, 
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everyone wants data, and if possible on their territory, and there is 
a growing belief that restrictions to data flows, including the ones 
introduced by the GDPR for the purposes of data protection, may 
hamper the development of digital technology, and the 
competitiveness of legal systems that dare to go down the road of 
strong privacy and data security standards. 
However, this is only a very static way of portraying reality. 
This is what has happened to date, but there is no reason to believe 
that it should happen in the same way, and to the same extent, in 
the future. In a word: the data train is still on the platform and has 
not left the station. Here’s why. 
First, in the B2C domain large online platforms have 
accumulated personal and non-personal data for several years, 
often without having to pay, and will most likely continue to do so 
on account of positive network effects, which tend to sustain and 
reinforce their position in the market. But to the extent that these 
data will be needed for services of general interest, or whenever 
these data will be found to represent a significant barrier to entry, 
public authorities will have the option of requiring access to specific 
datasets, or even imposing mandatory interoperability 
requirements on large technology giants. This would be a re-
proposition of the essential facilities doctrine in a new fashion, with 
a specific approach that dates back more than two decades in EU 
competition law, to cases like Magill, IMS Health, and Microsoft 
(Renda, 2010). Based on this approach, whenever a dominant 
market player holds an asset of information that is essential for 
competitors to viably compete in the relevant market, and refusal to 
provide access to this information is likely to either lead to the exit, 
or even prevent the growth of, ‘as efficient’ or even ‘not yet as 
efficient’ competitors, then competition law may provide for 
compulsory access remedies. Much in the same vein, the German 
government is now imposing compulsory access obligations to tech 
giants for specific datasets. In a recent paper for the European 
Commission’s DG COMP, Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de 
Montjoye and Heike Schweitzer echo this view by observing that 
“the ability to use data to develop new, innovative services and 
products is a competitive parameter whose relevance will continue 
to increase”; and clarified that “in a number of settings, data access 
will not be indispensable to compete, and public authorities should 
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then refrain from intervention. In other settings, however, duties to 
ensure data access – and possibly “data interoperability” – may 
have to be imposed”. The paper correctly points out that a “broader 
diffusion of data is not always desirable, either from a social welfare 
or from a competition perspective” due to privacy concerns; and 
that in addition to data interoperability, in some cases full protocol 
interoperability may be needed for competitors to be able to 
compete on an equal footing.  
Second, in the B2C domain, EU institutions could decide to go 
beyond data access and interoperability obligations, and adopt 
policies aimed at returning control of their data to end users, or even 
treat data ‘as labour’ whenever possible, as advocated recently by 
the Report of the High Level Expert Group on the Impact of the 
Digital Transformation on EU Labour Markets.121 This would lead 
to forms of remuneration from digital platforms to end users, which 
may take various forms, including the provision of free services, or 
a web tax along the lines currently considered by France, and which 
received a first political agreement in the G7 context in August 2019 
in Biarritz, France. In that case, the tax would be based on the 
consideration that the digital platforms derive (some would say, 
extract) value from the end users, who provide data in exchange for 
being part of the platform: the main theoretical argument in favour 
of such a form of redistribution is the ‘collective action problem’ 
faced by end users, who are structurally unable to place a price on 
the data they provide, while these data, once aggregated, become 
extremely valuable to the platform. This form of positive externality 
could be seen as the market failure that a web tax, or any other form 
of redistribution, would seek to remedy. This approach, however, 
would not lead to the creation of more competition in the market, 
or possibly even the entry of European players in the B2C segment.  
Third, and most importantly, the current wave of AI-enabled 
data analytics was spurred by one key factor: the explosion of digital 
data availability made possible by the first wave of the internet, 
which connected people across the globe. The availability of an end-
to-end digital environment in which ever-growing computing 
capacity and enhanced broadband connectivity led to the ‘zettabyte 
age’, an extremely information-rich environment in which the 
availability of data in digital form roughly doubles every year: 
someone, or better something has to process all that information, 
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and the use of AI has become inevitable to accompany this breath-
taking development. In 2018, the amount of data created every day 
had reached 2.5 quintillion bytes, and the data created in the last 
two years amounts to more than 90% of the data ever created. While 
this is already mind-boggling, it is also still the beginning, and not 
necessarily the most important development in the use of data to 
ensure productivity, growth and prosperity. Given the current 
evolution of the internet ‘of people’, it is not surprising to find that 
the data and AI applications that have been entering the 
marketplace over the past years, starting from chatbots and 
recommendation engines to end with AI-enabled cameras for 
smartphones and personal fitness applications, are often unrelated 
to emerging existential challenges for our planet such as climate 
change. The data we need to tackle the climate challenge, and 
improve our productivity in factories, has not been created yet, and 
will be massively created in the future thanks to development such 
as the internet of things, 5G and edge computing. But for these types 
of data, which most often pertain to the B2B or G2C (government-
to-citizens) domains, the there is no obvious leader around the 
world, and the processing of the information and related AI 
elaboration (in what is often called ‘embedded AI’) will take place 
more locally, and in a less standardised way compared to what 
happens in mass B2C markets.  
In other, simpler words, the race to collect and process data 
has just started, and Europe has a chance to get it right. While the 
US and China are increasingly engaging in a digital arms race, the 
use of digital technologies for sustainable development suffers from 
a chronic lack of leadership, which only the EU can try to fill. 
Current initiatives such as the proposed creation of an Inter-
Governmental Panel on Artificial Intelligence (modelled on the 
Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change), proposed by France 
and Canada within the G7, are meeting the resistance of the US and 
the silence of EU institutions, and may never be even seriously 
discussed. All this is occurring while the data related to climate and 
biodiversity are increasingly disastrous, and the widespread 
implementation data-hungry AI/IoT solutions appears as a 
necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition to bring the planet back 
towards a sustainable path (See Renda et al., forthcoming 2019). 
Rather than complaining about data that are stored in the US, EU 
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institutions could instead grasp that much more data will now be 
created by connected things, and data can even be created by 
regulators simply through requiring regulated entities to report 
data on compliance, in what is often termed ‘RegTech’, or 
technology-enabled regulation and public services.  
The adequate collection, processing and governance of data 
in support of Europe’s sustainable development strategy, and in 
compliance with EU data protection standards, is one of the key 
challenges for Europe in the years to come, The reassuring news is 
that this future is not written yet, and not compromised yet: but it 
takes a massive commitment, a significant investment and a certain 
amount of industrial policy to bring it about in a sustainable way 
from an economic, social and environmental perspective.  
10.3.5 New forms of governance for the single market  
One corollary of Europe’s ‘difference’ in digital technologies is that 
Europe has less to lose from moving from highly concentrated 
platform-to-consumer (P2C) markets towards more distributed 
governance forms. In fact, digital technologies today allow for forms 
of governance that were hardly feasible and cost-effective in the 
past. For example, the extreme redundancy of decentralised 
blockchain platforms such as Bitcoin is such that most existing 
applications have to sacrifice something in terms of speed of 
synchronisation, or in terms of scalability. But increasingly, the 
world of digital technology is making a broad variety of governance 
options available to policymakers.  
More specifically, the economies of scale that characterise the 
analogue world are much less present in the digital space. This, in 
turn, means that markets that previously displayed oligopolistic 
structures, given the need for large-sized firms that would be able 
to invest in plants, factories and heavy infrastructure, can now work 
in a much more agile way. And in many sectors, even tangible assets 
such as lorries, medical equipment, servers, or drones are now being 
‘uberised’, and require much less investment on the side of market 
players. If anything, economies of scale have now moved to data. 
This being the case, adopting interoperability obligations to enable 
more pluralistic market structures could also lead to configuring the 
single market in a much more fragmented way: as a common 
economic space in which public administrations share data between 
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themselves and with businesses (through open APIs); in which 
citizens have control of their data and choice between a variety of 
different providers; and in which small competitors can thrive and 
provide local solutions to local problems, on equal conditions 
throughout the territory of the Union. This does not imply as such 
that distributed, or even decentralised forms of governance will 
always be the most efficient; in some cases, however, despite not 
being the most efficient, they may prove the most sustainable in the 
long run, and those less prone to creating inequality and allowing 
the ongoing distancing between value creation and value extraction 
in the digital economy.  
10.4 Policy recommendations 
The new von der Leyen Commission has promised to focus on 
digital technology, pursuing the work of the Juncker Commission 
in the period 2014-2019. There is a lot to be done, and quickly, to 
make sure Europe catches the new wave of technological 
developments, after admittedly having missed the first one. Below, 
we offer some policy recommendations on how to fully leverage the 
potential of digital technologies for Europe’s competitiveness and 
sustainable development. 
10.4.1 Build a new industrial policy on trusted data spaces 
It is important that the EU rebalances the power of digital platforms 
in key sectors, by returning control of personal data to end users, 
and non-personal data to those market players that operate in the 
real economy, as close as possible to where value is created. Rather 
than the ‘free flow’ of data, what is most important is the controlled, 
managed and shared flow of data. And rather than data, trust 
should be the ‘new oil’: independently of how much data are used, 
the creation of trusted relationships through digital technology is 
the most important way for Europe to enhance its competitiveness 
and its vocation towards sustainability. Workers’ data, when used 
to enhance the profitability of algorithms, should be adequately 
remunerated.  
An important initiative, in this respect, would be to mobilise 
all public and private data resources to enable an unprecedented 
effort towards tackling the climate challenge through a smart use of 
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data, AI and the internet of things. This, as always happens with 
data, requires human resources to collect and annotate data from 
various sources, and make them interoperable by placing them into 
a common ‘data lake’, which could then be used by researchers to 
devise new solutions to the worrying climate and biodiversity 
trends. Having a common, shared pool of data could also lead to 
launching open prizes and challenges to address key societal and 
environmental risks. All in all, this is a collective effort that requires 
the mobilisation of massive resources: something that private 
players alone would not be sufficiently incentivised to undertake 
absent a strong lead by government. 
10.4.2 Invest in “embedded AI” for sustainable development 
While the United States and China fight for digital supremacy in the 
B2C space, Europe has an opportunity to leverage its advanced 
technological base and a solid set of legal and ethical principles to 
support investment in solutions that integrate AI and the IoT, 
creating value that can be leveraged for sustainable development. 
Against this background, the European Commission has shown at 
times determination, at times elusiveness in its approach to SDGs. 
Although sustainable development is considered a fundamental 
and overarching objective of the EU, enshrined in Article 3 TEU, and 
despite the existence of an EU strategy since 2001 and a set of 
Sustainable Development Indicators since 2005, the salience of this 
strategy at the highest political level had never been particularly 
strong before the launch of Agenda 2030: indeed, the EU was 
heavily criticised for lacking ownership and governance (Gregersen 
et al., 2016). Over the past few years, the European Commission has 
shown, at least in theory, strong commitment towards the SDGs, in 
particular in a series of communications that outlined the future 
Agenda 2030, centred on SDGs. This patchwork of initiatives, still 
lacking full coordination, is reflected in the state of advancement of 
the EU towards SDGs. Recently, in a stocktaking exercise of 
progress achieved over the past five years, Eurostat found that 
progress was strongest for SDG 3 (‘Good health and well-being’), 
SDG 4 (‘Quality education’) and SDG 7 (‘Affordable and clean 
energy’); slow or inexistent for other SDGs, and even negative on 
SDG 10 (‘Reduced inequalities’), due to the continued rise of income 
inequalities within member states.  
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Leveraging digital technologies to achieve sustainable 
development requires, inter alia, strong political will; specific, well-
coordinated industrial policy measures (e.g. the strategic value 
chains approach adopted by the European Commission’s DG 
GROW; but also the KICs, the Partnerships and the Missions 
launched by DG Research and Innovation; and the specific 
programmes such as “Digitising agriculture” launched by DG 
CONNECT); demand-side measures such as leveraging public 
procurement to create market opportunities for these technological 
solutions; and the use of taxation and regulatory incentives to steer 
market developments towards sustainable technological solutions. 
Such a complex mix of measures is something that the EU has 
proven to be capable of, but will require more coordination, 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement than in the past, and 
more agile forms of policymaking. 
10.4.3 Alternative visions for the single market 
As already explained, digital technologies make it possible to think 
about a more integrated single market, without always requiring 
the creation of large European champions. EU institutions should 
devote more attention to the study of alternative forms of 
governance, and evaluate them not only on the basis of economic 
efficiency (e.g. cost-cutting), but also in terms of their ability to 
trigger a sustainable, harmonious development of the European 
economy and society. In particular, the following actions appear 
essential during the life of the next Commission presided by Ursula 
von der Leyen.  
First, as many sectors of the economy feature an ongoing 
process of ‘servitisation’, the need to complete the single market for 
services (notoriously less developed than that for goods) becomes 
more compelling every day. The servitisation of the economy is a 
well-known process that largely pre-dates the internet era; however, 
the internet economy has become almost an ‘everything as a service’ 
economy. Devices are given to mobile customers as a service 
bundled with subscriptions (and in exchange for customer loyalty); 
cloud services dominate the market in a large part of the application 
layer; previously downloaded ‘to own’ software is now accessed 
online; and even large supercomputers such as GPUs and TPUs are 
made available on a usage basis through the cloud. Moreover, the 
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‘uberisation’ of passenger transport, accommodation, child care, 
handyman jobs, IT work (e.g. Mechanical Turk, Upwork) and low-
skilled jobs and many other markets has led to extreme situations in 
which humans, themselves, are offered ‘as a service’ (Prassl, 2018). 
Importantly, this leads to all imbalances of contractual power 
permeating relationships with no real safeguards offered by the 
legal system arising from contract law. One clear example is the 
application of product liability rules for cases in which software is 
provided as a service: since the scope of most product liability 
regimes does not include intangible goods, this means cases of 
inadequate services, careless advice, erroneous diagnostics and 
flawed information are as such not covered. A comparable situation 
exists in the field of product safety regulation, which so far has not 
been accompanied by a regulatory framework in the field of safety 
of services. In all these fields, the EU acquis appears far from 
complete, and will require more attention in the years to come.  
Second, the transformation of the economic structure and 
business models made possible by the digital economy will lead in 
many circumstances to a convergence between the alternative 
modes of governance used in information systems (centralised, 
distributed, decentralised) and the conceptual models used in EU 
public policy to address problems such as subsidiarity, 
proportionality and resilience. In this respect, as already recalled, it 
will be possible to imagine a single market based on a network of 
interoperable administrations at the local level, which share data by 
joining a common, trusted data space, and offering APIs to 
businesses and academics willing to develop services, or perform 
research activities. In this way, a common, multi-level ‘EU 
administrative space’ would be offered ‘as a platform’ to businesses 
of all sizes, potentially eliminating, or mitigating, the competitive 
edge currently available to larger tech giants due to network effects 
and ‘winner-takes-all’ competition. This possible configuration, at 
least in some areas of the single market, would require that all 
member states deliver on the Tallinn declaration and take steps to 
make programmes like ISA2 mandatory (see above, Chapter 7). 
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10.4.4 Step up as a global leader of ethical and sustainable use of 
digital technologies 
Europe must become a credible leader in setting a balanced 
approach to the regulation of the digital economy. Encouraging first 
steps were taken with the GDPR, and more recently with the Ethics 
Guidelines on Trustworthy AI adopted by the High-Level Expert 
Group on Artificial Intelligence, which were followed by policy and 
investment recommendations in June 2019. Much remains to be 
done, however, especially if one considers that this topic has been a 
nightmare for regulators when it comes to implementation and 
enforcement. The time is ripe to show how a safer, but still free and 
open internet can thrive thanks to adequate enforcement of 
principles-based regulation. At a time in which some countries 
already see the massive development of facial recognition (e.g. the 
US) and even forms of widespread social credit scoring (China), 
there is a clear need for strong leadership in urging the global 
community away from the weaponisation of cyberspace, as well as 
from a digital cold war.  
The new legislature, with the European Commission led by a 
former Minister of Defence (in Germany), will need to pay close 
attention to preserving a constructive global dialogue, especially if 
oriented towards sustainable development, rather than focused on 
‘mutually assured hacking’ (a new form of what used to be called 
‘mutually assured destruction’ in the domain of nuclear weapons). 
Currently, countries seem to be increasingly exhibiting diverging 
visions of the internet economy and policy, as noted, among others, 
by O’Hara and Hall (2018), who identify as many as four internets, 
including a US “commercial” internet, an EU “bourgeois” internet, 
a Chinese “authoritarian internet”, and a more vulnerability-
exploiting internet (mostly in Russia, Iran and North Korea). These 
diverging views are also echoed in end users’ preferences for 
specific policy priorities, such as protecting end-user privacy (Graf 
et al., 2016). These developments, coupled with the growing 
strategic importance of retaining control of internet infrastructure 
and the flow of data, ultimately led many countries to consider 
forms of ‘data sovereignty’ policies, as well as policies for ‘strategic 
autonomy’ as emerging priorities at the national and regional level 
(EPSC, 2019). Many countries are indeed discovering the enormous 
strategic importance of controlling the infrastructure, the data and 
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the computing capacity related to the new technology stack: notable 
examples are the querelle over the possible ban of Huawei from the 
deployment of 5G networks in the United States and beyond; 
Europe’s reported temptation to build its own European 
microprocessors and calls to launch an “Airbus for AI” as a form of 
industrial policy; and the European idea of building ‘data spaces’, 
which may evolve towards orchestrated ways to build European 
champions in key sectors such as automotive, healthcare, etc. 
Looming in this debate is also the growing competition between 
countries in securing advantage in new technologies such as 
quantum computing and cryptography (Gros et al., 2018); and the 
increased threat to national security represented by the expected 
boom in the internet of things over the next few years, which will 
expand the possible ‘attack surface’, thereby requiring enhanced 
control over data flows and ultimately, a likely deviation from 
internet openness principles. 
Against this background, it is to be expected that Europe will 
be tempted by sovereignty-oriented policies in the years to come. 
And in some cases, it will become clear that infrastructure such as 
the internet of things and 5G should be given enhanced attention, 
as they significantly expand the attack surface, possibly requiring 
massive investment in strengthening the EU’s cyber resilience and 
defence (Griffiths et al., 2019). But the real hidden treasure here is 
not strategic autonomy: there is indeed little merit in ring-fencing 
or even ‘hard-forking’ the internet. Rather, Europe’s hidden 
treasure is its superior ability to reconcile technology with fairness, 
quality and sustainability (see Epilogue below), widely involving 
civil society in its governance decisions. Current steps are 
encouraging (think about the AI Alliance, an unprecedented forum 
for discussion that tops almost 4,000 participants), but a lot more 
needs to be done in the years to come to make EU institutions 
champions of trust at home, and leaders of peaceful, sustainable 
development on a global scale.  
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11. EPILOGUE:  
FAIRNESS, QUALITY, SUSTAINABILITY  
AND TRUST AS THE COMMON FEATURES  
OF EUROPE’S HIDDEN TREASURES 
In a world increasingly dominated by nationalism, protectionism, 
short-termism and deteriorating trust, Europe still has a choice, and 
a challenge. The choice is whether to do “more of the same, and 
better” by adapting to a global governance regime largely modelled 
on the experience of other blocs, and in particular the United States; 
or to nurture, deepen and expand a unique European way, 
politically, economically and socially, creating a distinct form of 
capitalism that can easily compete with financial capitalism and 
state capitalism. If successful, Europe would create a truly tripolar 
world and set an example for many countries to emulate, especially 
those that share with the Old Continent legal traditions and values 
(e.g. Latin American, and many African countries).  
Europe can and should capitalise on its common deeper 
cultural and historical roots, longer history, and variety of 
experiences to learn from. But Europe also has a challenge: changing 
its governance to make the most of its invaluable wealth and 
political foundations and finding its post-Brexit identity by 
exploiting the aligned interests of continental European countries 
more fully. 
Our analysis of the hidden treasures in ten different areas of 
policy should not be taken as exhaustive, but rather as a collection 
of ‘low hanging fruits’, some admittedly hanging lower than others. 
Other treasures wait to be discovered, and we have already started 
to identify future candidates: for example, vocational training, 
nearly free access to higher education, increasing labour market 
participation (from 60% in 2008 to 70% in 2018), universal health 
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care coverage; and a better regulation agenda that is less slave to 
neoclassical economics. We believe that our recommendations, even 
if far-reaching, are actionable in policy terms during the legislature 
that has just started. They are the vanguard of several steps that 
should be taken to strengthen what is already strong. This is a cost-
effective way to make progress, less subject to resistance on the part 
of vested interests: we call on EU institutions to start from Europe’s 
strengths, rather that conceive of EU policies as always reacting to a 
(market) failure. This, in our humble opinion, should become a new 
modus operandi when crafting EU policies and strategies vis-à-vis 
European citizens and the global community. We also point at the 
need to work closely with the private sector, for example in putting 
the relationship between large companies and SMEs on a different 
footing in the interest of all and the economy at large. 
Our recommendations also show a remarkable degree of 
alignment, which we had not anticipated when we started our 
research. Such alignment, in our ex post reflection, falls into a few 
different buckets. We explore them one by one below.  
In the US and EU-27, fundamentally different views of the 
role of government prevail. Freedom to act and full ownership 
rights are important on both sides of the Atlantic; however, 
government regulation and taxation are seen in the US as attacks on 
these basic freedoms, while on the European continent regulation 
and taxation are forms of self-rule (Selbstgesetzgebung) enacted in 
order to protect economic freedom and, more generally, European 
citizens. In the US, this translates into perpetual antagonism 
between the state and its citizens.  
Such a difference also reverberates in distributional policies 
on the two sides of the Atlantic. Back in 2003, Alesina and Angeletos 
synthesised the approach to government in the US and the EU with 
very clear words: “pre-tax inequality is higher in the United States 
than in continental Western European countries … Nevertheless, 
redistributive policies are more extensive in Europe. The income tax 
structure is more progressive in Europe, and the overall size of 
government is about 50 per cent larger in Europe than in the United 
States”. These differences are also a consequence of different 
approaches to the concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ in the United 
States and in the EU. This appears to be more than a difference in 
implementation, and more than a constitutional divergence. As Eric 
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Foner (1998) explains in his history of American freedom, and as 
brilliantly echoed by Guido Calabresi (2016) in his analysis of 
equality in the US Constitution, the 14th amendment in the United 
States calls for a notion of equality that is substantive: as Calabresi 
recalls, citizens must “be willing to say, ‘in my back yard,’ ‘raise my 
taxes,’ ‘on my back,’ to achieve the substantive equality that the 14th 
amendment demands. Reneging on our 14th amendment promise of 
equality and avoiding paying the cost of achieving that equality 
ourselves: both of these are cursed in our Constitution”. To the 
contrary, today’s America seems to have embraced Nozick’s 
“minimalist state”, and ultimately a view of inequality-powered 
freedom that has little to do with the premises of the 14th 
Amendment. The Chicago School views of competition, and even 
more so Friedman’s view of shareholder capitalism, which was 
analysed in Chapter 3, must be seen and approached in this context. 
And the revival of trickle-down economics, with the recent tax 
reform as a concrete example, confirms America’s tendency 
towards a view of freedom ‘from’, rather than freedom ‘of’.  
These differences have profound consequences for many 
policy domains, for example securing fair competition and 
protecting privacy. In the US, competition rules are mostly for 
private players to settle private damages cases; whereas in the EU, 
they are largely entrusted to public authorities and enforced in the 
public interest (Renda et al., 2008). Provisions such as the “special 
responsibility of dominant players” and emphasis on the essential 
facility rule, among others, show how different EU antitrust is 
compared to the apparently similar rules applied on the other side 
of the Atlantic. Privacy rules in the US mostly refer to government 
interference with private life (e.g. the Fourth Amendment), whereas 
in the EU they also focus, and more prevalently, on the mishandling 
of personal data by private players. Tax rules are enforced in the 
name of mutual distrust between the IRS and the private sector in 
the US; in the EU, the search for fairness is frequently found to be in 
the general interest and the interest of the private sector.  
This book has argued that there is no need for the EU to feel 
bound by elaborations and evolutions that pertain explicitly to the 
Anglo-Saxon world. Europe has managed to maintain its economic 
growth per capita on a par with the US despite the latter’s many 
competitive advantages, ranging from one homogenous market for 
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goods and services and one legal and fiscal system to deep capital 
markets and the most advanced universities in the world. In 
keeping up, Europe has also managed to remain more sustainable, 
less unequal, and on average a leading continent in terms of quality 
of life, as was recently recalled by EU leaders in their Sibiu 
Declaration. 122 Against this background, Brexit increasingly seems 
like a ‘blessing in disguise’, as Europe can now pursue well-
established rules with new vigour, create new rules and build new 
institutions. This would provide remedies for some of the vexed 
problems that have emerged on the two sides of the Atlantic over 
the past decades. The analysis of the role and the merits of fairness 
and good faith in contract law, competition law, tax law and anti-
corruption policies in Chapters 1, 6, 7 and 8 go exactly in that 
direction. Our discussions of the role of relationship banking and 
the emergence of the European Enterprise Model in Chapters 2 and 
3 follow a similar pattern. Our view of innovation, outlined in 
Chapter 4, as a public-private endeavour, is very different from the 
perspective of Silicon Valley and Palo Alto as it is focused on legacy 
and emerging societal challenges. Innovation, in Europe, may be 
required to be ‘fair’ to society. Disruptive innovation is not 
necessarily good (as the verb disruptive suggests), unless it caters to 
the needs of society, and advances prosperity for all, not only the 
happy few.  
All this demonstrates that Europe can build a different and 
appealing narrative. Not necessarily a brand new one: to some 
extent, our fairness- and sustainability-centred vision of Europe’s 
hidden treasures can be traced back to the early days of economic 
theory, and to the renowned work of Adam Smith. Classical and 
neoclassical economics, including the Chicago School, largely 
referred to Smith’s rather elusive “invisible hand” to build a theory 
of minimalistic state presence in the economy. In contrast, in Smith’s 
Theory of Moral Sentiments the Scottish philosopher argued clearly 
and convincingly that justice, not efficiency, should be the basis for 
the distribution of rights in an economy. Justice, in Smith’s words, 
is “the main pillar that upholds the immense fabric of human 
society”. Europe’s unique balance between freedom (‘of’, not 
‘from’), and justice explains its unique legal and economic tradition. 
Fairness, reasonableness, good faith, pre- and post-contractual 
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obligations are time-tested principles and part of the heritage of 
continental Europe.  
This book also shows that these principles are crucial for 
meeting the economic challenges of our time: insufficient 
investment, lack of socially relevant innovation, and slowing 
productivity growth. Chapters 2 and 3 show that the Shareholder 
Model of capitalism fails conspicuously on all three fronts. As things 
stand, only the EU-27 can be home to alternative enterprise models 
that make a positive difference. Focus on the creation of economic 
value, rather than short-term profit, unshackles innovation and 
investments. And the counter-argument, that well-functioning 
financial markets would price in long-term economic value is no 
longer convincing. Financial markets are guided by profit per share, 
are driven by algorithms that can only take the past into account 
and are therefore blind to trend breaks and are subject to biases in 
decision-making and herd behaviour. The causal link between 
corporate value and share price has gone, the rudder of financial 
capitalism is broken.  
All this takes on new urgency as the global economy is 
appearing to run out of steam, the next recession is approaching 
rapidly, and central banks and governments have exhausted their 
ammunition for stimulating the economy (with the notable 
exception of Germany and some of its neighbours). 
This book leads to two additional, essential findings related 
to technology and sustainability. On the one hand, Europe can 
harness the potential of digital technology ‘for good’, by setting 
ethical and policy standards through the sheer size of its single 
market, as well as through procurement, certification and trade 
policy. Europe’s ‘secret sauce’ in digital technology can fill an 
existing gap in global governance, and help the ‘Old Continent’ find 
space for its approach to economic policy at the global level. This is 
crucially related to Europe’s ability to treat technology as a means, 
not an end: in this respect, the recent ethical guidelines on artificial 
intelligence and the effective implementation of legislation such as 
the GDPR, rules on web taxation and platform-to-business practices 
will be essential in gauging Europe’s ability to play a decisive role 
in this expanding space.  
This also leads to a more general consideration on the 
broader, long-term picture. Looking at current trends such as the 
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resurgence of nationalism in politics, deterioration in the rule of law 
(also in some European countries), new protectionist stances and 
tariff wars in trade, short-termism in social policy and recurring 
denials of climate change, the SDG agreement reached in September 
2015 by 193 countries seems to belong to a very distant era. In the 
absence of any strong political will, the pursuit of the SDG agenda 
looks more dependent on technological breakthroughs and global 
private initiatives than on the alignment of governmental agendas 
in leading blocs. The contribution of the business community is 
greatly hampered by the focus on shareholder return, which 
discourages further investment. Stimulating investment, such as in 
replacing plant and equipment will not just increase productivity, 
but be key to the future of companies while reducing their 
environmental footprint, a key sustainability objective.  
Only setting unequivocal standards will trigger such 
behaviour, and only Europe, today, can set these unequivocal 
standards. For now, with the exception of Scandinavian countries, 
all high-income countries are far from a trajectory that would lead 
them to achieve the 17 goals, and they struggle in particular with 
the four objectives related to sustainable consumption and 
production patterns, climate action, aquatic life and life on land. The 
EU has not shown enough ability to step up its efforts to date. 
Recently, in a stocktaking exercise of progress achieved over the 
past five years, Eurostat found slow progress in certain areas of 
sustainable development, and a worrying rise in inequality. It is 
now time to shift gear: the financial crisis is over, the Silicon Valley 
model is plateauing, and the world is witnessing the rise of less 
democratic, less open forces in both developed and developing 
countries, as well as in the private sector. The Old Continent can 
push back against these worrying trends. We believe Europe’s 
hidden treasures offer an essential, compelling starting point to 
rethink Europe by retrieving its lost identity and strengthening its 
self-confidence.  
Our recommendations are different from what is usual in EU 
circles. This flows for a large part from our methodology. We do not 
set targets for a limited number of key parameters, design policies 
to achieve those targets, evaluate progress and make policy 
adjustments. Rather, we take the world as it is – according to our 
analysis it is doing much better than prima facie evidence suggests – 
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and call for structural improvements. Hence the considerable 
differences in character and scope between our proposals. Still, we 
see three recurring themes.  
The first is a strong emphasis on implementation and 
enforcement. The EU has a plethora of promising policies, well-
thought-out regulations and high-quality legislation. However, in 
many instances implementation is below standard. This ‘delivery 
phase’ is the less glamourous, ill-funded and politically less 
convenient part of good government. And yet it is the area where 
Europe needs to improve the most. If the rule of law is important, 
we need to invest in our court system. If we believe in the common 
market it is about time that the European capital markets become 
operational. If we truly worry about corruption, we should make far 
more resources available for combatting it.  
The second common denominator of our recommendations is 
the improvement of the position of SMEs. Their crucial contribution 
to innovation, economic development and employment is widely 
recognised, and many support programmes have been put in place. 
We point out that in the rough and tumble of day-to-day operations, 
SMEs are far more vulnerable than generally assumed, and the EU 
acquis is still insufficiently tailored to their specific needs. Our 
proposals thus seek to help SMEs (re)gain access to the courts, 
prevent abuses of power by their larger business partners, 
streamline the appeals process of the EPO and improve protection 
against corruption.    
A third common denominator is an underlying emphasis on 
productivity, as a component of a long-term goal to improve living 
standards. The slowing down of productivity growth is a vexed 
problem and the diagnosis, let alone the solution, have escaped 
economists and politicians alike. In our view, this also happened 
because productivity was approached as a macroeconomic, not a 
microeconomic problem. As we show in Chapter 3, both the 
shareholder and the stakeholder model are deeply flawed and the 
responsibility for lower productivity growth should be laid at the 
doorstep of the boards and management of private companies and 
public institutions. Productivity growth is key to sustainable 
growth, as it requires focus on the prudent use of resources and on 
investment as each new generation of plant and equipment is far 
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more efficient and more environmentally friendly then the previous 
one.  
Moreover, our call for enabling fair, smart and flexible 
cooperation between large and small businesses is aimed at 
boosting productivity in the medium to long run, just as those for 
better access to capital, adopting a suitable enterprise model, and 
charting the way towards product, process and organisational 
innovation inspired by the pursuit of the common good. The same 
can of course be said for our proposals for the patent system, as well 
as those on competition and trade. We also believe that investment 
would be greatly facilitated by improvements in the tax system, as 
well as by a Europe free of corruption, which otherwise lowers 
productivity as a result of the mis-allocation of capital and human 
resources. And needless to say, we believe that digital technologies 
have the potential to massively improve productivity, but 
policymakers have to be wary of the sirens of ‘automation at any 
cost’. 
The final common denominator is that our proposals help to 
restore trust. Trust in the courts, trust in the banks, trust in large 
companies, trust between large and small companies, and overall 
trust in governments and EU institutions. The latter, after a 
worrying inflection, is now hitting new highs. And yet, the time is 
ripe for more agile, flexible institutions, able to deliver on policies 
that increasingly suffer from rapid obsolescence, and from pressure 
from other global superpowers aiming to outcompete each other. 
Our call to properly embed fairness in our institutions, in the 
economy and in work relationships is a necessary, albeit not 
sufficient, condition for trust to grow. No society and no economy 
can prosper on divisive policies, rising inequality and acrobatic 
economics. As the noise of post-truth geopolitics rises, and 
underlying patterns of development blur, Europe is increasingly 
forced to walk tall, rather than playing second fiddle, or dancing to 
someone else’s drum. And as a starting point in the quest for this 
new course, there are a profusion of hidden treasures.  
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1 See i.a., Moedas, C. (2016), Presentation of the report ‘Science, 
Research and Innovation Performance of the EU 2016’ 10 March 
2016, Lisbon Council. And the so-called “Lamy Report” (2017), 
“LAB-FAB-APP. Investing in the European future we want”. Report 
of the independent High Level Group on maximising the impact of 
EU Research & Innovation Programmes, which argues that Europe 
does not feature breakthrough innovation due to “a range of factors, 
including lack of venture capital, a deep rooted aversion to risk and 
an inability to exploit the scale that an economy of half a billion 
people represents” (page 12).  
2 For example, one of the candidates in a recent political debate ahead 
of the election s, Guy Verhofstadt, argued that “The best way to 
tackle Facebook is to have a European Facebook”. See 
https://sciencebusiness.net/news/bolder-action-climate-change-
and-curbs-us-internet-giants-dominate-eu-election-debate.  
3 Indeed, our search for hidden treasures was motivated by the 
realisation that European companies must have some source of 
competitive advantage that compensates for these structural 
American strengths.  
4  See the EU Justice Scoreboard 2018, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, COM(2018) 364 final. 
5 Common law has been very influential also in civil law countries, the 
most vivid example being antitrust law. For an analysis of common 
law transplants in a former communist country (Poland), see e.g. 
Gessel (2017).  
6 One of the potential negative consequences of Brexit is the possible 
reduction of regulatory competition and consequently, of 
regulatory innovation in Europe. See Eidenmueller (2018). 
7 But see contra, McChesney (1977). 
8 Unlike in many other legal systems around the world, English 
common law does not recognise a general contractual duty to act in 
good faith either when negotiating or when performing contracts.  
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9 Parties would need to compensate negative interest.  
10 In US law, good faith was incorporated, in the 1950s, into the Uniform 
Commercial Code (Section 1-304), and codified as Section 205 of the 
Restatement (second) of Contracts (1981). Most US jurisdictions 
apply only the notion of breach of contract, that gives rise to 
ordinary contractual damages; hence, they do not recognise the 
existence of a general duty of good faith which, in case of violation, 
would give rise to tort liability (compensatory damages and 
punitive damages). 
11 Another set of objections stresses the moral dimension inherent to the 
notion of good faith and therefore rejects it, in order to avoid a 
“moralisation of civil law”. 
12 As Observed by Deffains (2003): the obligation to facilitate the other 
party’s contractual performance or the obligation to ensure that in 
carrying out one’s contractual promises, one’s performance is 
useful, appear in French law as participating in the concrete 
realisation of the apparently moral precepts of good faith and 
loyalty that guide contract law. The famous adage, “to promise to 
do something is to promise to do something useful”, credited to 
Pothier (one of the French Civil Code’s ‘founding fathers’), 
illustrates the same ideas: if a party is under the obligation “to fulfil 
his promise in the most useful way for his partner, failing a contract 
that has spelt out the complete details of its performance” or if he 
must “endeavour to quash selfish, personal considerations in order 
to facilitate the successful undertaking of his creditor”, he is obeying 
one and the same legal rule, the rule of loyalty embodied in Article 
1134 of the Civil Code. In the same way, the duty to cooperate, that 
is to say the obligation for the debtor to perform his task in such a 
way as to ‘maximise utility’ is directly linked to the duty of loyal 
contractual performance. Logically, duties to inform can also be 
seen as related to loyalty.  
13 Garoupa and Morris (2012) list six important factors identified from 
the nineteenth century codification debate and their review of the 
efficiency literature for legal systems’ ability to generate economic 
growth: (1) the costs of identifying and applying efficient rules, (2) 
the system’s ability to restrain rent-seeking in rule formulation and 
application, (3) the cost of adapting rules to changing circumstances, 
(4) the transaction costs to parties needing to learn the law, (5) the 
ease of contracting around rules, and (6) the costs of transitions 
between systems. 
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14 See also Parisi et al. (2016). 
15 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-530_en.htm 
and the Recommendation on Collective Redress, paras. 21-24. 
16 In the Netherlands, the Rotterdam District Courts allows use of 
English since January 2016 in cases involving maritime, transport 
law and international sales of goods. The Netherlands is setting up 
a specialised court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC), to be 
opened in 2017/2018. In Germany, the District Courts of Aachen, 
Bonn and Cologne have started a pilot project where hearings can 
be conducted, and documentary evidence can be presented in 
English without interpretation. And in France since 2010, the 
International Courtroom of the Paris Commercial Court has been 
accepting hearings and processing of case documents in English, 
German and Spanish, while the final decisions have to be delivered 
in French. However, a proposal was made recently to create a 
specialised chamber within the Court of Appeal in Paris to deal with 
international trade and financial market disputes, applying 
common law where needed. See Batsaikhan, Kalcik and 
Schoenmaker (2017). 
17 https://www.iptalks.eu/key-issues/sme-manifesto/ 
18 European Commission (2015), Action Plan on Building a Capital 
Markets Union. 
19 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/patient-capital/ 
20 A recent report by the New Economics Foundation (2018) confirms 
the view that stakeholder banks can deliver broader social and 
economic value. They fulfil a social mission and have a strong 
positive impact on local economic development. In general, they 
deliver more stable returns and lending than commercial banks and 
performed well during the financial crisis. 
21 International Financial Reporting Standards, usually called IFRS, are 
standards issued by the IFRS Foundation and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to provide a common global 
language for business affairs so that company accounts are 
understandable and comparable across international boundaries.  
22 See Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2019, More US Companies 
Separating Chief Executive and Chairman Roles, at 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-u-s-companies-separating-
chief-executive-and-chairman-roles-11548288502.  
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23 See Renda, A. (2019), Helping the EU Win the Trust Game, CEPS 
Commentary, at https://www.ceps.eu/helping-the-eu-win-the-
trust-game/ 
24 Among others, Westman (2015) observes that failures in bank 
corporate governance have been seen as a contributing factor to 
excessive risk-taking pre-crisis with devastating implications as 
risks realised during the financial crisis, and empirically finds a 
positive impact of management ownership in small diversified 
banks and non-traditional banks. Her final sample included 95 
listed and 105 unlisted banks from 35 European countries, more 
than two thirds of which headquartered in a western European 
country. She finds support for the finding of Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011) that aligning shareholder and management interests by 
means of shareholdings induced managers to take on too much risk. 
25 COM (2008) 396/3 of 25 June 2008. 
26 See, for an even more critical account, Martin Parker, Why we should 
bulldoze the business school, The Guardian, 27 April 2018, at 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/apr/27/bulldoze-
the-business-school 
27 See IESE Cities in Motion Index at 
https://media.iese.edu/research/pdfs/ST-0509-E.pdf. 
28 The European Commission in its contribution to the informal meeting 
of ministers of innovation in Sofia observes that “Europe is 
experiencing an innovation deficit. This is not down to a lack of 
ideas or initial start-ups: the problem is rather a lack of scale-up and 
diffusion, with innovations not always being translated into new 
market and growth opportunities”. See Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. A renewed European Agenda for 
Research and Innovation - Europe's chance to shape its future. The 
European Commission’s contribution to the Informal EU Leaders’ 
meeting on innovation in Sofia on 16 May 2018, COM/2018/306 
final. 
29 Examples include the US standards on particulate matter (PM2.5), 
which are far more stringent than in Europe, and are also more 
strictly enforced. More generally, the authors have expanded the 
number and diversity of qualitative case studies to risk connected to 
food safety (genetically modified foods, beef hormones, mad cow 
disease), air pollution, climate change, nuclear power, tobacco, 
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chemicals, marine and terrestrial biodiversity, medical safety, 
terrorism and precaution embodied in risk information disclosure 
and risk assessment systems. In addition to detailed case studies, 
they also presented a broad quantitative analysis of specific 
precaution based on a sample of 100 risks drawn from a dataset of 
nearly 3,000 risks from the 1970s up to 2004 in both the United States 
and the EU. The results suggest that the degree of precaution 
exhibited in European and American risk regulation is very similar: 
averaging across the 100 risks sample over a 35 year period, there 
are 36 risks that show greater US precaution and 31 risks that show 
greater EU precaution. In the quantitative analysis the authors find 
no difference between the relative levels of precaution. 
30 https://www.bcg.com/en-be/publications/2018/how-diverse-
leadership-teams-boost-innovation.aspx 
31 https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/Projekte/ 
Vielfalt_Leben/ ExecSummary_LW_The_ Diversity_Factor_2018.pdf 
32 Political guidelines for the next European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, Candidate for President of the European Commission, 22 
October 2014. “I want to promote a new European policy on legal 
migration. Such a policy could help us to address shortages of 
specific skills and attract talent to better cope with the demographic 
challenges of the European Union. I want Europe to become at least 
as attractive as the favourite migration destinations such as 
Australia, Canada and the USA. As a first step, I intend to review 
the ‘Blue Card’ legislation and its unsatisfactory state of 
implementation. I also believe that we need to deal more robustly 
with irregular migration, notably through better cooperation with 
third countries, including on readmission.”  
33 At companies like Facebook, not only is the median salary of an 
engineer $240,000, but Facebook’s stock has also increased 268% 
over the past five years. Therefore, the risk-reward equation for an 
employee with a hefty salary and competitive stock options to leave 
a large company to go to a start-up is a much, much harder 
calculation than it has been historically in the Valley. 
34 See European Commission Staff Working Document, “Better 
regulations for innovation-driven investment at EU level”, SWD 
(2015) 298 final, 15 December 2015. 
35 See e.g. https://bankwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ 
same-thing-EFSI.pdf 
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36 See https://rio.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/library/supply-and-demand-
side-innovation-policies.  
37 See the European Commission’s Interim evaluation report on the 
Horizon 2020 programme, available online at 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/evaluations/pdf/book_interim_ev
aluation_horizon_2020.pdf#view=fit&pagemode=none  
38 Ibid. 
39 In the Netherlands, SBIR has an annual budget of €2.5 million and 
takes the form of a competition: businesses with the best offers are 
awarded a feasibility study. Those companies with the most 
promising studies receive funding to further develop their products. 
In 2017, 89% of the petitioners were small businesses. Companies 
working on blockchain, mobility and renewable energy received 
early-stage funding from the programme. 
40 See Mazzucato report (2018), on FET Flagships: “the FET Flagships 
have not so far put the same emphasis on public engagement or on 
defining goals and milestones in terms of societal relevance, even 
though they do aim to turn scientific and technological 
developments into innovations that can be brought to market, and 
aim to support societal challenges. The experience from the current 
FET flagships should prove valuable for designing and 
implementing future missions, and applying the selection criteria, 
implementation requirements and public engagement criterion 
proposed here could increase the impact and visibility of FET 
flagships as future missions”. 
41 Harberger speaks of two types of growth. One is characterised as 
“mushroom” growth, in which a limited number of sectors, 
industries or firms deliver much better productivity performance 
than others. “Yeasty” growth occurs when the productivity 
improvements spread more widely across the economy. Similarly, 
Carlota Perez (2002) speaks of an "installation phase" versus a 
"deployment phase" of a new technological paradigm.  
42 See the USPTO Congressional Justification for Fiscal year 2020, March 
2019. 
43 Interestingly, the complaint alleges that AbbVie entered into 
unlawful market division agreements with the biosimilar 
manufacturers, which permit competition in Europe, but which 
delay biosimilars in the US market until at least January 2023 
(UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund v AbbVie Inc., March 18, 2019). 
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44 The Economist, Time to Fix Patents, 8 August 2015. And see also the 
reply on Forbes by Marshall Phelps on Forbes, quoting extensive 
literature, https://www.forbes.com/sites/marshallphelps/2015/ 
09/16/do-patents-really-promote-innovation-a-response-to-the-
economist/#2b14cfa71921.  
45 http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2017-
chapter2.pdf 
46 In the conclusion of the European Council in Lisbon (March 2000), it 
was hoped that by 2001 a Community patent would be available for 
European applicants. As the Union replaced the Community, the 
“Community” patent became the “unitary” patent. Of course, the 
use of “European” was precluded to avoid confusion with the title 
granted by the European Patent Office under the EPC. 
47 The Commission focused only on the first two sources in their ex ante 
impact assessment (SEC 2011 482 final 13.4.2011) 
48 See Case AT.39612 - Perindopril (Servier). On 9 July 2014, the 
Commission imposed fines totalling EUR427.7 million on the 
French pharmaceutical company Servier and five generic 
companies for curbing entry of cheaper versions of cardiovascular 
medicine and thereby violating Article 101(1) of the TFEU. In 2006, 
Servier had launched an infringement proceedings against Apotex 
before the UK courts, claiming infringement of a patent and 
applying for an interim injunction. On 6 July 2007, almost a year 
after the EPO Opposition Division had confirmed its validity, the 
High Court found the English part of the patent invalid. See 
Judgment [2008] EWCA Civ 445, Case No A3/2007/1715, 
paragraphs 9 and 10 (ID5149).  
49 http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2018/06/14/leading-german-
patent-law-firms-criticize-epo-examination-proceedings/ 
50 https://www.iptalks.eu/key-issues/sme-manifesto/ 
51 See Prof. Ansgar Ohly. “The rejected complaint shows just how anti-
competitive a law of unfair competition would or might be. What 
one man calls ‘unfair’ another calls ‘fair’. (…) I think there are real 
difficulties in formulating a clear and rational line between that 
which is fair and that which is not, once one goes outside the 
requirement of no deception.” (L‘Oréal v Bellure, [2007] EWCA Civ 
968 at paras 139, 140 per Jacob LJ).  
52 Regulation 1/2003 – while introducing a “convergence rule” (Article 
3 para. 2) that seeks to create a level-playing field by providing for 
234 | NOTES 
 
a single standard of assessment for agreements, concerted practices 
and decisions by associations of undertakings (Article 101 TFEU) – 
does not prevent member states from enacting or maintaining rules 
that are stricter than Article 102 TFEU (formerly Article 82 EC). 
More specifically, Article 3(2) of Regulation 1/2003 allows Member 
States to enact or preserve legislation on unilateral conduct that is 
stricter than Article 102 TFEU; however, the same paragraph does 
not allow member states to apply rules that exactly mirror Article 
102 TFEU in a stricter way than at EU level under the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the EU. 
53 See Vestager’s speech, “Fairness and competition”, GCLC Annual 
Conference, Brussels, 25 January 2018.  
54 Interestingly, the early jurisprudence of EU courts led to a significant 
emphasis on the need to preserve “workable competition”. For 
example, see the Court of Justice decision in Case 26/76 Metro v 
Commission [1977] ECR 1875 (so-called Metro I decision).  
55 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/02-682P.ZO 
56 https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/USA.pdf 
57 As stated by Byrnes (2017), “the actual amount of tax collected by 
FATCA is statistically insignificant.” Casi et al. (2018) find that since 
the enactment of the Automatic Exchange of Information in 2013, 
and more specifically for the period 2014-2017, the CRS induced a 
reduction of 14% in cross-border deposits parked in offshore 
locations for tax evasion purposes; however, such wealth and 
related income has not been repatriated but rather moved to new 
locations to avoid domestic tax obligations. In particular, the US has 
emerged as a “potentially attractive location for cross-border tax 
evasion”. Zucman (2013) finds that around 8% of worldwide 
household wealth is located in tax havens. Alstadsæter et al. (2018) 
show that average values vary significantly across the world. 60% 
of the wealth in tax havens is held in the Gulf and certain Latin 
American countries, while only 15% in continental Europe and even 
less in Scandinavia. Moreover, Hanlon et al. (2015) estimate a tax 
gap of around $8 billion to $27 billion caused by US investors’ 
round-tripping activities. 
58 Amending Protocol to the Agreement between the European 
Community and the Swiss Confederation providing for measures 
equivalent to those laid down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC on 
taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments 
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59 Willem Pieter de Groen (2015), Corporate Taxation in Europe: Let's 
get it together! CEPS Commentary. 
60 A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 
Key Areas for Action, European Commission, Communication, 17 
June 2015. 
61 The proposal builds on Action plan 13 of the OECD initiative against 
BEPS (OECD 2015e) but goes beyond the initial OECD proposal in 
that it requires MNEs to publicly disclose the information rather 
than confidentially reporting it to national tax authorities. 
62 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/inequality-and-tax-rates-
global-comparison 
63 See European Parliament, Report on financial crimes, tax evasion and 
tax avoidance (2018/2121(INI)), Special Committee on financial 
crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance. At  
64 OECD (2014), The rationale for fighting corruption, Background brief. 
65 RAND Corporation (2016), The Cost of Non-Europe in the area of 
Organised Crime and Corruption, European Union. 
66 Notices from European Union institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies, European Council, The Stockholm PROGRAMME — An 
open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens (2010/C 115/01). 
67 PwC, Ecorys (2013), Identifying and Reducing Corruption in Public 
Procurement in the EU, available online at: 
corruption_in_public_procurement_en.pdf 
68 Global Integrity (2018), The Global Integrity Report, 
https://www.globalintegrity.org/. 
69 Transparency International (2017), G20 Leaders or Laggards? Reviewing 
G20 Promises on Ending Anonymous Companies, available online at: 
publication/g20_leaders_or_laggards 
70 Transparency International (2015), Exporting Corruption. Progress 
Report 2015: Assessing Enforcement of the OECD Convention on 
Combatting Foreign Bribery, available online at: 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/exportin
g_corruption_progress_report_2015_assessing_enforcement_of_the
_oecd 
71 Higher indicator values reflect a better performance. 
72 The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) assesses the 
competitiveness of over 130 countries based on 12 pillars, including 
aspects related to ethics and corruption in the public and the private 
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sector. Based on a survey of business (small, medium, and large 
enterprises), the GCI compiles individual scores for the level of 
ethics and corruption in the public sector, as well as for the level of 
corporate ethics. The former refers to the perceived level of public 
funds diversion, public trust in politicians, as well as the frequency 
of irregular payments to public institutions. The latter captures the 
perceived level of ethical behaviour of firms in their interactions 
with public officials, politicians or other firms. World Economic 
Forum (2018), Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, available 
online at https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-
competitiveness-report-2017-2018. 
73 Conviction rates for corruption offences could serve as an additional 
indicator to measure anti-corruption efforts. To this end, the 
European Commission has developed an EU-wide data collection 
project in order to gain a comprehensive overview of the state of 
play in each member state. However, the classifications of 
corruption offences as well as the indicators available vary between 
the member states, thus rendering it difficult to create a fully formed 
picture of corruption convictions at the EU level. (European 
Commission (2016), Collection of official data on corruption offences, 
docs/official_corruption_statistics_2011_2013_jan16_en.pdf).  
74 Center for Public Integrity (2015) State Integrity Investigation. 
75 Transparency International (2017), Access all areas: when EU politicians 
become lobbyists, available online at: http://transparency.eu/access-
all-areas/ 
76 EBRD and World Bank (2015), Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey, https://ebrd-beeps.com/reports/beeps-
v/beeps-v-report/ 
77 UNODC, Corruption prevention to foster small and medium-sized 
enterprise development, Vol. II, available online at: 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/20
12/Corruption_prevention_to_foster_small_and_medium_size_ent
erprise_development_Vol_2.pdf= 
78 Ibid. 
79 European Commission (2017), Special Eurobarometer 470. Corruption. 
80 European Commission (2017), Flash Eurobarometer 457: Businesses’ 
attitudes towards corruption in the EU. 
81 European Commission (2014), EU Anti-Corruption Report, COM(2014) 
38 final. 
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82 RAND Corporation (2016), The Cost of Non-Europe in the area of 
Organised Crime and Corruption. 
83 Frans Timmermans (2017), Letter to Claude Moraes, MEP, Chair of the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), European 
Parliament, ARES(2017)455202, 25 Jan. 2017, Brussels. 
84 See the recent Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of persons reporting on 
breaches of Union law, COM/2018/218 final - 2018/0106 (COD). 
85 Brookings Institution (2018), Global Metro Monitor 2018, available 
online at https://www.brookings.edu/research/global-metro-
monitor-2018/ 
86 ‘Domestic’ here means ‘intra-EU’. In 2006 the Commission published 
a strategic trade policy document called ‘Global Europe’ [ COM 
(2006) 567 of 4 Oct 2006], the main tenets of which are still followed 
in EU trade policy today. The quote is from the Commission Staff 
Document [background paper, as SWD (2006) 1230, p. 11].  
87 The term ‘European business’ comprises enterprises owned by 
Europeans (possibly also operating in other parts of the world) as 
well as non-EU companies doing business in Europe.  
88 The following is based on three surveys: European Commission 
(2015), OECD (2017) and IMF/World Bank & WTO (2017). 
89 EEA is the European Economic Area, i.e. the EU-28 plus Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein (these three countries are fully in the 
single market, except for fisheries and agriculture). 
90 Such as Alcala & Ciccone (2004) with a ratio of 1.23%; Ahn et al. (2016) 
is slightly more specific: when cutting tariffs on inputs by 1%, the 
total factor productivity in that sector improves by no less than 2%.  
91 See Pelkmans, Hu, di Salvo, Francois et al. (2018), pp. 240/1 for data; 
the figure of up to €600 benefit for consumers is the result of an 
analogy with several empirical US studies (e.g. Hufbauer & Lu, 
2017). 
92 See Autor, D. et al. (2014); Autor, D., D. Dorn & G. Hanson (2016).  
93 See Metivier, di Salvo & Pelkmans (2017) for a comparative analysis 
between the US and the EU of the cushioning and adjustment 
support of workers unemployed due to trade. 
94 See Cernat & Mustilli (2017) for a detailed and careful assessment. 
95 ‘Plurilaterals’ are agreements between a subset of WTO countries on 
a well-defined aspect of WTO rules (like public procurement or 
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‘green goods’). Plurilaterals go further in liberalisation than other 
members of the WTO accept at a certain point in time. However, 
plurilaterals must be ‘open’ for all WTO countries. 
96 Thus, for example, the EU/Turkish customs union of 1995 includes a 
very long list of technical regulations (from the EU) for goods and 
reference to many thousands of related technical European 
standards for Turkey to be incorporated in their laws.  
97 TRIPs is about minimum regulatory levels of protection of IPRs as 
well as enforcement; TRIMs are about trade-related investment 
measures; TBTs are about the disciplines for technical barriers; SPS 
is about common rules, based on scientific risk assessment, for food 
and feed, including animal products.  
98 EU trade agreements which have to be signed by EU member states 
as well are called ‘mixed agreements’.  
99 Remember the recent problems caused by the regional parliament of 
Wallonia for the ratification of CETA.  
100 ‘Good [or, ‘better’] regulation’ is defined as regulation justified 
correctly by market failures, and proportional to the risk(s) 
involved, while considering various alternative regulatory options 
before choosing the one minimising the costs to market participants 
or the one with the highest benefit/cost ratio.  
101 The fifth freedom, not formally recognised in the Lisbon treaty – only 
in secondary legislation, consists of the free movement of codified 
technology (embodied technology moves freely anyway) in know-
how agreements and IPRs, with the crucial European Unitary Patent 
waiting for ratification. 
102 See the annual World Bank indicators on Doing Business: 
www.doingbusiness.org; these are, for the most part, aspects of the 
national institutions and how (well) they operate (paying taxes, 
getting electricity, construction permits, resolving insolvency, 
getting credit, starting a business, registering property, etc.). 
103 Like the ones from IMD or the WEF. Economists tend to have 
problems with the arbitrariness and subjective nature of the 
measures, as well as the intrinsic incomparability between countries 
of what are subjective impressions of local managers and opinion 
leaders. Nevertheless, this does not mean that many of the 
numerous aspects listed in these Indices are irrelevant for the 
performance of enterprises and the benefits for consumers. 
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104 Just to illustrate, in 2003 7 of the 10 top performers were EU member 
states or candidate members. By 2015 8 of the top 20 reformers still 
were EU member states and the differences between the higher 
scores became smaller.  
105 European Commission, SWD(2017) 439 of 10 Jan 2017, Proposal for 
a Regulation introducing e-card services, Impact Assessment, 
Annex 4, pp. 102 – 132, comprising an ex post evaluation of the 
working of the services directive. It shows that implementation is 
unsatisfactory. The difficulties in getting member states to improve 
on the implementation of the services directive are extensively 
documented in Pelkmans (2019, chapter 3).  
106 The only important result (after 12 years of negotiating) is the WTO 
Trade Facilitation Agreement concluded in Nairobi in 2015. It is of 
importance for developing countries as they have relatively high 
costs and time-loss in logistics connected to customs, port handling 
and some regulatory verification procedures. In fact, it results in 
pure cost-cutting (after some minor investments) and there are no 
losers. OECD countries gain too but less. 
107 It should not be forgotten that this applies to countries outside 
Europe. In Europe, the EU-12 had grown into EU-15 (1995) with the 
EU membership of Austria, Finland and Sweden, followed by the 
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Europe is often presented as a declining global power, in which red 
tape, incumbency interests and governance flaws hamper economic 
performance, innovation and productivity. In fact, Europe has done 
very well despite the wide array of America’s competitive advantages – 
and its ‘hidden treasures’ partially explain this anomaly. In the future, 
while cracks in the fabric of US society and the American approach to 
entrepreneurship may widen, Europe and its entrepreneurs can build on 
their strengths.
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with contributions from Willem Pieter De Groen, Karel Lannoo, Felice 
Simonelli, Nadina Iacob and Jacques Pelkmans, aims at identifying 
and exploring Europe’s ‘hidden treasures’, often neglected competitive 
advantages that could, if adequately nurtured, bring the ‘Old Continent’ 
back to the forefront of the global order.
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